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Abstract 
British psychiatry is dominated by a biological model of mental illness. To date, there 
has been considerable research which has focused on the validity of the biological of 
mental illness. There has been a dearth of research which has aimed to investigate the 
social impact of the biological model by reference to mental health service users' 
perspectives. Indeed, overall there has been little research that has aimed to evaluate 
mental health service provision by means of an analysis of service users' views. In the 
research that has been carried out previously, the specific issues affecting women 
service users have often been overlooked. This thesis contends that women service 
users' experiences must be taken into account in order to effectively analyse the 
operation of the mental health system. The research is based on interviews with 
women mental health service users and ex-users. These interviews suggest that many 
women are dissatisfied with mental health service provision. A recurrent criticism 
made by the interviewees was that they felt objectified by medical professionals who 
did not allow them to become involved in decisions relating to their treatment. In 
some cases the women described how oppressive experiences that were significant in 
causing their mental health problems were repeated within statutory service 
provision. The majority of participants criticised the policy of 'care in the community' 
for failing to address their needs; they opposed the programme of psychiatric hospital 
closure despite expressing reservations about hospital treatment. In this thesis it is 
argued that women's dissatisfaction with statutory mental health service provision 
often stems from the inherently conservative nature of psychiatry. The biological 
model serves to disempower service users, whilst providing a secure power base for 
psychiatrists. It also serves to divert attention from oppressive social processes and 
plays a role in maintaining the social status quo. 
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Introduction 
An investigation of community care provision for women mental health 
service users formed the initial focus of this research. The declared aim of the 'care in 
the community' policy was to redirect expenditure on mental health services to 
community based 'needs-led' services that would enable service users to remain 
within their own homes or in a 'homely' environment within the community (RMSO 
1989). In line with this policy a programme of psychiatric hospital closure has been 
implemented. However, in the development of community care provision, the 
particular needs of women have often been ignored. The 'All Wales Strategy for 
Mental Illness Services' (Welsh Office 1989) and the 'Welsh Office Agenda for 
Action in Housing' (Welsh Office 199 1 a) for example, made no particular mention of 
women, despite the fact that government statistics at the time indicated a higher 
incidence of diagnosed mental health problems among women (Welsh Office 199 1 b). 
Some commentators have suggested that women service users' may have a particular 
need for a residential place of safety in order for their mental health to improve 
(Williams, Watson, Smith, Copperman and Wood 1993, Ussher 1991). Consequently, 
I initially set out to examine women service users' views on the type of mental health 
services that they found most effective, and I was particularly interested in whether 
women service users perceived a need for a residential mental health service. 
As the study progressed, however, it became apparent that a fundamental 
issue underlying the organisation and proVision of mental health services for women 
relates to the model of mental health and illness that is utilised within psychiatry. The 
biological model is the dominant approach within psychiatry, and has a considerable 
impact upon the organisation of statutory mental health services in Britain. The 
biological model also has a significant effect upon the type of treatment that statutory 
services offer women who are perceived to have a mental health problem. In order to 
adequately investigate statutory mental health service provision for women, the 
biological model of mental illness must comprise a central consideration. To date, 
there has been a plethora of research concerning the validity of the biological model 
of mental illness. However, there has been very little research which has examined the 
effects of the biological model by reference to the perspectives of service users 
themselves. In this research I evaluate statutory mental health service provision for 
women, by means of an analysis of the effects of the biological model of mental illness 
on women service users' experiences. 
The acknowledgement of issues relating to the experiences of fear, sadness 
and unintelligibility are common to most human societies (Rogers and Pilgrim 1996). 
Historically, however, there has been no universal cross-cultural agreement as to how 
these conditions should be analysed and understood. In contemporary Britain there 
are a variety of terms that are commonly used to describe these conditions, such as 
'madness'; 'mental illness'; 'mental health problem'; 'mental distress'; 'mental 
disorder' and 'emotional distress'. The semantic variety in the discourse relating to 
issues of mental health and illness are often related to different approaches amongst 
stakeholder groups in the conceptualisation and treatment of mental health problems 
(Rogers and Pilgrim 1996). The term 'mental illness' forms part of the medical 
discourse found in the statutory mental health system in Britain. The term 'mental 
health problem' forms part of the discourse of many mental health service user groups 
(such as MIND for example) who question the dominant approach used within 
psychiatnc practice. 
In this research I generally use the term 'mental health problem' to discuss the 
range of psychological problems experienced by the mental health service users who 
participated in my research. However, I use the term 'mental illness' when I am 
discussing the biomedical approach utilised within mainstream psychiatry. I 
occasionally use the term 'madness' when discussing particular theorists who 
conceptualise psychological problems using this term (Foucault 1967 for example). 
In this research I use the term 'statutory mental health system' to refer to the 
range of mental health services which are funded by central government. Statutory 
mental health services are predominantly provided by GPs; psychiatrists; 
psychologists; social workers; psychiatric nurses; and occupational therapists. Outside 
the statutory mental health system, services are also provided by voluntary sector 
organisations, such as mental health service user groups (for example the Manic 
Depression Fellowship; the National Schizophrenia Fellowship; and MIND); and 
housing organisations offering limited practical and emotional support. In this 
research I use the term 'mental health service user' to refer to a person who has 
received medical treatment and/or social care and support through a mental health 
agency, in either the statutory or voluntary sector. This service use may have been 
sought by them voluntarily, or may have been imposed upon them by an application 
of a section of the Mental Health Act 1983 (HMSO 1983). 
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Introduction 
In this chapter I review the literature which provides the background to my 
research. I begin with a consideration of the biological model of mental illness, as 
this is the dominant approach utilised in British psychiatry (section 1.1). In the 
following section, I discuss the definition of mental illness and consider the process 
of defining and diagnosing mental illness that is used within psychiatry (section 1.2), 
In section 1.3 1 discuss previous research which has indicated some of the effects of 
the biological model on service users. One outcome of the dominance of the 
biological model is that mental health service users are usually prescribed physical 
treatments (such as medication and electro-convulsive therapy) in an attempt to cure 
or control the illness with which they have been diagnosed (section 1.4). In this 
chapter I also consider the stigma surrounding mental health service use (section 
1.5) and examine the development of the policy of care in the community (section 
1.6). There is considerable evidence that this policy has not been informed by the 
perspectives of service users, and in particular, the specific needs of women service 
users have often been ignored. In the final sections of the chapter I consider research 
which suggests that mainstream psychiatry itself contributes to the disempowerment 
of women mental health service users (see sections 1.7,1.8). 
1.1 The biological model of mental illness 
In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, a process began in which a list of deviant 
behaviour which had previously been described as heresy, sin, witchcraft and 
possession by demons, were renamed and reclassified as mental illnesses (Szasz 
197 1, Foucault 1967). This led to the creation of the medical specialism of 
psychiatry which aims to diagnose, treat and cure individuals thought to be suffering 
with a mental illness. 
Within modern psychiatry there are a range of different approaches in 
understanding and treating people who are perceived to have a mental illness. These 
approaches can be divided broadly into three major schools of thought as to the 
aetiology and treatment of mental illness - the biological model, the psychodynamic 
model and the behavioural model. This is a simple differentiation as there are 
differences within these schools of thought and there are also other, less popular 
approaches which psychiatrists and other mental health professionals may utilise. In 
this section I discuss the biological model of mental illness, as this approach has a 
fundamental significance for the way that psychiatric services are organised and 
delivered within Britain. 
Proponents of the biological model of mental illness argue that a whole range 
of emotional states and forms of behaviour (for example those that are often 
diagnosed as depression, anorexia, bulimia, alcoholism, schizophrenia and manic 
depression) are indicative of a biological abnormality or disease, usually (though not 
necessarily) located within the brain (Kramer 1993, Guze 1989, Trimble 1988, 
Andreasen 1984, Kety 1978). Many proponents of the biological model have 
asserted that social factors play a role in the aetiology of mental illness, to the extent 
that they provide a 'trigger' for mental illnesses to develop in individuals who 
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already have the biological prerequisites for the disease (see for example Kramer 
1993, Kety 1978, Lader 1975, Mendels 1973, Rosenthal 1971), In particular it has 
been argued that there is a genetic 'predisposition' to mental illness. This 
I predisposition', in the form of (as yet unidentified) genes, means that an individual 
does not develop the illness for many years, until stress factors in the environment 
provoke it to develop. It is contended that social factors will not lead an individual to 
develop mental illness unless they have in their genetic makeup a specific inherited 
gene which is key in producing the illness. For example Kety (1978) has asserted: 
"None of these [biological] studies exclude the importance of environmental 
factors. In fact, we believe that what is genetically transmitted is simply a vulnerability to 
the disorder and that everyone who has the genetic vulnerability does not necessarily 
develop the illness unless certain crucial environmental factors operate. What these 
environmental factors are, we don't know. " (Kety 1978: 9) 
Despite referring to the importance of social factors in the genesis of mental 
illness, Kety (like other proponents of the biological model who refer to 
environmental 'trigger' factors, such as Kramer 1993, Lader 1975, Mendels 1973, 
Rosenthal 1971), devotes his attention to studying the hypothesised biological 
causes of mental illness. In all of these accounts social factors receive only cursory 
attention (if they receive any attention at all) and biological factors are presumed to 
have analytic primacy in the development of mental illness. 
There is some evidence to suggest that the majority of British psychiatrists 
espouse a form of eclecticism, in which biological, social and psychological factors 
are acknowledged to play a role in the development of mental illnesses (see for 
example Griffiths 1996, Samson 1995). This has been termed the 'biopsychosocial 
model" (Rogers and Pilgrim 1996). It has been asserted, however, that this claim to 
eclecticism is misleading as psychiatrists working within British medicine 2 usually 
focus primarily upon the biological factors associated with mental illness. Samson 
(1995) studied the approaches of forty psychiatrists working within British medicine 
as well as examining the published writings of contemporary British psychiatrists. 
He concluded that social and psychological factors were not seen by psychiatrists as 
significant in the aetiology of mental illness, rather "social and psychological 
'factors' simply gave the disease its individual stamp" (Samson 1995-250). Thus 
they could be seen to have some influence upon presenting symptoms (for example , 
in terms of the content of delusions) but were not themselves seen as primarily 
responsible for producing mental illnesses. Samson concludes that: 
"... British psychiatry has not made any serious excursions into non-biomedical 
approaches ... 
British psychiatry has been predominantly biological in its aetiological 
theories, medical in its professional organisation and political allegiances, and yet 'eclectic' 
in its self perception. That is, while biological medicine has provided its main source of 
knowledge for theory and practice, members of the profession have represented their 
enterprise as one engaging in wider domains within the social sciences. Although social 
theories of mental 111-health have been forwarded, these have been present only on the 
margins of the profession. " (Samson 1995: 247-248) 
One reason why psychiatrists may espouse an eclectic approach whilst 
retaining a primary focus on biology is that, currently, the scientific study of 
' Because there is evidence to suggest that an eclectic approach has been used only on the 
margins, I have rejected the term 'biopsychosocial' in this research, in favour of the term 
'biological' to describe the approach used in mainstream psychiatry. This is also the term 
used by Busfield (1996). 
' The history of British psychiatry contrasts to some extent with that of psychiatry in the 
USA. Although biological explanations have become increasingly popular within the USA, 
historically American psychiatry has been significantly influenced by the development of 
psychodynamic ideas (Andreasen 1984). 
genetics is a central preoccupation within medicine. Genes are hypothesised to play 
a role in the development of a myriad of biological, social and psychological 
phenomena (Sayce 2000). However, the hypothesis that genes have some effect on 
psychosocial phenomena can lead to an exclusive concern with identifying these 
genes, whilst neglecting the non-biological factors involved. 
"Geneticist Gottesman admits that, m the current climate, a whisper of genetic 
influence tends to be turned into a shout of total genetic control. " (Sayce 2000.93) 
A further reason may be that a claim to eclecticism serves to bolster the 
prestige associated with the practice of psychiatry (Griffiths 1996, Samson 1995). In 
his research, Samson found that many psychiatrists identified themselves as being 
intellectually superior to other mental health professionals (such as nurses, 
psychologist and social workers) because their medical training had enabled them to 
become experts in understanding and treating problems relating to the mind as well 
as the body. 
"Psychiatnsts claim they are absolutely vital to the mental health team because they 
have professional expertise over both body and mind. The psychiatnst is represented as a 
holistic healer, capable of transcending the philosophy of mind/body dualism which 
biomedicine is so often depicted as basing itself upon ... However, this has been 
accomplished at the theoretical level primarily by materialising the mind as biological 
matter... Although the initial impetus may be thought to be socially defived - bereavement 
for example - this is held to trigger a physiological response which drives the illness. 
'Iberefore, lacking specialised training in neurology, physiology, pharmacology and 
anatomy, the psychologist, nurse, or social worker are considered less effective than the 
psychiatrist. " (Samson 1995: 252) 
There are various philosophical problems associated with a Cartesian 
position of mind/body dualism (Dilman 1988, Malcolm 1972). These are often 
solved within the theory and practice of mainstream psychiatry by conceptualising 
the mind (and its emotions, thoughts and behaviour) as determined by the organic 
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functioning of the material elements in the brain. This causal relationship is often 
conceived as operating in one direction only, so that psychosocial factors are often 
not acknowledged as causing physiological changes in the biochemical operations of 
the brain (Coleman 1998). 
In a paper entitled 'Biological psychiatry: is there any other kind? '(1989), 
Guze (a professor of psychiatry), has argued that despite a lack of scientific 
knowledge about the organic structure of the brain and how it affects the 
development of mental illness, psychiatry should still concern itself exclusively with 
a biological approach to the study and treatment of mental health illness. 
"... There is no such thing as a p. sýychiatq that is too biological. I say this even 
though I believe that we still know all too little about the physiology of the brain in most 
psychiatric conditions. " (Guze 1989: 315 emphasis in original). 
Guze argues that psychiatry is a science on a par with the natural sciences. In 
order to be properly scientific, he argues that psychiatry should utilise the same 
focus as that found in natural sciences such as biology. 
"I believe that continuing debate about the biological basis of psychiatry is derived 
much more from philosophical, ideological and political concerns than from scientific ones. 
Modem biology 
... 
focuses appropriately on the fundamental elements of all forms of life: 
evolution, development, structure, and function. Modem psychiatry is inescapably 
biological because it shares this focus as applied to the psychopathology. " (Guze 1989.322) 
It could be argued, however, that all scientific research is inevitably affected 
by philosophical, ideological and political issues, psychiatry included (see section 
2.1). Indeed, the debate about what causes mental illness is not simply a debate 
about which methods are most useful in the study of human behaviour and emotions. 
At the heart of the dispute lie radically different philosophies of human action and 
emotion, all of which have significant political implications. The nature of the 
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human mind, the effects of the mind upon behaviour, the interaction of the mind and 
body, and the relationship between the mind and the brain are all philosophical 
questions, the answers to which form the basic conceptual frameworks of the various 
schools in psychology (the study of 'normal' as well as 'abnormal' behaviour). 
These schools in psychology in turn inform the various schools of thought within 
psychiatry. 
The biological model of mental illness derives its major support from 
diseases such as syphilis which can produce a disorder in thinking and behaviour. In 
1952 tranquillising drugs were first introduced into psychiatry as method for treating 
psychiatric patients. A new discipline was created called psychopharmacology - the 
study of drugs useful in the treatment of mental illnesses and their application in 
clinical practice. The effects of these drugs in altering the emotion and behaviour of 
patients lent support to the idea that psychiatric disorders are medical diseases which 
are amenable to treatment and cure by specific drugs (Samson 1995, Szasz 197 1 ). 
Some proponents of the biological model have argued that the success of 
psychiatric medication in treating mental illness itself provides proof of the 
biological cause of mental illness (see for example Kramer 1993). This argument is 
somewhat inadequate however, as the fact that medication may improve an 
individual's condition does not mean that the condition itself was physiologically 
rather than psychosocially caused. For example a person might experience shock at 
the news of a bereavement, and a minor tranquilliser may help in ameliorating this 
shock, but nevertheless the shock has been caused by the bad news, not by a brain 
disorder (Pilgrim and Rogers 1994). That there is a biological dimension to 
conditions of psychological distress is clearly indicated by the fact that tranquillisers 
and antidepressants can work to ease painful feelings such as anxiety and depression 
(Busfield 1996, Breggin and Breggin 1994). Nevertheless it is unwarranted to infer 
from this that biological factors take analytic primacy in the causality of all mental 
health problems, because, as in the example indicated above, the biological 
processes connected with feelings of distress can themselves be prompted by 
psychosocial experiences. 
The primacy allocated physiology in the biological model tends to overlook 
the importance of social factors in the construction of diagnostic categories, and in 
the causation of many conditions perceived as evidence of mental illness (Busfield 
1996). Of course there are behavioural and emotional states in which physiology is 
indisputably the most important factor, such as in the case of traumatic brain injury, 
or identifiable viral infections of the body which can have a deleterious effect upon 
brain functioning. It is also possible that further scientific research may uncover 
specific biological mechanisms that are significant in the aetiology of a range of 
mental health problems. However there is already considerable research evidence to 
suggest that social experiences may themselves be key in causing the psychological 
conditions which are diagnosed and treated as mental illnesses (see for example 
Nazroo, Edwards and Brown 1998, Ashurst and Hall 1994, Breggin and Breggin 
1994, Herman 1992, Barnes and Maple 1992, Beliappa 199 1, Corob 1987, Cochrane 
1984, Brown and Harris 1978, Miller 1978 - see also section 1.7). 
A further important issue is that discriminatory labelling within psychiatry 
can lead to individuals being diagnosed with a serious mental illness for engaging in 
behaviour which challenges the- dominant political ideotogy3 (see, for examp Ie 
'I use the term 'ideology' to denote an interlocking set of ideas -a cultural, communication 
and representational system that forms the distinctive perspective of a social group. I 
employ the Althuserrian notion that the dominant ideology tends to operate in the interests 
of the dominant class and against the interests of oppressed groups. It presents a distorted 
picture of the relations of domination, misrepresenting the real relations of power (Althusser 
1971 -see section 2.3 for a further discussion of this). 
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Burstow 1992, Torkington 1991, Littlewood and Lipsedge 1989, Burstow and Weitz 
1988, Diamant 1987, Hill 1983). During the slavetrade a psychiatric category was 
utilised which was known as 'drapetomania' (Torkington 1991). This was meant to 
refer to the 'irrational' desire of slaves to escape from servitude to their masters. It 
disappeared as a diagnostic category on the abolition of the slave trade. 
Homosexuality was defined as a mental illness until the 1970's when under pressure 
from gay rights activists it was removed from the official diagnostic frameworks 
(Diamant 1987). The pathologising of homosexuality has continued however, as 
there has remained an official category of psychiatric disorder which concerns 
homosexuals who are unhappy with their sexual orientation (American Psychiatric 
Association 1994). Treatment for them involves therapy to encourage them to 
become heterosexual rather than addressing the stigmatisation and oppression of 
homosexuals within society (Diamant 1987). 
Because of the role of political factors in the construction and application of 
diagnostic categories, Szasz (1983) has argued for the abolition of psychiatry, 
maintaining that it is a 'pseudoscience' which cannot pretend to produce objective 
knowledge. Szasz has been rightly criticised, however, for ignoring the fact that 
questions of politics and ideology play a role on other branches of medical science 
(Bentall and Pilgrim 1993) and within the scientific enterprise as a whole (I discuss 
this issue in detail in section 2.1). 
Because of the dominance of the biological model within psychiatry, the vast 
majority of research which aims to investigate the development of mental illness 
exclusively focuses on the search for the physiological factors which are presumed 
to be key in causing it. In addition, social science research which has indicated a link 
between social experience and mental illness is often overlooked within mainstream 
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psychiatry (such as that produced by Nazroo, Edwards and Brown 1998, Ashurst 
and Hall 1994, Breggin and Breggin 1994, Herman 1992, Barnes and Maple 1992, 
Bellappa 1991, Corob 1987, Cochrane 1984, Brown and Harris 1978). Critics of the 
biological model have argued that the reason why research in the biological model 
has been unsuccessful, is because the concept of mental illness used in the dominant 
model is fundamentally flawed, as it ignores issues relating to the social construction 
of mental illness (see for example Bentall, Jackson and Pilgrim 1988a, 1988b, Szasz 
1976). It has been suggested that the study of the aetiology of mental illness should 
proceed using alternative hypotheses, which take into account the role of social, 
psychological and environmental factors (Ciompi 1984). However, despite the 
dearth of research evidence which supports its claims, the biological model remains 
the dominant approach taught to psychiatrists in medical school and is the most 
widely used model amongst practising psychiatrists. Indeed, many influential 
psychiatrists present their view that mental Illnesses are primarily biologically 
induced, as an undisputed fact (Bentall, Jackson and Pilgrim 1988a, 1988b). 
Despite its dominance within psychiatry, the biological model has come in 
for a considerable amount of criticism in the last thirty years (see for example 
Coleman 1998, Burstow 1992, Boyle 1990, Szasz 1987,1971, Penfold and Walker 
1984, Hill 1983, Chesler 1972, Laing and Esterson 1969, Laing 1967,1960). During 
the 1960's it came under considerable attack from radical psychiatrists such as RD 
Laing (1967,1960) and Thomas Szasz (1987,1971) in a movement which became 
known as 'antipsychiatry'. Their fundamental objection to psychiatry was that it 
overlooked questions of politics and morality in relation to emotions and behaviour. 
In their analysis psychiatry forms another aspect of state social control, in that in 
many instances it labels nonconformity as an illness which then becomes liable to 
enforced psychiatric treatment. According to Laing, a condition like schizophrenia 
14 
should be renamed a 'problem in living' as it stems from social factors and has no 
proven organic basis (1967,1960). 
Indeed, to date there has never been a proven physiological explanation for 
the development of mental 
illneSS4 
and a gene which is supposed to cause it has not 
been identified (Sayce 2000, Pilgrim and Rogers 1994). It has not been possible 
therefore to examine whether people with or without the gene do or do not go on to 
produce the mental illness which the gene signifies or what factors including 
environmental ones are responsible for 'triggering' it. Of course, because there has 
been no substantive evidence produced for a biological cause for conditions 
diagnosed as mental illnesses, it does not follow logically that there cannot be a 
biological component involved (Bentall, Jackson and Pilgrim 1988a, 1988b). The 
success of psychotropic medication in ameliorating feelings of distress clearly 
indicates that there are biological mechanisms at work. Thus it would be unwise to 
assume a polar position and completely reject the role of biological factors in the 
aetiology and development of mental health problems. It could be argued that what 
is needed is a position in which the role of biological, psychological and social 
factors are acknowledged as interacting in a dynamic way to produce the conditions 
commonly diagnosed as mental illnesses (Sayce 2000, Busfield 1996). The role of 
issues of power and inequality in contributing to the experience of mental distress 
and in the construction of diagnostic categories are also factors which warrant 
examination (see section 1.2). This is the approach recommended by Sayce, when 
she says: 
4 Whilst organic brain damage has been identified in post-mortem examinations of people 
diagnosed with schizophrenia, there is some dispute as to whether these changes were 
induced by the condition itself, or whether they were caused by long-term treatment with 
psychatropic medication amongst the sample groups (PtIgnm and Rogers 1994). 
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"Mental health problems ... are 
biological, in the sense that every thought and feeling 
is a physiological event, but they need to be understood through a lens that scans a person's 
interactions with his or her whole environment - and which is prepared to make ethical 
judgements, to spur action to tackle poverty, gender discrimination and other patterns of 
inequality that impact on people's mental health. - (Sayce 2000: 91). 
1.2 The definition of mental illness and the process of psychiatric diagnosis 
Joan Busfield, in her book 'Men, Women and Madness' (1996), defines 
mental illness as "a shifting, changing category which classifies certain social 
problems as problems of mind, a process that involves attributes of irrationality and 
unreason" ( 1996: 119). This definition means that a person comes to be defined as 
having a mental illness via a social process in which their feelings or behaviour are 
defined by themselves and/or others as being problematic, and this problem is 
located as being associated with the mind. Busfield's definition is a useful one as it 
emphasises that the conception of mental illness is one which is itself socially 
constructed and therefore contingent. 
When psychiatrists set about diagnosing people believed to be suffering with 
a mental illness they are concerned to isolate and identify the symptoms of the 
illness in to make an accurate diagnosis and prescribe medical treatment. The 
process of doing this is what enables psychiatrists to call themselves scientists, as 
within a positivistic methodology scientists are properly supposed to be 'neutral 
disinterested observers'; classifying and cataloguing objective facts. Within 
psychiatry it is claimed that the diagnoses used are scientifically objective and thus 
independent of political bias. To acknowledge that political factors and value 
judgements may play a role in the development and application of categories of 
mental illness could tend to undermine psychiatry's claim to scientific status and 
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thus involve a substantial loss of prestige to the discipline. The particular power 
relations which occur within the construction of diagnostic categories and within the 
application of these diagnoses to service users are therefore often not acknowledged, 
as to do so would mean acknowledging that a 'bias' had intruded into the consulting 
room which had rendered the process 'unscientific'. 
However, psychiatric categories have not remained constant over time and 
sometimes reflect the dominant ideology concerning norms of behaviour. The 
diagnosis of slaves with 'drapetomania' in the era of the slavetrade, and the 
diagnosis of homosexuals as mentally ill, both reflect the dominant political 
ideology in wider society (see section 1.1). Freud's development of the diagnostic 
category of hysteria (see section 2.1 for a discussion of this) also indicates how 
social and political factors affect the construction of diagnostic categories. 
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders IV (American 
Psychiatric Association 1994) presents a diagnostic framework which is widely used 
within British psychiatry (Prior 1999). It has undergone four revisions since 1952 
when it was first introduced. Each revision has taken into account not only scientific 
developments, but also changes in social attitudes (hence the removal of 
homosexuality as an illness per se) (Prior 1999). 
The DSM contains a wide variety of behaviours and emotional states which, 
it is contended, are indicative of particular mental illness, It is also contended that 
these disorders are 'objective' in character; having an identifiable existence 
independent of the political beliefs on the part of the psychiatrists who invent the 
categories or the psychiatrist who apply them to their patients. The DSM states that 
the aetiology of most mental health problems is unknown, although it does discuss 
some of the organic and biological factors which are presumed to cause them. The 
emotions and behaviours it contains are presented without reference to the social 
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context in which they originate, and are described as symptomatic of an identifiable 
disorder. In defining mental health problems, the DSM states that: 
"... each of the mental disorders is conceptuallsed as a clinically significant 
behavioral or psychological syndrome or pattern that occurs in an individual and that is 
associated with present distress (e. g., a painful symptom) or disability (i. e., impairment in 
one or more important areas of functioning) or with a significantly increased risk of 
suffenng death, pain, disability, or an important loss of freedom. In addition, this syndrome 
or pattern must not be merely an expectable and culturally sanctioned response to a 
particular event, for example, the death of a loved one. Whatever its onginal cause, it must 
currently be considered a manifestation of a behavioral, psychological, or biological 
dysfunction in the individual. " (American Psychiatric Association 1994: xxi-xxii) 
The DSM provides some scope for individual psychiatrists to impose upon 
their patients their value system in terms of whether or not they think a particular 
response is one a rational person would have made, or whether it can rightly be seen 
to be indicative of a mental illness. The DSM warns in its introduction that if a 
particular emotional response is what it terms an "expectable" ( 1994: xxi) reaction to 
a given event (such as a bereavement) then it should not be interpreted as evidence 
of a mental illness. However the DSM does not discuss what it regards as 
"expectable" reactions to any particular life events. For example, although it 
specifically mentions bereavement it does not state how long the grieving process is 
supposed to last, or how it should be carried out, in order to classify as an 
"expectable" response. Of course this begs the question of who is doing the 
'expecting'. Psychiatrists are dominant in the structure of the mental health services 
in both Britain and the United States and have the most power to diagnose and treat 
service users. Thus their expectations are accorded the most power in how a 
particular persons feelings are understood. What psychiatrists believe is a rational 
response to any given event is inevitably informed by their social background, 
political perspective and of course their medical training. However psychiatrists are 
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drawn from an elite group within society - predominantly male and middle class 
(Samson 1995, Burstow 1992). Historically, as medicine has been professional i sed 
women have been systematically removed from positions of power as healers and 
placed in a subordinate role in the medical hierarchy (Penfold and Walker 1984, 
Ehrenreich and English 1978). Many psychiatrists have argued that their training 
counters the bias presented by their personal backgrounds as it is a scientific training 
which is essentially apolitical and value neutral (Samson 1995). It could be argued, 
however, that science in general, and psychiatry in particular, is not and cannot be a 
politically neutral enterprise (see section 2.1 for a detailed discussion of this). 
Torkington in her book 'Black Health. - A Political Issue' (1991) describes a 
variety of cases in which psychiatrists have diagnosed black patients as mentally ill 
because of religious beliefs and/or cultural practices which did not conform to the 
dominant ideology in Britain. She cites one instance in which an Afro Caribbean 
man who refused to have his hair cut and who talked about going to Africa to fulfil 
his destiny with God was diagnosed as psychotic and held on section because his 
claims indicated that he was evidently 'out of touch with reality'. He was a 
Rastafarian, however, and his beliefs formed part of his religion. The DSM does 
state in its introduction that particular behaviour should not be regarded as 
symptomatic of a mental illness if it is a "culturally sanctioned response" 
(1994: xxii). However this comprises only one sentence in the introduction, and 
issues of politics or religion are not discussed any further. Indeed, the DSM 
persistently ignores political issues within inter-personal relationships and within 
broader society. 
According to several commentators the labelling of oppressed groups by the 
elite characterises psychiatry as an institution of social control, in which behaviour 
which does not conform to the dominant ideology may be characterised as a mental 
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illness (Burstow 1992, Penfold and Walker 1984, Hill 1983). Burstow (1992), for 
example, saysý 
"The pathologization of deviance or of different life-styles is blatantly evident in 
DSM disorders ... IT IS OUT 
OF THIS DIFFERENCE BETWEEN WHAT THE ELITE 
GROUP CALLED "PSYCHIATRISTS" EXPECT AND WHAT OTHERS DO THAT 
PSYCHOPATHOLOGY EMERGES". (Burstow 1992: 29 emphasis in original) 
Women are caught in a particular double bind as they may be labelled as ill 
for not conforming to the dominant ideology of femininity-, but they also may be 
labelled as ill precisely because they do conform. There is some evidence to suggest 
that the qualities associated with femininity are sometimes perceived as evidence of 
a disorder (I discuss this double bind in detail in section 1.7). 
Discriminatory labelling has very serious implications for service users as 
the power relations inherent in service provision for those diagnosed with a mental 
illness differ considerably from that in services provided for individuals diagnosed 
as with physical illnesses. Because people labelled with a mental illness are regarded 
as inherently less capable of making rational decisions than those not similarly 
labelled, mechanisms exist to force them to accept the treatment which is deemed 
necessary by a psychiatrist. In general medicine if a doctor administers treatment to 
a patient against their will even if he believes it to be in the patients 'best interests' 
he will be liable to a charge of assault. This is still the case where a patient who 
refuses treatment is in danger of losing their life. However, a person who is 
classified as suffering from a mental illness can be detained in hospital under a 
section of the Mental Health Act 1983 (HMSO 1983) and kept there until they are 
deemed to be fit for release by a psychiatrist (Barnes, Bowl and Fisher 1990). 
Compulsory admission to hospital ('sectioning') and enforced treatment is 
regarded as necessary in cases where someone is thought to be severely disturbed 
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and posing a danger to themselves or other people. Most patients in British 
psychiatric hospitals are voluntary patients who have the right to refuse treatment 
and can leave when they decide to. However many people become voluntary 
patients because they are told that unless they do so, they will be compulsorily 
detained under a section of the Mental Health Act 1983 (Community Care 1994). 
Furthermore under the provisions of the Mental Health Act 1983 a patient who has 
entered hospital on a voluntary basis may be compulsorily detained and forcibly 
treated under 'section', if this is deemed appropriate by medical personnel. For the 
'sectioned' patient the power of medical personnel is almost absolute. The Mental 
Health Act Commission is the watchdog set up to safeguard the fights of patients 
detained under the Mental Health Act. However it is perceived by many to be 
inadequate in balancing the special powers of treatment and detention that apply to 
those who are regarded as suffering from 'mental disorder' under the Mental Health 
Act (Bames, Bowl and Fisher 1990). Patients who are compulsorily committed must 
seek permission from hospital staff to leave hospital premises, they can be locked 
into their wards and can have medical treatment such as psychotropic medication 
and electro-convulsive therapy forced upon them (Pilgrim and Rogers 1994). This 
medical treatment can have serious irreversible side effects on the patient to whom 
they are administered. In some cases it proves fatal (see section 1.4). In addition the 
application of a psychiatric diagnosis, and a stay in a psychiatric hospital can in 
itself can have serious implications for a service user in terms of stigma, social 
isolation, and a lack of housing and employment opportunities (see section 1.5). 
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1.3 Previous research concerning the effects of the biological model on mental 
health service users 
To date there has been a plethora of debate in the social sciences concerning 
the validity of the biological model of mental illness (for example Coleman 1998, 
Bentall and Pilgrim 1993, Bentall, Jackson and Pilgrim 1988a, 1988b, Burstow 
1992, Boyle 1990, Szasz 1987,1976,1971, Hill 1983, Laing and Esterson 1969, 
Laing 1967,1960). However, there has been a particular dearth of research which 
has aimed to examine the social impact of the biological model of mental illness by 
reference to the perspectives of mental health service users. Indeed, overall there has 
been very little research which has aimed to evaluate mental health service provision 
by means of an analysis of the experiences of service users. 
"User/survivors' views are seen as invalid by definition. In the media, this is 
conveyed by the chronic absence of users' voices - everyone else, from clinician to relative, 
seeming more 'listened to' - and by articles commenting on the self-evident absurdity of the 
patients running the asylums. " (Sayce 2000: 64) 
It could be argued that the lack of research focusing on service users' views 
is itself influenced by the dominant approach to understanding mental health 
problems, as serious mental illness is conceptualised as a condition which inevitably 
undermines service users' rationality and thus reduces their capacity to communicate 
adequately5. For example, in research carried out by Barham and Hayward (199 1) 
with twenty five women and men diagnosed with schizophrenia, they found that 
-' Although the notion of a biologically based mental illness can tend to undermine service 
users' views, this tendency may sometimes be seen in other approaches to conceptualising 
mental health problems. For example, psychodynamic theories could be used to undermine 
service users' opinions by asserting that these views are motivated by unconscious factors of 
which the client is unaware (Sayce 2000). 
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because participants had received this diagnosis, their views were not taken 
seriously by mental health service providers. In fact when they expressed their 
opinions, these were perceived to be symptomatic of the illness with which they had 
been diagnosed. (see section 1.5). In his research with psychiatrists Samson (1995) 
made a similar observation. 
"... in conventional psychiatric practice, patients are not always 'believed'. Their 
conduct and speech is scrutinised for symptoms of mental illness and placed within a 
taxonomic scheme, rather than being seen, at least in part, as occurring in the context of 
particular, especially adverse, circumstances. " (Samson 1995: 261) 
In a guide to doing research with mental health service users, Dworkin 
(1992), warns that it is very difficult and sometimes impossible to interview people 
who have been diagnosed as mentally ill, She says that many service users deny that 
they have a mental illness at all, which, she claims, is symptomatic of the illness 
itself Furthermore, she states that it is not appropriate to interview people who have 
received a diagnosis of psychosiS6 , as by virtue of 
having received this diagnosis, 
they will have a tendency to delusions of a grandiose or persecutory nature, and may 
often be incoherent and illogical. She asserts that it would be extremely difficult for 
an interviewer to establish rapport with people who have received a diagnosis of 
psychosis; and suggests that it thus would be preferable in many cases to interview 
6 Within the mental health system, mental illnesses are often broadly divided into two 
categories - the neurotic disorders which are charactensed by anxiety and depression, and 
the psychotic disorders (such as schizophrenia and manic depression) which are 
characterised by an inability to comprehend 'reality', because of delusional thoughts or 
hallucinations (Taylor and Taylor 1989). Where diagnosed neuroses are concerned there is 
sometimes more likelihood of medical practitioners acknowledging the effects of social 
factors In their cause, than there is in the case of the psychoses. This is because the neuroses 
are perceived as quantitatively rather than qualitatively different from 'normality' (Taylor 
and Taylor 1989). 
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the families of people with this diagnosis. Dworkin does acknowledge that the 
concerns of the families may differ significantly from those of service users but she 
also warns that information gained from other family members may be biased as 
they too may have a mental illness (implicitly holding the view that such conditions 
have a tendency to run in families). 
In my fieldwork for this research I interviewed roughly even numbers of 
women who had been given a diagnosis of psychotic and neurotic mental illness (see 
section 2.12 table 8). 1 would not wish to deny that there are sometimes difficulties 
associated with carrying out research with mental health service users. Many of 
these are ones which are associated with doing research in an emotionally very 
sensitive area (see sections 2.6 and 2.7). In particular, the manner in which 
communication is carried out between interviewer and interviewee may be an issue 
which needs to be handled particularly carefully when interviewing on such a 
sensitive issue. For example, in interviewing one participant in this research, Joy 
(who had been diagnosed with a psychosis - see section 5.4.2), 1 found that there 
were initial difficulties between us, as she did not feel comfortable answering the 
questions I had outlined in my interview schedule. This problem was solved by 
allowing her to convey her concerns in the manner that was most comfortable to her. 
She did this by acting out a play she had developed, in which she described the 
experiences of an abuse survivor within the mental health system (a transcript of the 
play can be seen in appendix a). Although she adopted an unconventional manner of 
communicating her ideas, they were perfectly intelligible; as were the ideas of all of 
the other women I interviewed in this study. However, an uncritical acceptance of 
the medical approach (as evidenced by Dworkin above), means that service users' 
views, especially those of service users who may have received a diagnosis of 
psychotic disorders, are often regarded as inherently unreliable from the outset. 
24 
From this viewpoint it would seem that there is not a lot of point in taking the 
trouble to interview mental health service users, as their perspectives would, in 
many cases, yield unreliable information. Research carried out by Rogers, Pilgrim 
and Lacey (1993) and Barham and Hayward ( 199 1) are among the few studies 
which have focused on service users perspectives. In both of these studies, the 
researchers indicated that social issues are not usually addressed by psychiatrists. 
Patients are not conceived of as people within a network of social relationships, both 
at the level of family and friends and at the level of the societal institutions which 
impact upon them. This research also indicated that psychotropic medication and 
ECT are the treatments most widely prescribed for service users. These findings can 
be seen as inevitable outcomes of the biological model of mental illness, as within 
this approach psychiatrists are supposed to concentrate on identifying the symptoms 
presented by a service user in order to make a diagnosis and prescribe what is 
thought to be the appropriate physical treatment. As many psychiatrists do not 
accord significance to social factors in the aetiology of mental illness; they would 
not see the relevance of discussing these issues with their patients. 
In research which has been carried out with medical practitioners, it has been 
asserted that the training which is provided to doctors is inadequate in equipping 
them with the skills to communicate with emotionally distressed patients (Baker, 
Yoels and Clair 1996, Silverman 1987, Thompson 1984). Medical schools first 
select students who have pursued a narrow range of natural science subjects for 
admission to become trainee doctors (Baker, Yoels and Clair 1996). The training 
which they then undergo is dominated by a biological model of physical and mental 
illness causation (Johnstone 1991). Psychiatrists in particular, are trained through 
completing the standard five or six year medical training course and then following a 
further three year course of basic specialist training in psychiatry (Royal College of 
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Psychiatrists 2000). Although there is an option to specialise in psychotherapy, this 
is one of the least popular and less accessible study options. It has been suggested 
that a lack of training in the personal and social issues affecting service users means 
that, when they eventually qualify, doctors are fundamentally ill-equipped to 
communicate with service users about emotional issues (Baker, Yoels and Clair 
1996, Silverman 1987, Thompson 1984). 
The biological approach used by most psychiatrists has been criticised by 
mental health professionals working lower down in the hierarchy of the statutory 
mental health services. For example, research carried out by Johnstone (who herself 
worked for eleven years as an NHS psychologist) indicated major dissatisfaction 
amongst nurses and occupational therapists because of the dominance of physical 
treatments within the system and the lack of attention paid to the social and personal 
issues affecting service users. However, they feel powerless to challenge the 
dominance of psychiatrists in treating patients. Johnstone says that in her research 
she: 
"... uncovered widespread demoralization and elicited comments such as 'Real 
issues are avoided when patients are admitted. We concentrate on symptoms rather than the 
family or home situation. We take away people's responsibility and put them in the sick 
role. We are doing nothing and getting nowhere. ' '17his was coupled with hopelessness about 
the possibility of change. Much blame was pinned on the doctors, who are the most 
powerful professional group and have most invested in maintaining the status quo ... their 
official powers (to admit, discharge, diagnose, medicate, section and have the final say on 
treatment plans) are considerable. " (1993: 30). 
Johnstone points out that nurses feel particularly disillusioned by dominant 
psychiatric practice. 
"Nurses ... 
have the kind of close day to day contact with patients that exposes the 
meaningless of psychiatnc diagnoses and highlights the real social and emotional dilemmas 
behind the labels. Even if they stop short of queryig the whole theoretical basis of 
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psychiatry, they are often deeply disillusioned with its practice. " (Johnstone 1993: 30) 
Johnstone argues that psychiatry is actively involved in suppressing dissent. 
She says that this is carried out by individual psychiatrists working in hospitals and 
clinics who will not allow any other models to be considered in the treatment of 
patients and by psychiatric journals which will not allow papers to appear that 
criticise the dominant viewpoint. She says that alternative viewpoints are suppressed 
in order to maintain the dominance of the biological model and the vested power 
interests of psychiatrists and the pharmaceutical industry. Indeed, a significant 
outcome of the dominance of the biological model is that as psychological distress is 
conceived of as a medical illness, then medically trained doctors must be regarded as 
the experts in the diagnosis and treatment of the condition. 
Among the few pieces of research which have attempted to systematically 
investigate the perspectives of women mental health service users is that carried out 
by Miles (1988), with sixty five women who had all received a diagnosis of 
neurosis. Despite providing valuable information relating to the women's 
experiences (in relation to the women's experience of consulting GPs for example - 
see section 4.2), Miles's study is limited in certain respects. For example, she does 
not consider the impact of the biological model of mental illness upon women 
service users' experiences within the statutory mental health system. Miles contacted 
her interviewees through one or more psychiatrists (the number of psychiatrists who 
participated is unclear) who wished to co-operate in her study and who were treating 
the women as their patients. Because of the power relations inherent in psychiatric 
service provision, such an arrangement can have a significant effect on whether 
interviewees feel able to speak freely (see section 2.10 for a further discussion of 
this issue as it affected my research). Although Miles does not indicate the 
theoretical outlook of the psychiatrists who participated with her fieldwork, there 
27 
may be some reason to believe that psychiatrists who would be willing to participate 
in qualitative social science research (like that carried out by Miles) may not operate 
within a strictly biological model of mental health. Research carried out by Britten 
(1991) is somewhat suggestive of this conclusion (see section 3.3 and 3.5). 
Whatever the case in this respect, the lack of a thorough analysis of the power 
relations (and the dominant model used) within the statutory mental health services, 
is an important limitation in Miles' research. 
Other research which has aimed to explore the social implications of 
psychiatry has been done by practitioners who work (or have worked) within the 
mental health system; who have provided illustrative evidence for their arguments 
drawn from a small number of their clients' case histories (see for example Barnes 
and Maple 1992, Johnstone 1989, Penfold and Walker 1984). All of these studies 
have yielded important information and have been key in drawing attention to some 
of the damaging effects of statutory mental health services. In particular, it has been 
argued by Johnstone (1989) that the medical approach to the treatment of mental 
illness underlies all of the problems which service users may experience within the 
statutory mental health system - such as discriminatory labelling (see section 1.7) 
and an over reliance on physical treatments (see section 1.4). However, to date there 
has not been a systematic attempt to investigate the social impact of the biological 
model of mental illness on women, by reference to women mental health service 
users' perspectives. In my research I aim to make a contribution to the debate on the 
social effects of the biological model of mental illness, by presenting a study which 
is based on the perspectives of women mental health service users (see also sections 
2.3 and 2.4). 
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1.4 The medical treatment of mental health problems 
1.4.1 Psychotropic medication 
Due to the dominance of the biological model of mental illness, physical 
treatments are the favoured treatment options for service users in the statutory 
sector. From his research with psychiatrists (see section 1.1), Samson has asserted 
that alternatives to medication and electro-convulsive therapy may be used by some 
practitioners "if they happened to be available, but [they] would not be the dominant 
treatment modalities on any NHS ward" (Samson 1995-251). 
In this country up to twenty five percent of the total NHS budget for 
medicines is spent on psychiatric drugs (Gorman 1992). This amounts to a cost of 
around twenty five million pounds a year (Williams et al 1993). In 1987 there were 
forty-six million prescriptions for psychotropic drugs for a population of fifty-five 
million people in Britain (Ashton 1991). Previous research has indicated that women 
are twice as likely as men to be taking tranquillisers (Darton et al 1994), Up to two 
thirds of people taking antidepressants in Britain are women (Association of 
Metropolitan Authorities 1993). 
Major tranquillisers can have serious irreversible side effects such as tardive 
dyskinesia and in some cases even cause death (Burstow 1992, Scheff 1984). 
Tardive dyskinesia is a neurological disorder, indicating brain damage. It is an 
incurable condition and is caused by the use of major tranquillisers - neuroleptic 
(which literally means 'nerve seizing' (Burstow and Weitz 1988)) drugs such as 
chlorpromazine. It has the same effects on the nervous system as Parkinson's 
Disease. The disorder is permanent and it has been estimated that world-wide at 
least twenty-five million people suffer from the disease, and that roughly twenty- 
five to fifty percent of those receiving medication with major tranquillisers will 
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develop it (Burstow and Weitz 1988). Tardive dyskinesia typically occurs within the 
first two months of a patient beginning treatment (Brown and Funk 1986). Its 
symptoms include involuntary muscle spasms, especially as regards the tongue, lips 
and jaw, a shuffling walk, tremors, restlessness and immobility (Brown and Funk 
1986). These symptoms are mistaken by many people as symptomatic of mental 
illness even though they are in fact produced by the medication prescribed to control 
the symptoms of diagnosed mental illness (Burstow 1992). The standard treatment 
for tardive dyskinesia is increased dosage of major tranquillisers which will serve to 
mask the symptoms of the disease whilst at the same time ftirthering its development 
(Burstow 1992). The medication which can induce tardive dyskinesia (neuroleptics 
such as chlorpromazine) are usually prescribed to people who have been diagnosed 
with a psychotic mental illness. These drugs do not cure the disease which has been 
diagnosed however, they merely serve to control its 'symptoms' (Scheff 1984). 
Because of the severity of the side effects which may be incurred, including the 
possibility of death, treatment with neuroleptics may incur worse effects for the 
patient than the disease which they are supposed to cure (Scheff 1984). 
The history of tardive dyskinesia has been marked by widespread resistance 
to acknowledging its seriousness and even its existence, by psychiatrists. Part of the 
reason for this resistance has been that drug companies have themselves failed to 
publicise the condition, even obstructing research which provided evidence of the 
disease being linked to major tranquilliser use, and psychiatrists often rely 
exclusively on the information provided by the drug industry (Brown and Funk 
1986) 
At present, there is scientific consensus that tardive dyskinesia is currently 
the most pervasive side effect of medication with major tranquillisers other than 
sedation (Brown and Funk 1986). Nevertheless there is continuing resistance 
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amongst psychiatrists in both Britain and North America to properly publicise the 
risks of the disease and to inform patients and their families of the possibility of their 
contracting it (Burstow 1992, Brown and Funk 1986). In explaining this tendency, 
Brown and Funk suggest that: 
"Perhaps the reluctance to make the TD [tardive dyskinesia] case into a larger 
public health issue stems from the fact that to take such a tack might suggest that the 
profession was not in control of its own practice. Were that so, one implication might then 
be that external regulation might be necessary, and physicians have always resisted such 
control. " (1986-. 127) 
Although the minor tranquillisers such as Valium (diazepam) do not have 
such dangerous or dramatically visible side effects as the major tranquillisers, they 
are very addictive. It has been estimated that only three weeks of regular use causes 
a physical addiction. In the long term, minor tranquilliser use can actually cause the 
symptoms which the drugs are supposed to cure, such as acute anxiety (Burstow 
1992). Because of an increasing acknowledgement of the addictiveness of minor 
tranquillisers, GPs and psychiatrists are now far less likely to prescribe them for 
long term regular use. Antidepressants are believed to be physically non addictive 
and are now routinely prescribed in place of tranquillisers for people suffering 
anxiety and depression. Many types of antidepressants are highly toxic in large 
doses however. The side effects which they may incur include lethargy, dry mouth, 
loss of libido and an increase in, or loss of, appetite. 
The pharmaceutical industry is worth billions of pounds world-wide. It has 
often been ranked the first or second most profitable industry in the world since 
1955 when psychotropic drugs began to be marketed on a widespread basis 
(Johnstone 1989). It has been claimed that one reason for this, is because medication 
does not provide a 'cure' and only alleviates the symptoms of a perceived disorder, 
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psychiatrists may be tempted to resort to continuous drugging of their patients in 
order to control 'symptoms' which otherwise they could do nothing about (Scheff 
1984). Indeed the drug industry has a vested interest in the biological model, and is 
in fact a powerful and influential force in maintaining the dominance of the 
biological model in conceptualising mental illness Johnstone 1989). 
Drug companies sponsor a considerable amount of research into finding a 
cure for conditions diagnosed variously as anxiety, depression, schizophrenia and 
manic depression (Pilgrim and Rogers 1994). Usually this comprises of the testing 
of pharmaceutical drugs which the company manufactures (Johnstone 1989). It has 
been claimed (by Johnstone 1989 for example) that research which indicates 
favourable effects of the drug is promoted, whilst more negative findings are 
suppressed. Such research has several important effects. It preserves the notion that 
conditions diagnosed, for example, as schizophrenia and manic depression, are 
categones of biological disease which manifest psychological symptoms, and which 
are amenable to cure (at least in theory) through drug intervention (Johnstone 1989). 
This is despite the fact that a cure has never been found, and there is, in fact, 
substantial controversy as to whether many of these conditions have any basis in a 
physical disease (Bentall, Jackson and Pilgrim 1988a, 1988b). Furthermore, the drug 
industry spends vast sums of money on advertising and promoting psychotropic 
drugs to medical practitioners (Johnstone 1989). This is done in various ways, for 
example, through full page advertisements in medical journals, reports of research 
carried out which has supported the use of the drug and free gifts offered to doctors 
who agree to prescribe the drug (such as stationery, watches, clocks, microwaves, 
televisions, free lunches and all expenses paid visits abroad for doctors and their 
partners to attend conferences set up to promote the drug - see Johnstone 1989). In 
addition the industry sponsors the training of trainee psychiatrists through the 
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provision of books, reports, films and other learning materials. It also funds 
postgraduate training and the making of television programmes which support its 
interests. There is evidence of corruption by the pharmaceutical industry, in 
particular the bribery of politicians who could affect the interests of the 
pharmaceutical industry and the fraudulent reporting of research on drug testing (see 
Braithwaite 1986). Many medical journals are so reliant on advertising revenue from 
the drug companies that they routinely reject articles which criticise the 
pharmaceutical industry, or which question the biological model of mental illness, 
for fear of offending their sponsors (Johnstone 1993,1989). 
1.4.2 Electro-convulsive therapy 
Despite widespread public unease over the use of electro-convulsive therapy 
(ECT) it has not become a marginalised procedure within psychiatry (Samson 1995). 
Much of the controversy concerning the use of ECT centres on the extent of the side 
effects which the treatment produces. ECT involves passing an electric current of 
approximately 120 volts of electricity through the skull and into the brain of a 
patient in order to induce a grand mal seizure (Hill 1983). This inevitably produces 
brain damage in the patient. Its immediate effects are confusion, headache, 
disorientation, muscle ache, weakness and dizziness. Some patients who have 
received the treatment as well as doctors who support its use report therapeutic 
benefits from ECT despite the side effects which are incurred (Ussher 1991). 
Psychiatric professionals who support the use of ECT, claim that mild memory loss 
lasts two weeks to three months, while critics of the procedure insist that memory 
loss is more profound and should be taken more seriously as a side effect of the 
treatment. There is no doubt that ECT does induce amnesia although the extent of 
this is argued over. It has been suggested, however, that the very reason why ECT is 
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experienced as effective at all, is that it causes amnesia in patients. Like leucotomy 
(the surgical removal of sections of the brain) it literally removes from 
consciousness memories which are experienced as distressing (Ussher 1991). 
Furthermore, ECT has proved to be fatal in some cases. There are no reliable 
statistics relating to ECT induced deaths available in Britain. However, according to 
one study there have been four hundred deaths due to ECT reported in English 
language medical literature since 1941 (Burstow and Weitz 1988). According to a 
study carried out by the American Food and Drug Administration in the 1970s 
(quoted in Hill 1988), between one in three thousand and one in twenty eight 
thousand ECT treatments prove fatal to patients. This is certainly a worrying figure, 
especially as ECT is never administered as a single dose. Those who have been 
prescribed it often receive between six to thirty five treatments (Burstow and Weitz 
1988) 
Because of the dominance of the biological model of mental illness in 
psychiatry, government policy aims to concentrate resources on the provision of 
medical treatment (such as medication and ECT) for those diagnosed with mental 
illness, rather than providing social support (Goodwin 1993). The development of 
the biological model and the increasing medicalisation of mental health problems 
has not had the hoped for result of curing people who are affected by mental health 
problems however. This is reflected in the increasing numbers of readmissions to 
psychiatric hospitals and the failure to reduce the long stay hospital population as 
quickly as successive Governments have intended by developing the policy of care 
in the community (Goodwin 1993) . (I consider 
issues relating to care in community 
in detail in section 1.6). 
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1.5 Stigma 
Stigmatised individuals are widely regarded as inherently less valuable than 
others not similarly labelled (Goffman 1963). An excerpt from the definition of 
'stigma' provided in the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary states that 'stigma' is: 
"2. A mark of disgrace or infamy; a sign of severe censure or condemnation, 
regarded as impressed on a person or thing, a 'brand'... b. A distinguishing mark or 
characteristic (of a bad or objectionable kind), in I)ath. [Pathology] a sign of some specific 
disorder, as hystena 1859. " (1983: 2127) 
Several studies have indicated that there is a stigma associated with mental 
illness (see for example Rogers, Pilgrim and Lacey 1993, Barham and Hayward 
199 1, Teasdale 1987). This stigma means that a history of psychiatric service use 
can be used to cast doubt on the reliability of a person's behaviour or feelings at any 
time (Rogers, Pilgrim and Lacey 1993, Miles 1988,1987, D'Arcy and Brockman 
1977). People identified as mental health service users are often discriminated 
against in terms of housing, employment and a range of other social activities 
(Rogers, Pilgrim and Lacey 1993, Barham and Hayward 1991). 
Research carried out by Barham and Hayward (1991) indicates some of the 
difficulties encountered by people diagnosed with a serious mental illness such as 
schizophrenia, in trying to re establish a life for themselves outside of the psychiatric 
services. A major Problem for many service users, especially ex-psychiatric patients, 
is that they are not treated as 'normal' people. Instead they are regarded with fear, 
suspicion and mistrust. Even when no longer using mental health services the fact 
that a person has been a psychiatric service user means that their credibility can be 
called into question at any moment. They are often excluded from wider social life. 
Ex-psychiatric patients in particular face enormous challenges when they leave 
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hospital. Not only are they faced with trying to obtain employment and secure 
housing, they have to cope with the realisation that a disclosure of their psychiatric 
history may invoke enormous repercussions across all aspects of their life. In 
addition, they are faced with the challenge of having to 'reorientate' themselves, that 
is to make sense of their experiences, to understand and come to terms with 
themselves and their mental health issues and to assimilate their experiences into 
their understanding of themselves. The researchers found that this vital part of the 
recovery process is not helped by official psychiatric frameworks, such as the 
psychiatric interview and the diagnostic procedures. These do not address the central 
concerns of service users and centre solely on the delivery of medication. 
Furthermore, Barham and Hayward (199 1) found that even community based 
services within the mental health system did not provide a 'stepping stone' to more 
fulfilling forms of social life, but instead marginalised and disempowered users, 
exacerbating feelings of isolation and worthlessness. Participants often felt that they 
were confined within a stigmatised identity as a community psychiatric patient . 
Barham and Hayward reported that the participants in their study were 
largely defined by others in terms of their psychiatric labels. Although they rejected 
this identification of themselves with the psychiatric diagnosis they had received in 
the mental health system, they did not want to have to hide this aspect of their lives. 
In order to cope with the inevitability of unemployment, the lack of suitable 
affordable housing, the poverty, and social isolation, participants felt pressure to 
conceal their psychiatric history. This contributed to their distress and if they 
decided not to disclose their psychiatric history to a prospective employer, they were 
left with the problem of how to obtain suitable references and fill large gaps in their 
work history. 
Miles (1988), in her research with women diagnosed as suffering with 
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neurosis and receiving psychiatric treatment on an outpatient basis, reported that her 
participants also experienced considerable stigma connected with their service use. 
She argues that one of the most significant reasons for the attachment of this stigma 
is that 
"Disturbed persons may fail to comply with social norms, may even violate them, 
and thus they appear unpredictable and inexplicable to their fellows. The consequence of a 
breakdown in social expectations is the attachment of stigma. " (Miles 1988: 68) 
However the women in Miles' study (1988) described how it was not their 
feelings or behaviour which was the source of the stigma they experienced. Rather, 
if it became known that they had seen a psychiatrist, stigma inevitably followed 
( 1988: 84-85). Because of the stigma associated with specialist psychiatric services 
Miles argues that alternatives to specialist psychiatric treatment should be provided 
so that psychiatric labelling can be avoided. 
"... if problems can be handled by non-psychiatric services, for example, family 
practitioners, health visitors or even, where appropriate self help lay groups, then in some 
cases stigma may not arise, or at least, may be minimised. Those whose behaviour does not 
of itself invite lay labels of 'mental' and such-like would benefit most from the absence of 
professional psychiatric labelling. " (Miles 1988: 86) 
Avoiding labelling in this way would no doubt reduce the stigma 
experienced by many service users. Nevertheless there are further issues associated 
with conceptual i sation of mental illness which are a considerable source of stigma 
for service users, and which are not investigated by Miles. In particular, she does not 
consider the power relations in mental health service provision which render it 
inevitable that service users believed to be suffering with a severe mental illness are 
referred (involuntarily in some cases) to psychiatrists for diagnosis and treatment. 
All of Miles's participants were diagnosed as suffering with a neurotic disorder and 
none had been hospitalised. There is reason to believe that for people believed to be 
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psychotic, there is even more stigma, especially when they have had inpatient 
treatment. Much of the furore surrounding care in the community (see section 1.6) 
has concerned ex-hospital inpatients diagnosed with psychosis posing a threat of 
violence in the community. 
Several commentators have argued that the power relations inherent within 
the medical approach result in dependence, stigma and a basic mistrust of those 
labelled as mentally ill (see for example Pilgrim 1993, Barham and Hayward 199 1, 
Burstow and Weitz 1988, Chamberlain 1988). They have argued that this is not 
merely a by-product of the system which can be removed by altering the 
geographical sites of treatment. Within the debate surrounding community care (see 
section 1.6), the psychiatric hospital has been condemned for stigmatising service 
users and there has been a clear assumption that relocating services within the 
community would solve these problems. However, there is limited evidence to 
suggest that since community based services have retained a medical analysis of 
mental health issues they have replicated some of the problems evident in large scale 
institutions (see for example Pilgrim 1993, Davis 1988). 
In a study carried out by mental health service providers (Teasdale 1987) it 
was reported that clients attending a psychiatric day unit experienced considerable 
stigma in association with the use of the service. This report recommends that 
service users should be more open about their fears about stigma and that service 
providers should encourage their openness in order to help them manage this 
problem. However, the role of service providers themselves in contributing to the 
stigma that the service users experienced was largely ignored in the study. By 
contrast, in the Barham and Hayward study ( 199 1 ), the researchers reported that 
their participants were stigmatised as irrational and unreliable by hospital staff. 
Because their participants had been diagnosed with a severe mental illness, they 
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were not taken seriously by mental health professionals. When they tried to 
communicate their point of view, what they verbalised was frequently disregarded as 
a symptom of the illness with which they were diagnosed. Thus the service users 
attempts to talk to the clinical staff involved in treating them was not regarded as 
meaningful discourse in itself, and was often used only to study the progress of their 
illness. The process of diagnosing mental illness is carried out by medical 
practitioners by means of identifying the symptoms of the illness, as evidenced by 
the speech and behaviour of service users. Thus the views expressed by service users 
are often reconceptuallsed to represent symptoms which are presumed to indicate the 
presence of a biologically based illness (see also sections 3.4 and 3.5 on the 
particular issues relating to women and the stigma of a psychiatric diagnosis). 
1.6 The policy of care in the community 
1.6.1 The development of the policy 
The organisation of mental health services within the statutory sector in 
Britain has been influenced significantly over the last twenty years by the 
introduction of the policy of community care. The term 'community care' is 
infamously ill defined, both in government policy documents, and in other literature 
on the subject (Goodwin 1993, McCourt Perring 1993). This reflects the lack of 
clarity in the formulation of the policy (Pilgrim and Rogers 1994). In practice, the 
term refers to the policy of administering treatment and care in non-institutional 
settings to people who have learning disabilities, are physically disabled, diagnosed 
with mental illness or elderly people in need of care (Pilling 1991). Among the main 
initiatives in community care for those diagnosed as mentally ill, are the 
development of acute psychiatric units in district general hospitals, the introduction 
of multi-disciplinary community mental health teams, the development of day 
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centres, and community mental health centres. There is also an emphasis on caring 
done by volunteers, unpaid relatives and friends (Pilgrim and Rogers 1994). Women 
may find themselves particularly affected by the policy as they often assume a 
caring role for other family members affected by health problems (Annandale 1998). 
In addition, as members of the working class of both genders often cannot afford to 
pay for caring services, they may also be disproportionately affected by the move 
towards community care and the rundown of formal caring services (Arber and Ginn 
1992) 
A major justification for the introduction of the programme of psychiatric 
hospital closure has been the negative effect upon patients of institutionalisation. 
Studies suggest that those who remain in psychiatric hospitals for a prolonged period 
of time experience a severe decrease in social functioning and have an increased risk 
of rehospitalisation when they are released (Pilling 199 1, Wales 1975, Goffman 
1961). The hospital environment where even the smallest details of everyday life are 
regulated - when to get up, when to go to sleep, when and what to eat and drink for 
example, is inherently disempowering and fosters passivity and dependency in 
patients (Wales 1975, Goffman 196 1). 
Another significant reason for the closure of psychiatric hospitals has been a 
desire by the medical establishment to create a more secure and prestigious basis for 
psychiatry. The latter had long been regarded as the 'poor cousin' of general 
medicine (Pilgrim and Rogers 1994). There has been a clear desire on behalf of the 
medical profession to locate psychiatry alongside other medical specialisms in the 
general hospital (Pilgrim and Rogers 1994, Busfield 1993, McCourt Perring 1993, 
Baruch and Treacher 1978). In addition there have been problems for service 
providers in maintaining large psychiatric hospitals, for example the high level of 
financial expenditure needed to run them, chronic understaffing and difficulties in 
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recruiting and retaining staff (Pilling 1991 ). 
However, the policy of care in the community has been developed and 
implemented quickly over the last twenty years, largely due to financial constraints 
on the welfare state. Scull ( 1977) has pointed out that the critique of the asylum 
system of psychiatry was nothing new, in fact it was a hundred years old, but was 
being implemented in Britain as a matter of urgency largely for financial reasons. 
This led to what has been called an 'unholy alliance' between those whose main 
concern is the cost saving potential for community care and those who have a 
genuine interest in the provision of a comprehensive therapeutic community based 
service (Pilling 1991), 
The original intention in much of the rhetoric around the policy was that the 
money from the closure of the hospitals would be used to fund community based 
services. However, there is little evidence that this money is being redirected into 
community based alternatives and there have been no explanations offered for this 
by the relevant government departments (Prior 1999, Community Care 1994). 
Despite a steady decline in the number of people occupying hospital beds in Britain 
since the 1960s, short stay admissions have actually increased dramatically. This 
increase is indicative of a 'revolving door syndrome' of hospitalisation rather than of 
care in the community (Francis 1994, Pilgrim and Rogers 1994). This is a common 
situation where psychiatric patients are released from hospital, but because they 
receive inadequate services in the community must be readmitted to hospital. 
Clearly this syndrome is perpetuated by providing services which are not responsive 
to the needs of service uscrs. 
The care in the community policy has been roundly condemned by user 
groups (see section 1.6.2) and campaigning bodies such as the Zito trust and SANE 
(Schizophrenia A National Emergency). There is no doubt that community based 
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services are seriously underfunded and as a result significant numbers of people are 
not accessing mental health services (Prior 1999, Community Care 1994). However, 
the failure of the policy has been emphasised by some groups by means of 
highlighting the acts of violence which have been caff ied out by some psychiatric 
patients in the community. This has been criticised by many users for further 
stigmatising and demonising psychiatric service users (see section 3.4). Indeed, in 
the public perception violence has become increasingly linked with mental illness 
(Sayce 2000, Pearson 1999, Prior 1999, Samson 1995), despite the fact that over 
95% of violent crime is committed by people who have never received a diagnosis 
of mental illness (Sayce 2000). 
It has been asserted that the criticisms of the community care policy, in 
particular, the perceived link between violence and mental illness may lead to a 
reversal of the policy and moves towards rein stitutional i sation of service users (Prior 
1999, Samson 1995). In 1999 the Department of Health issued a report on the 
community care policy entitled 'Modernising Mental Health Services- Safe, Sound 
and Supportive' (Department of Health 1999). In discussing proposed changes to the 
system it emphasises. the failure of the community care policy, particularly in terms 
of public safety. 
"Care In the community has failed because, while it improved the treatment of many 
people who were mentally ill, it left far too many walking the streets, often at risk to 
themselves and a nuisance to others. A small but significant minority have been a threat to 
others and themselves. " (Department of Health 1999: 6) 
It asserts that the first priority of mental health services is safety for the 
public. One of the problems it identifies is an "outdated legal framework which 
failed to support effective treatment outside hospital" (Department of Health 
1999: 3). It also suggests the introduction of more hospital beds. As a result of this 
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report the Mental Health Act 1983 is currently being reviewed. One of the suggested 
changes is that individuals can be legally compelled to accept psychiatric medication 
(if they are deemed to be a danger to themselves or other people) whilst they are 
residing in the community (Scoping Study Committee 1999). The government has 
announced that "non compliance with agreed treatment will not be an option" 
(Quoted in Sayce 2000: 120). Under the provisions of the 1983 Act, enforced 
treatment can only take place within a hospital environment. 
A major justification for the move towards community care was that the 
changes in the system would benefit the people who actually use the services in 
question. However, the development of successive governmental policies in this area 
has not been informed in any significant way by the perspectives of service users 
(Prior 1999, Davis 1988). As successive governments have assumed that dominant 
psychiatric practice is effective, they have tended to rely upon the views of 
psychiatrists when reorganising psychiatric service provision (Goodwin 1993, 
Pilgrim 1993). 
"Politicians of all hues still defer to doctors to identify the clinical needs of 'their' 
patients. 11iis reinforces the tradition of paternalism in welfare provision in which 
professionals 'know best' and patients are not expected to speak for themselves. " (Pilgrim 
1993: 254) 
It could be argued that in order to effectively reform mental health service 
provision the views of users themselves should, at a fundamental level, inform the 
development of alternative service provision (see also sections 2.3-2.4). This is 
especially relevant as the rise of the mental health users movement and the large 
scale survey 'People First' carried out with the user group MIND (Rogers, Pilgrim 
and Lacey 1993), indicates widespread dissatisfaction with psychiatric practice 
among service users (see section 1.6.2). To continue to fund services which are not 
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regarded as beneficial by users is a serious waste of resources and one that can have 
a long term damaging effect upon the users involved. For this reason service users' 
groups have consistently campaigned for more input into the policy-making 
processes that take place at both a national and local level. Despite some successes, 
however, they are still not perceived as the equal partners of psychiatrists and other 
professional bodies in the consultative process. 
'4... although they are expanding in number, many user orgarnsatlons are 
disappointed by the lack of progress that the movements have made in terms of making an 
impact on changes in policy directions. In the UK, for example, user organisations are 
increasingly being asked to sit on committees of service users to give feedback to the NHS 
trusts responsible for mental health services. However, there is very little power attached to 
such committees, and any changes made are usually fairly minor. " (Prior 1999.74) 
1.6.2 The mental health users movement and community care 
The proliferation of mental health service users' groups in the last two 
decades has been noted by a number of commentators (Rogers and Pilgrim 1991, 
Burstow and Weitz 1988, Chamberlain 1988). This development is a result of a 
groundswell of dissatisfaction among service users which health and social services 
have overall failed to contain (Pilgrim and Rogers 1994). 
The dominant groups in the mental health users movement are MIND, The 
National Schizophrenia Fellowship (NSF), The Manic Depression Fellowship 
(MDF), Survivors Speak Out and the Campaign Against Psychiatric Oppression 7 
There are important differences in theoretical approach among user groups. The 
NSF and MDF propound the biological model of mental illness. They accept the 
'These are the dominant groups within the movement but there are other smaller groups, 
such as women's advocacy groups, groups for survivors of abuse (in which members are 
also mental health service users) and inter-group service users' forums. 
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labels 'schizophrenia' and 'manic depression' uncritically; believing that 'sufferers' 
have a biological disease and supporting the medical profession in its attempt to find 
a medical cure for the conditions. By contrast, other groups such as MIND, 
Survivors Speak Out and the Campaign Against Psychiatric Oppression reject the 
term 'mental illness' and the notion that there is a biological illness which requires a 
cure. The term 'mental illness' is therefore replaced by terms such as 'emotional 
distress', 'mental distress' or 'mental health problem'. There is some hostility 
towards the NSF by other user groups. One of the reasons for this is that the 
organisation is perceived as giving priority to the interests of relatives and carers 
over those of the users themselves (Rogers and Pilgrim 199 1) and their uncritical 
acceptance of professional authority. However, the majority of groups within the 
mental health users movement overall, have a critical attitude towards mental health 
professionals. The oppressive power relationship inherent in dealing with mental 
health professionals, is constantly emphasised (Rogers and Pilgrim 1991). 
Rogers and Pilgrim ( 199 1) carried out a study of the British Mental Health 
Users' movement based- oil iramiews. with- ten activists in the mGvemenL- The 
researchers discussed with interviewees their views on the care in the community 
policy which has been pursued by successive governments. They concluded that: 
"A consensual principle... is that alternatives to the status quo are required in 
relation to mental health policy and practice. In particular, the need for non-hospital based 
'asylum' during crises and material resources such as housing to enrich everyday life are 
emphasised as current deficiencies, as were the negative effects of psychotropic drugs. 
Generally, deinstitutionalisation was deemed to be a positive aspect of policy and there 
appeared to be few reservations about its consequences... All shades of opinion emphasised 
the importance of being listened to and treated with respect. "(Rogers and Pilgrim 1991) 
The 'People First' study carried out in conjunction with the user group 
MIND (Rogers, Pilgrim and Lacey 1993) also indicates a high level of 
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dissatisfaction among mental health service users with the current organisation of 
psychiatric services. Of a sample of 516 service users who had all been hospitalised 
on at least one occasion, 73% thought that their admission to hospital had been 
necessary because of a need for asylum and a failure to cope with their everyday 
lives. However, half of the sample thought that they should have been offered an 
alternative form of crisis care. Only 14% of the sample were actually offered an 
alternative to hospital 1 sation, but this was perceived as inadequate as it was usually 
only the offer of an outpatient appointment. 
The 'People First' (1993) study indicates that psychiatric intervention is still 
based primarily on the hospital and is dominated by drugs and ECT . Despite the 
removal of the old Victorian psychiatric hospitals, the hospital still remains the key 
focus for the care of clients regardless of whether they are treated on an in or 
outpatient basis. This is often an acute unit in a district general hospital (Pilgrim 
1993). The 'People First' study also indicated problems in relation to the coercion of 
patients, even those who are resident in hospital on a voluntary basis. Frequently 
participants had felt forced into becoming a hospital patient and receiving physical 
treatments because of a lack of any other alternatives (Pilgrim 1993). In addition 
there was a general lack of informed consent. According to Pilgrim 
"Me data make it clear that the further recipients are away from hospital, the more 
they like their lives. Hospital interventions are not user-friendly. They are associated 
generally with an oppressive or distressing experience. If patients and prospective patients 
are to live as normally as possible in the community, the implications are that service 
options should be available in that setting. Tbese would include crisis houses, outreach work 
and 24-hour, seven-days-a-week crisis intervention teams, counselling, drop-in centres and 
day centres housing a variety of activities. "(Pi lgrim 1993: 252). 
The 'People First' survey provides a valuable source of information on a 
wide range of topics relating to the concerns of service users, but the findings of the 
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study are not rigorously analysed according to the gender of the participants in the 
research. For example, the specific views of women participants on the policy of 
care in the community were not analysed and presented in their research report. In 
addition, the 'People First' study was carried out by means of a questionnaire in 
which the researchers did not set out to gather information on issues which 
specifically relate to women. Thus issues such as the mixed ward system in hospital, 
sexist attitudes amongst service providers, and the lack of childcare provision for 
users with young children were not addressed. This does represent a significant 
omission in the 'People First' study. 
The 'People First' study (1993) clearly indicates that service users are 
dissatisfied with the emphasis on the medical, rather than the social, assistance of 
service users within the statutory mental health system. The medicallsation of 
mental health issues is, at least in part, responsible for the lack of mental health 
services that are available outside of the hospital setting as within psychiatry, 
medical treatment, rather than social support, is regarded as the most appropriate 
way of assisting mental health service users. 
1.7 The incidence of diagnosed mental illness among women 
Over the last twenty years numerous studies have been published which 
indicate that women have a higher overall rate of diagnosed mental illness than do 
men (for example Darton et al 1994, Community Care 1994, Association of 
Metropolitan Authorities 1993, Cobb 1993, Gorman 1992, Welsh Office 1991b, 
HMSO 1987). One of the explanations which has been offered for the higher rate of 
recorded mental illness amongst women, is that reproductive processes affecting 
women, such as childbirth, menstruation and menopause, make them particularly 
susceptible to developing mental health problems (Busfield 1996, Cochrane 1983). 
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A significant number of women (10-30%) experience depression after childbirth and 
there is some debate as to whether this is the result of psychosocial stresses, changes 
in physiology, or a combination of the two (Busfield 1996, Ussher 199 1, Nicolson 
1989). Research relating to this issue (such as that carried out by Nazroo, Edwards 
and Brown 1998, Weissman and Klerman 1977) has asserted that the social factors 
associated with women's reproductive processes - such as the social isolation of new 
mothers for example - significantly mediate women's experiences of these 
biological processes. They conclude that the biological factors in themselves could 
not account for the rate of diagnosed mental illness, as sex differences in the 
incidence of diagnosed mental illness are not universal across time and place. As 
women's biological processes are the same, this tends to rule out biology as being 
the simple cause of women's diagnoses of mental illness 
Feminist theorists have offered two basic reasons for the higher incidence 
among women of recorded mental illness - the social causation hypothesis and the 
labelling theory (Darton et al 1994, Gorman 1992). The former asserts that 
experiences of violence, harassment and discrimination on the grounds of gender 
produce a high level of actual mental distress among women (Darton et al 1994, 
Gorman 1992, Barnes and Maple 1992, Beckert 1987). The latter indicates that 
cultural notions of what constitutes 'proper' femininity influence the definition and 
treatment of mental health problems among women, so that more women are 
labelled as 'mentally ill' (Darton et al 1994, Gorman 1992, Barnes and Maple 1992). 
In making both of these arguments feminist theorists have sometimes been accused 
of making an essentially contradictory statement; asserting that more women are 
mentally ill because of their position in society, and also saying that they are not 
mentally ill but merely labelled as such because of the application of sexist 
diagnostic criteria (Sedgewick 1982). Busfield (1996) has correctly pointed out that 
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this criticism stems from a misreading of the feminist argument. The actual 
experience of mental distress and the process of diagnosing mental illness by 
psychiatrists are two quite distinct social processes. Large numbers of women 
approach mental health professionals for help with psychological distress which is 
caused by oppressive social experiences. The diagnostic labels which are then 
applied to women in a clinical setting may be chosen with reference to sexist 
criteria. Thus there is no inherent contradiction in the feminist position, a position 
which I will now explore in more depth. 
It has been asserted that women are often perceived to have a mental illness 
simply by virtue of their gender (Gorman 1992, Bames and Maple 1992, Penfold 
and Walker 1984, Broverman, Broverman, Clarkson, Rosenkrantz and Vogel 1970). 
In a study carried out by Broverman et al in 1970, seventy nine medical practitioners 
were asked to describe a healthy, mature adult, sex unspecified, a healthy mature 
man and a healthy mature woman. It was found that definitions of healthy men and 
women differed according to traditional sex role stereotypes. In addition the 
characteristics of the healthy adult sex unspecified were the same as the 
characteristics listed for the healthy adult man. Thus the characteristics clinicians 
believed to be mentally healthy in general, were the same characteristics which they 
ascribed to healthy men. Particular characteristics were thought to be evidence of 
pathology in one sex, but not pathological in the opposite sex. The researchers 
conclude 
"... we see the judgements of our sample of clinicians as merely reflecting the sex- 
role stereotypes, and the diffenng valuations of these stereotypes prevalent in our society. It 
is the attitudes of our society that create the difficulty. However the present study does 
provide evidence that clinicians do accept these sex role stereotypes, at least implicitly, and 
by so doing, help to perpetuate the stereotypes. Therapists should be concerned about 
whether the influence of the sex-role stereotypes on their professional activities acts to 
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reinforce social and intrapsychic conflict. " (Broverman et al 1970: 7) 
Although this study is now thirty years old, it has been claimed that this 
tendency to sex role stereotype men and women remains (Busfield 1996, Barnes and 
Maple 1992, Gorman 1992, Penfold and Walker 1984). Women who show signs of 
aggression, anger, independence and are concerned with self advancement are often 
perceived by clinicians to be less emotionally stable than men with the same 
personality characteristics (Gorman 1992, Penfold and Walker 1984). 
"Clinical judgements of women tend to reflect the traditional stereotype of 
femininity centred on passivity, dependency and putting others before oneself - 
characteristics which are at odds with healthy adult behaviour centred on activity, 
independence and assertiveness. Femininity and positive mental health seem to be mutually 
exclusive - to be considered mentally healthy, women are required not to respond in a 
natural manner to events but In a predetermined 'feminme' manner... "(Gorman 1992: 19) 
However, even if women act in a 'feminine' manner, the characteristics 
which they display may be perceived by many clinicians to be inherently unhealthy 
(Hill 1983 - see also section 1.2). The dominant ideology which asserts that men are 
more rational than women may have some impact upon psychiatry. Women are 
sometimes thought to be particularly susceptible to mental illness as mental illnesses 
themselves are characterised by a loss of rationality (Busfield 1996). In reviewing 
the literature which indicates this tendency Hill concludes 
"... women entering 'mental health' agencles are victIms of the same vicious double- 
bind which so effectively oppresses them in the broader society. Women are devalued for 
acting the way their socialization trained them to act and are punished for trying to escape 
the roles traditionally imposed on them. " (Hill 1983: 270). 
it has been claimed that because they are often expected to be less healthy 
anyway, women are often not diagnosed with the most severe mental illness unless 
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they are breaking out of traditional gender behaviour (Hill 1983). Behaviour which 
violates traditional gender norms for women and men may incur a severe reaction 
both in society generally and in the mental health services in particular (Busfield 
1996, Barnes and Maple 1992, Gallagher 1987, Penfold and Walker 1984). 
It has been argued that a further reason for the higher rate of recorded mental 
illness among women is that women are socialised into expressing emotion and 
talking about their problems, so that they are more likely to be labelled and to label 
themselves as having a mental health problem (Busfield 1996, Gorman 1992, 
Chesler 1972). Men who are socialised to be less expressive concerning their 
emotions may be less likely to consult a GP concerning a mental health problem 
(Gorman 1992). Men generally have a higher incidence of alcoholism and death by 
suicide than do women (Busfield 1996, Department of Health 1993, RMSO 1987). 
If the prevalence of diagnosed mental illness amongst women was only due to an 
increased tendency amongst women to admit to problems, however, it would not 
explain why some studies have suggested that married women have higher rates of 
diagnosed mental illness than married men or single women (Gallagher 1987). This 
research appears to suggest that marriage can have a positive effect on men's mental 
health whilst sometimes having a detrimental effect on the mental health of women 
(Faludi 1992, McRae and Brody 1989, Gallagher 1987). 
There have been various reasons suggested why marital status should affect 
the distribution of mental illness. One reason is that marriage may be more stressful 
for women than it is for men. Bearing responsibility for the running of a household 
is particularly fi-ustrating and unrewarding (Oakley 1990). The role of the housewife 
is simply to do 'everything', all the domestic tasks within the home (Oakley 1990, 
Gove 1972). The work is isolated, unstructured, and highly demanding (Oakley 
1990). There is no wage to be earned in return for work done, there are no set hours 
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to be worked and no holidays. Married women who have jobs outside the home are 
often under greater strain than their husbands since they often still bear 
responsibility for housework while also in paid employment (Gove 1972). 
Historically, the development of the modem nuclear family has seen the separation 
of work and home, and the increasing privatisation of family life. The ideology of 
the family, including psychological theories about the role of the mother in the 
healthy development of children, has led to Increasing pressure upon women to 
perform the emotional and practical tasks of creating a 'haven in a heartless world' 
for other family members to enjoy (Penfold and Walker 1984, Barrett and McIntosh 
1982) 
"The emotional management of strains created outside the family but experienced 
within the family, along with the management of those strains in the family, is all seen as 
the woman's job. Further, with the recognition that the workplace is insecure, alienating 
and, for most middle - as well as working-class men, organised in ways which are outside of 
their control and location, women are expected to provide the intimacy lacking outside and 
to take up the emotional and economic slack in times of hardship". (Penfold and Walker 
1984: 68-69). 
In addition, women have a lower socio-economic status than men overall 
(Ussher 1991). They often earn less income, have less status and participate less in 
leisure activities. This is significant, as there is an established link between poverty 
and psychological distress (Bruce et al 1991). The responsibility of caring for 
children can contribute to emotional distress (Barnes and Maple 1992, Brooke and 
Davis 1985, Brown and Harris 1978). Sexual and physical violence against women 
is also a significant cause of emotional distress (Dobash and Dobash 1992, Herman 
1992). In fact, there is a considerable amount of research evidence which suggests 
that a history of physical and sexual abuse is the cause of many conditions which 
receive a diagnosis of severe mental illness (Darton et al 1994, Williams et a] 1993, 
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Herman 1992, Barnes and Maple 1992 - see also chapter five). 
It is only through the women's movement that attention has been focused on 
the problems of domestic violence and incest (Dobash and Dobash 1992, Herman 
1992, Armstrong 1991). It has been estimated that domestic violence occurs in I in 4 
households (Smith 1989). This violence is usually carried out by men and is directed 
towards the women and children within their families (Hague and Malos 1993, 
Dobash and Dobash 1992). The violence ranges from repeated assaults to rape and 
murder. Research has indicated that men's possessiveness and jealousy, their 
expectations concerning women's domestic work, the importance to men of 
exercising their authority along with a sense of their 'right' to punish 'their' women 
for perceived wrongdoing are all significant sources of conflict leading to men's 
violent attacks on women (Dobash and Dobash 1992). Domestic violence is not 
confined to any particular socio-economic group (Hall and Lynch 1998, Dobash and 
Dobash 1992). 
The prevalence of child sexual abuse has been estimated at between 6% and 
62% for girls, and 3% to 27% for boys (Ghate and Spencer 1995). The discrepancies 
in these estimates relate to the definitions of sexual abuse, sample size; and the 
methodologies used in the studies. Previous research has indicated that more 
children are sexually abused within their families of origin than by strangers (Ciba 
Foundation 1984, Finkelhor 1979). The sexual abuse of children within the family is 
not confined to any particular socio-economic group (Hall and Lynch 1998, 
Finkelhor 1979). The effects of child sexual abuse can be far reaching and continue 
into adulthood. Anxiety, depression, problems forming relationships, phobias, panic 
attacks self mutilation, attempted suicide, substance abuse and eating disorders are 
some of the effects of this abuse (Hall and Lynch 1998, Mullen, Martin, Anderson, 
Romans and Herbison 1996, Herman 1992, John 1991, Browne and Finkelhor 
53 
1986). A woman having a history of abuse is often linked to high levels of mental 
health service use (Williams et al 1993, Bames and Maple 1992, Herman 1992). In 
planning and providing mental health services it is vital, therefore, that abuse issues 
are tackled in order to create a responsive service (Williams et al 1993). However 
there is some evidence that services are not providing women help in dealing with 
their abuse history (see for example Neate 1995, Williams et al 1993, - see also 
chapter five which concerns the particular experiences of women survivors of child 
sexual abuse in the mental health system ). In particular, Herman (1992) has 
indicated that dissociative feelings are often perceived by medical practitioners to be 
symptomatic of a psychosis. She asserts that: 
"Survivors of childhood abuse, like other traumatized people, are frequently 
misdiagnosed and mistreated in the mental health system. Because of the number and 
complexity of their symptoms, their treatment is often fragmented and incomplete. Because 
of their characteristic difficulties in close relationships, they are particularly vulnerable to 
revictimisation by caregivers. They may become engaged in ongoing, destructive 
interactions, In which the medical or mental health system replicates the behaviour of the 
abusive family. " (Herman 1992: 123) 
In this manner, many feminist theorists have argued that the incidence of 
recorded mental illness amongst women is produced, at least in part, by the high 
level of actual distress amongst women caused by social factors such as poverty; the 
stress of motherhood and the responsibilities for housework; and sexual and physical 
abuse. It has also been argued that the development and application of sexist 
diagnostic criteria may create the appearance that women suffer more from mental 
health problems than do men. In addition to sexism, it has been claimed that 
- ageist, and homophobic criteria in clinicians sometimes use racist; classist, 
diagnosing mental illness (Darton et al 1994, Barnes and Maple 1992, Torkington 
1991, Diamant 1987, Penfold and Walker 1984). The problem of discriminatory 
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labelling is not one that can simply be removed by encouraging psychiatric 
professionals to change their attitudes to women and other oppressed groups, by 
means of equal opportunities training for example. The problem is a much more 
fundamental one than this, as historically theories of psychological development and 
psychological disorder have developed in a social context which is imbued at every 
level with the ideology of women's inferiority to men, black people's inferiority to 
white people, homosexual inferiority to heterosexual. 
There are further issues relating to the gender distfibution of mental illness, 
and these relate to the relationship between gender differences in expressing 
emotions and the construction of diagnostic categories within psychiatry. Busfield 
(1996) argues caution in generalising from statistical data on the epidemiology of 
mental illness the theory that women as a group suffer from more mental health 
problems than do men. She points out that such studies do not take account of 
gender differences in the way that men and women experience and express 
psychological distress. Busfield argues that men and women are socialised to 
express their feelings in different ways. Women are encouraged to turn distressing 
feelings inwards so that they are experienced as anxiety and depression, states which 
commonly come within the remit of psychiatry. Men, on the other hand turn these 
feelings outwards, being more inclined to alcoholism and acts of violence (Busfield 
1996, Barrett and McIntosh 1982). 
Anti-social behaviour is often diagnosed by psychiatrists as evidence of a 
personality disorder. Personality disorders are often regarded as untreatable within 
psychiatry and whilst they are perceived as indicative of a mental disorder, they are 
not defined as mental illnesses. Therefore they are often disregarded in 
epidemiological studies which aim to collect data on the prevalence of mental 
illness. Similarly, substance abuse is not defined as a mental illness and so is not 
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included in many studies which focus on mental illness. However, men have much 
higher prevalence rates for both personality disorders and substance abuse than do 
women (Prior 1999). Prior (1999) has asserted that the exclusion of these conditions 
from statistical studies on the prevalence of mental illness has led to the mistaken 
view that women suffer more mental health problems than do men. When these 
other conditions are taken into account, the incidence of recorded mental health 
problems amongst women and men tends to balance out (Prior 1999). 
In Wales in 1998, women made up the majority of psychiatric inpatients 
(10,061 women compared with 8,446 men - Welsh Office 1999). However research 
has indicated that in urban areas particularly, young men are quickly becoming the 
group most likely to be admitted to psychiatric hospitals (Prior 1999, Payne 1996, 
1995). This is in part explained by the implementation of the community care policy 
and the closure of many psychiatric hospitals. A perceived link between mental 
health problems and violence, coupled with a scarcity of hospital beds means that 
priority is often given to admitting young men, particularly young men from ethnic 
minorities, who are often seen as more prone to violence (Prior 1999, Payne 1996, 
1995). 
Outside of inpatient treatment however, women still largely predominate as 
mental health service users (Prior 1999). Prior has argued that because of the way 
men express emotions they are often perceived to be 'bad' rather than 'mad' and so 
are more likely to be relegated to the prison system rather than to outpatient medical 
care (Prior 1999). 
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1.8 Psychiatry as a mechanism of social control 
In 'Madness and Civilization' (1967) Foucault argues that madness is a 
socio-historical construction that is defined and treated according to the particular 
preoccupations of the age. In mediaeval England madness was defined in religious 
terms. From the mid-seventeenth century a 'great confinement' took place in Europe 
when deviant groups who posed a threat to bourgeois values - such as the mad, the 
destitute, the lazy and the criminal - were segregated from the rest of society". 
Economic inactivity was seen as a particular threat at the time and madness was 
condemned as a morally reprehensible form of idleness. Foucault also argues that in 
line with enlightenment values (which placed a great emphasis on rationality), those 
who were seen as irrational were stigmatised and excluded from the rest of society. 
The emergence of psychology and psychiatry was thus based on the exclusion and 
containment of madness by reason. 
Foucault has described how the emergence of a dominant medical discourse 
defined notions of normality (health) and deviance (illness) in relation to the 
population. He asserted that this medical discourse plays a significant role in the 
management both of the bodies of individual people and of collectivities of bodies. 
The power of the medical profession stems from their monopoly over the 
construction of this medical discourse (Foucault 1973). Thus the practice of 
medicine concerns wider structures of power and control both in relation to 
individuals and the population at large. Foucault (1967) argues that medicine plays a 
moral role in articulating the norms of behaviour (such as 'appropriate' forms of 
sexuality). In Foucault the notion of discipline is also important, as medicine plays a 
' This picture is somewhat inaccurate, however, as it was not until after 1780, that the 
number of psychiatric institutions grew rapidly in Britain (Plitgrim and Rogers 1996). 
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role in disciplining both public and private bodies in terms of what is appropriate 
behaviour for any given space (Foucault 1979,1973). 
One of the important aspects of Foucault's analysis is that he drew attention 
to the fact that issues such as madness, asylums, hospitals and institutions had 
largely been forgotten by many Marxist theorists in their analyses of power. These 
detailed operations of power had been ignored through an exclusive focus on global 
forms of power. Foucault asserted that power does not take on a monolithic form 
and cannot be reduced to centralised macropolitical power. According to Foucault 
(1979), power is not centralised but is reproduced in discursive9 networks at every 
point where someone who possesses knowledge is in a position of instructing those 
who do not know. Thus power relations are reproduced whenever there is an 
exchange of knowledge. Discourses promote specific kinds of power relations, 
usually favouring the 'neutral' person or professional who is using the discourse (the 
psychiatrist, lawyer, professor etc. ). Knowledge is therefore not a neutral 
phenomenon but entails participation in complex webs of power. 
The work of Foucault has been influential in the development of 
postmodernist theories (for example Weedon 1987). However, many feminists 
utilise a Foucault-derived concept relating to the role of discourse in maintaining 
and reproducing power relations without subscribing to a postmodemist position of 
the radical deconstruction of the subject (Andermahr, Lovell and Wolkowitz 1997, 
Charles and Hughes-Freeland 1996). It is also possible to make use of the concept 
whilst at the same time indicating the importance of state and legal power in 
' Foucault defines discourse as Ahe group of statements that belong to a single system of 
formation" (1972: 107-8). Discourse is also used to denote an authoritative way of 
describing. Discourses are propagated by specific institutions and divide up the world in 
specific ways. For example, economic, medical, legal and psychological discourses. 
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regulating women. The notion of discourse has been seen as a useful tool in 
analysing power relations, for even where power is conceptualised as being invested 
in the global forms of capitalism and/or patriarchy, there are a nexus of 
micropolitical channels in which power relations are exercised and reproduced on an 
interpersonal level (Grosz 1990). Indeed, the feminist notion that 'the personal is 
political' indicates that power relations are sustained in the interpersonal as well as 
the public domain. Although not adopting a postmodemist approach in my research I 
utilise the Foucauldian notion of discourse as embodying forms of power in order to 
analyse some of the specific relations between service users and providers in the 
statutory mental health system. 
In addition, throughout my research I make use of the approach adopted by 
Penfold and Walker in their analysis of psychiatry entitled "Women and The 
Psychiatric Paradox" (1984). In this work they utilise both Marxist and feminist 
ideas to explain what appears to be a fundamental paradox within psychiatry, 
namely that the discipline claims to be assisting mental health service users, whilst 
at the same time often engaging in practices which oppress many users. 
According to Penfold and Walker psychiatry serves both as a mechanism of 
social control within contemporary Western capitalist society whilst at the same time 
seeking to cure individuals of the psychological distress which the oppressive 
mechanisms of this society (psychiatry included) can actually produce. 
"Psychiatry is both part of the ideological and coercive mechanisms of industrial 
society and at the same time is committed to the resolution of the very tensions and strains 
which that society and its institutions produce. It is from this central contradiction that many 
other difficulties stem and this makes it possible for psychiatry to take a part in the 
oppression of some of the very people it purports to help. " (Penfold and Walker 1984: v) 
Penfold and Walker argue that psychiatry is an agent of social control for 
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two reasons. Psychiatry often seeks to promote conformity to the ideological norms 
of behaviour in society. Thus for example people who act against the stereotypical 
norms of gender behaviour sometimes incur severe diagnoses of mental illness and 
treatment often aims to make them adjust their behaviour to these ideological norms 
(see also Busfield 1996, Bames and Maple 1992, Gallagher 1987). Secondly, it is an 
inherently conservative institution due to its emphasis on individual pathology. 
Social forces within society are either ignored altogether or receive very cursory 
attention. The fact that there are oppressed groups within society, and that 
ideological and material discrimination against these groups can lead to 
psychological distress in individual members of the group is often ignored. Instead 
psychological distress is perceived as personal pathology, and the societal 
mechanisms which have contributed to this distress are left unaddressed. Penfold 
and Walker note that: 
"Many decisions that directly affect people's lives are made at state and corporate 
levels ... Those who, like psychiatrists intervene at the level of individual experience, must 
restrict their interventions to the immediate environment ... Hence, the 
focus on adaptation or 
adjustment of the individual to the circumstances, for which psychiatry has often been 
criticized, can be seen as both a reflection of, and a justification for, the ideology of 
individualism - which obscures the actual structuring of society. The work of psychiatry is 
to make individual experience comprehensible in individual terms, and not in any other way 
in which we might understand it. " (Penfold and Walker 1984: 50) 
Penfold and Walker argue that the dominant psychiatric approach embodies 
the liberal ideology of individualism which came to the fore during the development 
of Western capitalism. As psychiatry both mirrors and sustains this ideology of 
individualism it can be seen as part of the ideological structure of advanced Western 
capitalist systems, and tends to obstruct social change in those systems. 
Penfold and Walker assert that the experience of psychological distress in 
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Western society forms part of what they describe as the 'social cost of living' of 
being a member of an advanced industrial capitalist society which is vastly out of 
step with human needs. Thus they argue that strategies for social intervention in an 
individual's experience of mental ill health need to be grounded firmly in an 
acknowledgement and analysis of the social processes which play a role in the 
genesis of mental health problems, including issues of women's oppression. 
Conclusion 
Within modern psychiatry there are a range of different approaches in 
understanding and treating people who are perceived to have a mental illness. Many 
lay people believe that psychiatrists predominantly concern themselves with 
providing 'talking therapy' for their patients, to the extent that within public 
perception, psychiatry and psychoanalysis are often regarded as synonymous 
(Trimble 1988, Andreasen 1984). This view is a mistaken one however, as despite 
some eclecticism within the discipline as a whole, British psychiatry is dominated 
by a biological approach to the study and treatment of mental health problems 
(Busfield 1996, Samson 1995, Pilgrim and Rogers 1994, Bentall and Pilgrim 1993, 
Dworkin 1992, Johnstone 1989, Andreasen 1984). Psychiatrists are placed at the top 
of the hierarchy within statutory mental health service provision and the training 
they receive in psychiatry is dominated by the biological model (Johnstone 1993, 
1989). This model is also the approach most widely used amongst practising 
psychiatrists (Busfield 1996, Johnstone 1993,1989). The biological model thus 
comprises the single most important influence in the conceptual i sation and treatment 
of mental health problems within statutory mental health services. 
Philosophical questions relating to the interaction of the mind and body are 
significant in the conceptualisation of mental health and illness. The notion that 
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'mind' and 'brain' are actually two different terms for talking about the same 
phenomenon is a widely held view in biological psychology. In this theory emotions 
are conceptualised as being caused by chemical processes in the brain. Thus in this 
view the study of the material structure of the brain and the biochemical processes 
which occur within it form the proper basis of the discipline of psychology and of 
psychiatry (Kalat 1992, Guze 1989, Carlson 1986,1984, Beloff 1975, Blundell 
1975). Although many proponents of the biological model assert that environmental 
factors 'trigger' mental illnesses to develop in people who already have a genetic 
vulnerability to the diseases, social, psychological and environmental factors are not 
accorded much attention in their studies, Because of the dominance of the biological 
model, the majority of research which is carried out into the causes of mental illness 
focuses on identifying the precise genetic or biochemical processes which are 
thought to produce mental illness. To date, the findings of this research remain 
inconclusive. However, social science research which has identified links between 
social experiences and the causation of mental health problems has often been 
overlooked within psychiatry (section 1.1). 
Associated with the biological approach in psychology and psychiatry is the 
widespread belief that in order to produce accurate knowledge, scientific disciplines 
should employ a positivist methodology (see section 2.1). A crude positivist 
methodology entails that issues relating to the researcher's politics, emotions, and 
values represent a bias when conducting scientific research and are thus an obstacle 
to the attaining of factual knowledge (see section 2.1). In this perspective, 
psychologists and psychiatrists, in order to count as scientists, must concern 
themselves with studying 'hard' data related to objectively measurable (at least in 
theory) changes in the organic structures of the brain and body. They should not set 
out to consider issues of politics and emotions in the aetiology of mental distress as 
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this would represent subjective and therefore essentially unscientific data. 
There is considerable evidence to suggest that scientific research is 
inevitably affected by political issues; and so a refusal to acknowledge them tends to 
make the political ideas in the research enterprise covert. I discuss the role of politics 
and emotions in the research process in detail in chapter two. In terms of psychiatry 
however, diagnostic categories are invented by theorists within the discipline, and 
are then applied to individual service users by medical practitioners. Therefore 
psychiatry inevitably has an important social component and one that is also 
crucially affected by political issues (Scull 1989) (section 1.2). 
To date there has been considerable debate (mostly occurring outside 
psychiatry) concerning the validity of the biological model of mental illness. 
However, there has been very little research done which has aimed to examine the 
social impact of the biological model by reference to the users of services 
themselves. Within the biological model of mental illness service users are 
perceived be suffering with a disease which can tend to undermine their ability to 
think, behave and communicate rationally. From this perspective there would not 
always be a lot of point interviewing service users, as the information which would 
be gained would tend to be unreliable. 
The growth of mental health user groups in the last fifteen years provides 
evidence of widespread dissatisfaction amongst service users with the organisation 
and provision of mental health services under the community care policy. Research 
carried out with the user group MIND (Rogers, Pilgrim and Lacey 1993) indicates 
that a serious cause for concern among users is the lack of any alternative to 
psychiatric hospitalisation for those experiencing a mental health crisis. Many 
service users feel coerced into becoming a psychiatric hospital inpatient and/or 
receiving physical treatments because of a lack of any alternative service. Barham 
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and Hayward ( 199 1) indicate that service users then have to deal with the stigma of 
a psychiatric label and a problematic identity as an ex-mental patient. Often their 
experiences leave them feeling isolated and alone, with difficulties in finding 
employment and suitable housing. 
Research which has focused on service users perspectives (such as that 
carried out by Barham and Hayward 1991 and Rogers, Pilgrim and Lacey 1993), 
whilst providing valuable information relating to service users' views, do not 
investigate the specific issues affecting the women mental health users who 
participated in their research. This is a significant omission as gender is an inevitable 
factor in the construction and treatment of diagnosed mental illness. Although 
mental health issues can be seen as relevant to all members of society there are very 
distinctive political issues which need to be considered when investigating mental 
health service provision for women. The concept of mental health itself, and the 
way it is operationalised in the mental health system is an historical and social 
construct. Feminist researchers have drawn attention to the ways in which 
fundamental concepts of mental health and illness cannot be operated independently 
of gender (see section 1.7). Women comprise an oppressed group in society (see 
section 2.3) and this inevitably will have an impact upon their experiences of service 
use. Family life may be a significant factor in the causation and exacerbation of 
women's mental health problems. The pressures of motherhood, sexual abuse, incest 
and domestic violence are all factors that can have an impact upon women's mental 
health. 
Although useful, research carried out with women service users by Miles 
(1988), does not explore key issues relating to the power relations within mental 
health service provision and the social construction of the concept of mental illness. 
In this research I argue that the social experience of women service users, including 
64 
issues relating to the oppression of women both within and outside psychiatry, must 
be fully taken into account in order to effectively analyse the operation of the mental 
health system (see also section 23). The conceptualisation of mental illness within 
the biological model of mental illness has a significant impact upon the organisation 
and provision of mental health services. In this research I have set out to interview 
women service users with a variety of social characteristics in order to analyse the 
women's perspectives on mental health service provision in the era of community 
care, and I use this information as the basis of an analysis of the social impact of the 
biological model of mental illness. 
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Chapter Two : 
Methods and Methodolozy 
Introduction 
In the last chapter I reviewed the research which forms the background to my 
study. In this chapter I consider issues related to the research process. I discuss the 
epistemology which informs my research (sections 2.1-2.4), and go on to describe the 
methodology that I have used (sections 2.5- 2.9). 1 conclude by describing the 
methods I used in my fieldwork (sections 2.10-2.12). 1 use the term 'method' to refer 
to the actual techniques used for gathering information and the term 'methodology' 
to refer to the theory which informs the research process. I use the term 
4 epistemology' to refer to the theories of knowledge which constitute the 
philosophical basis for deciding what kinds of knowledge are possible and how 
knowledge claims may be validated. In line with my methodological commitments to 
reflexivity in the process of research I include an account of my background and 
political beliefs (section 2.5). 
Epistemology 
2.1. Objectivity in social scientific research 
The dominant model of science in the Western world is based upon the 
empiricist approach and can be referred to as 'positivism' (Bryman 1988, Phillips 
1977). Positivist epistemology has exerted a tremendous influence upon the 
development of science and has, in fact, become a defining factor in what counts as 
knowledge in many scientific disciplines (Steedman 199 1). 
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According to the positivist model, scientific knowledge is a collection of 
individual facts about the world, collected and ordered by science by means of 
systematic observation of empirical data (Phillips 1977, Kolakowski 1972, Ayer 
1966). In the positivist approach, the adequacy of any knowledge claim is based on 
its objectivity. The two criteria of objectivity are that, first, claims are capable of 
being verified by others by reference to observable facts, and that second, claims are 
not affected by the researcher's personal emotions, values and political interests. In 
order to ensure objectivity in hypothesis testing there is a common method which is 
meant to be followed systematically in order to exclude bias and ensure the neutrality 
of the process of observation. Observation of empirical data provides the evidence 
against which hypotheses can be tested and so is the basis for settling conflicting 
claims between competing theories. In the positivist approach it is often contended 
that empirical observation is unaffected by theory, and therefore neutral between 
competing theories and hypotheses. 
The notion of empiricist objectivity which accompanied the development of 
Western capitalism was historically very progressive as it freed scientific research 
from the constraints of the church. All scientific and social scientific research is built 
upon a foundation of ideas which were developed during the enlightenment period, in 
which reason (rather than religion) was championed as a source of knowledge 
(Annandale 1998, Gumah and Scott 1992) 
However, there are several criticisms which can be made of the positivist 
conception of objectivity. Feminist researchers have revealed the white male bias in 
many of the dominant scientific explanations of social life (Campbell 1994, Harding 
1993, Longino 1993). This bias indicates that political ideology has influenced the 
findings of the research in question. 
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Indeed, there is some evidence to suggest that the hypothesis testing method 
is not and cannot be 'value free', and so it cannot be 'objective' in the strict 
empiricist sense. Numerous philosophers of science (such as Winch 1990, 
Wittgenstein 1988, Kuhn 1962) have argued that observation is always mediated by a 
prior understanding of how the world interrelates. The formulation of any research 
question and the process of research itself, including the method of empirical 
observation, takes place within an overall theoretical framework. It is not possible for 
it to do otherwise for this is what renders the whole process meaningftil. 
'Ve do not deploy seeing in the activities of observation with a mind purged of all its 
contents; just the opposite is true, we need to know what sort of thing we are looking for 
before we can find anything to which we could give a name. We come, in fact, to the 
activities of observation with minds crammed full of ideas. " (Steedman 1991: 54). 
Which particular models for understanding and interpreting data are dominant 
at any given time is determined by what theories are available and, crucially, which of 
these theories is preferred above others. In this way the process of empirical 
observation cannot be strictly neutral, as it is inevitably affected by the theoretical 
commitments of the individual researcher, which in turn are influenced by the 
commitments of the wider scientific community. 
Furthermore, political ideas may be an important factor in determining which 
theories are preferred in the scientific community and therefore may play a role in 
shaping the research process (Ramazanoglu 1992, Herman 1992). For example, on 
the basis of his clinical work with women at the end of the last century, Sigmund 
Freud developed an understanding of the origin of a psychological condition 
prevalent among women which was labelled 'hysteria', as being based in the sexual 
abuse of children (Freud 1962). However the radical political implications of his 
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theory were unacceptable in the wider scientific community, and consequently 
became unacceptable to Freud himself (Herman 1992, Masson 1985). Freud went on 
to develop an alternative explanation based upon the same clinical evidence. In his 
new theory he argued that child sexual abuse did not actually occur and that 
complaints of childhood sexual abuse by patients were really only produced by their 
sexual fantasies. Significantly his theory then served a politically reactionary purpose, 
the implications of which were held to be acceptable in the wider community 
(Herman 1992, Masson 1985). This reformulation of theory inevitably affected the 
observations which he made from his clinical work with women. Previously, women's 
complaints of sexual abuse in childhood were seen by him as revealing that children 
were actually sexually abused by adults. Armed with his reformulated theory 
however, he perceived the women's complaints as evidence of their childhood fantasy 
of engaging in sexual activity with adults. Although the women in his practice were 
saying similar things in both of these stages of his intellectual work, his observations 
were mediated by a radically different theory in each stage. Which of these theories 
was held to be acceptable by both Freud himself and by the scientific community was 
significantly influenced by the political climate of the time. 
This example serves to illustrate a major problem with the conventional 
notion of objectivity. Not that it is too rigorous or objectifying - but that it is often 
not rigorous enough (Harding 1993, Jaggar 1983). This is because it has rested on 
the notion that it is possible for research projects to transcend political interests and 
values. In writing up accounts of research projects language is often used which 
masks individual emotion, perception and political belief A third person account of 
research is still the required form of presentation in many disciplines within the 
natural and social sciences. This is because it makes a stronger claim to the objectivist 
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stance, appearing to remove the 'fingerprints' of the individual researcher. In fact 
many researchers have no choice but to write up their research reports using the 
'voice of god' technique or they would have their work rejected by their peers. 
"... fieldwork analyses reflect our identities, ideologies, and political Views. Yet we 
often omit them from our published accounts because we want to present ourselves as social 
scientists: objective and neutral observers". (Kleinman and Copp 1993: 13 emphasis in 
ofigmal) 
Certain Marxist theorists have argued that a political and ideological bias is 
working especially strongly in a crude positivist conception of objectivity, as the 
notion suggests that there is a category of knowledge which is totally independent of 
the social context in which it originates (Lukacs 1971). 
It is by means of a thorough critique of the dualisms which were key in the 
development of Western capitalism that feminist theorists have identified the 
androcentrism in some scientific knowledge production (Maynard 1994, 
Ramazanoglu 1992). The dualisms which have been criticised are those which assume 
that objectivity is separable from and superior to subjectivity, just as mind is to body, 
reason is to emotion, male is to female. Hartmann (1979) has argued, for example, 
that the denigration of women as 'emotional' is an historically locatable phenomenon 
which is inextricably linked with the development of Western capitalism. Within 
Western capitalist society men are identified with reason, while women are identified 
with emotionality. From an early age therefore, girls are socialised to be dependent, 
empathic, receptive and responsive to emotions in others, while boys are socialised to 
be independent, instrumental, controlling and unemotional in their interactions. Males 
are encouraged from childhood therefore to concern themselves with issues of 'fact' 
untinged by emotion or value, the very norm which is so valued within scientific 
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research. Females on the other hand are encouraged to concern themselves with 
emotions and 'values', skills which are seen to be inferior to the masculine traits, and 
often thought inappropriate to scientific research. 
"... sexist ideology serves the dual purpose of glorifying male characteristics/capitalist 
values, and denigrating female characteristics/social need. If women were degraded or 
powerless in other societies, the reasons (rationalizations) men had for this were different. 
Only in a capitalist society does it make sense to look down on women as emotional or 
irrational. As epithets, they would not have made sense in the renaissance. Only in a capitalist 
society does it make sense to look down on women as 'dependent'. 'Dependent' as an epithet 
would not make sense in feudal societies. " (Hartmann 1979: 2 1). 
It is somewhat misleading however to posit a simple male/female dichotomy 
within the dominant ideology of Western capitalism, as within this ideology it is white 
men (particularly of the middle class) who benefit from being identified with reason. 
For example, by contrast, men of Afro Caribbean descent are identified with 
emotionality - excessive aggression and violence (Littlewood and Lipsedge 1989). 
This has significant impact upon the way they are treated within society generally and 
within mental health services in particular. Similarly, women of Afro Caribbean 
descent and white working class women may not be encouraged, within their own 
cultures, to be dependent and passive in the same way that white middle class women 
are 
However, it is important to note that emotions can provide a valuable source 
of knowledge. The analysis of emotional response, as this affects the researcher in the 
course of his/her work can yield important insight into the dynamics of the subject 
which is being investigated (Kleinman and Copp 1993, Kirkwood 1993, Kelly 1988) 
(for a discussion of the methodological implications of this see section 2.6). Whether 
emotions in the research process are acknowledged and analysed or not, however, all 
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researchers are affected by emotions at some time in the course of their studies. As 
Stanley and Wise have observed: 
"Whether we like it or not, researchers remain human beings complete with all the 
usual assembly of feelings, failings and moods. And all of these things influence how we feel 
and understand what is going on. Our consciousness is always the medium through which the 
research occurs; there is no method or technique of doing research other than through the 
medium of the researcher. " (1983: 15 7) 
Historically, the notion of empiricist objectivity embodied in the positivist 
approach has been crucially important in the development of social scientific ideas. 
However there has been a tendency within this approach to overlook important 
questions relating to the role of values, emotions and politics as they affect 
researchers within the course of their work. 
"rhere is no alternative to political conunitment in feminist or any other ways of 
knowing. Since knowing is a political process, so knowledge is intrinsically political. The 
problem for sociologists of any persuasion is then how to validate the knowledge they 
produce. " (Ramazanoglu 1992: 210-211) 
The issue of validation will be discussed in the next section. 
2.2 The role of ontology in questions of epistemology 
Any discussion of epistemology inevitably entails ontological issues, that is, 
questions concerning the theory of being. Discussing what kinds of knowledge are 
possible and how these knowledge claims can be validated implies a view of what 
there is that can be known - the 'it' of which we are trying to gain knowledge. The 
issues of epistemology and ontology are currently a complex and contested ground 
within the social sciences. Positivist epistemology entails an ontology whereby reality 
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is comprised of a set of objective facts - truths which exist independently of 
theoretical or political belief Therefore the role of the scientist is to find, analyse and 
present these objective truths in a neutral, objective and impartial way. Consequently 
many epistemologists working within the empiricist mode assert that the proper 
standpoint for research is that of the neutral disinterested observer. In the previous 
section I discussed arguments which suggest that no such standpoint is possible, as all 
research is politically and socially situated. Numerous researchers have asserted that 
all social science knowledge is unavoidably political in character and is therefore 
neither neutral nor disinterested (Ramazanoglu 1992, Finch 1984, Bell and Newby 
1977) 
It would be wrong however, to assume that this argument leads inevitably 
into a position of relativism where knowledge comprises a set of competing beliefs, 
each as valid as the other. Postmodernism, for example, in its strong form, responds 
to the problems associated with positivism by asserting that it is mistaken to attempt 
to research material reality at all, as there is no way of accessing an objective set of 
truths which comprise reality. Many postmodernists assert therefore that science is a 
'doomed enterprise' and the task of research is to criticise and deconstruct existing 
examples of cultural production. 
My position in this research is that although there is no standpoint outside of 
material and social life, there is a material and social reality which can be analysed 
and made accessible in the research process. As individuals we engage in material and 
social activities; our identities are created and recreated in these socially structured 
interactions. Social and material interactions influence the way we identify ourselves, 
and understand the world around us. As researchers we are affected by material and 
social processes at the same time as we attempt to analyse and understand these 
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processes. Thus for example in considering gender issues or questions of race, class, 
ethnicity and age it can be seen that we are all gendered, of an age, of a race, 
ethnicity and social class. There is no way to climb out of these material experiences 
to achieve the status of a neutral observer. Therefore research which makes a 
commitment to strong reflexivity in the research process and thus explicitly addresses 
its own social situation, including the political interests, power relationships, and 
imbalances which impact upon the researcher and the researched, yields a form of 
knowledge which is more valid and more rigorous. As the personal identity and 
political commitments of the researcher inevitably impact upon the research process, 
these factors should be clearly acknowledged and situated within the research focus. 
This approach has been developed (though not exclusively) by feminist researchers in 
the social sciences (see for example Maynard 1994, Kelly 1988, Harding 1987). 
Furthermore, just as the social science researcher cannot become a neutral 
observer for the purposes of research, the social issues which are the focus of 
investigation are not themselves politically neutral. We can gain knowledge of social 
and material reality in studying material practices in society, but this knowledge is 
inevitably political in character. The operation of the medical establishment, or the 
family, for example, are not politically neutral phenomena. Such institutions structure 
social activity, their history and operation in society is crucially expressive of, and 
affected by, questions of political ideology. Conceived in this way, material reality is 
itself a political and social phenomenon and so it is not actually possible to obtain 
apolitical knowledge of it. This means that as regards research there are not simply 
competing opinions each as valid as the other. Instead there are competing political 
standpoints concerning material reality. In this way the particular analysis which is 
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adopted will reflect the political interests and motivations of the individual researcher, 
and the wider community of which the researcher is a part. 
2.3 Standpoint Theory 
Within the social sciences there are a variety of social locations which may be 
used as the central focus in researching any particular issue, but some of these 
locations will provide a more effective epistemological source of investigation than 
others. The importance of studying the experience of oppressed groups in order to 
understand the operation of the social system, has histoncally been acknowledged by 
a number of philosophers including Marx and Hegel. This idea has been picked up 
and developed by feminist (for example Hartsock 1987, Smith 1987) and Marxist 
epistemologists (for example Lukacs 1971). Inevitably however, asserting the 
standpoint of the oppressed as a significant epistemological source of investigation, 
entails an ontological position in which it is acknowledged that there are groups 
which experience oppression within society. It also implies a political commitment to 
understanding this oppression in order to challenge it. It is not surprising therefore 
that this idea has been developed by both Marxist and feminist theorists. Both of 
these social movements are concerned with praxis - theory as a guide to action. 
In this research I use a Marxist definition of an oppressed group as a group of 
people who are systematically disadvantaged in relation to economic and social 
factors within the social structure, and in relation to whom there is a dominant 
ideology which asserts that this group is inferior to the rest of society who are not 
identified as belonging to the group. Women; the working class, people of colour; 
disabled people; and lesbians and gays, are examples of oppressed groups within 
British society. 
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I also utilise the Marxist view that the dominant ideology in any historical 
period is the ideology of the dominant class, a class in society which has a vested 
interest in maintaining its own position (Marx 1977). Because they wish to maintain 
their position at the upper echelons of the social hierarchy, the dominant class has an 
interest in ignoring, distorting and concealing the condition of oppressed groups 
within that society. As the ruling class within Western capitalism tends to dominate 
access to the means of knowledge production, prevailing scientific knowledge often 
reflects and perpetuates their interests (Lukacs 197 1 ). Furthermore the ruling class 
tends to accept an interpretation of reality which perpetuates a hierarchical system of 
organisation which satisfies their needs. They are largely insulated from reality as it is 
experienced by oppressed groups within society. On the other hand oppressed groups 
have an awareness of the dominant ideology within society which justifies this status 
quo, coupled with an awareness of their own experience at the lower layers of the 
social hierarchy. 
Marx has sometimes been accused of subscribing to a position of economic 
determinism in relation to ideology. This is a somewhat inaccurate criticism however, 
as within a position of Marxist dialecticaL matefigisd social institutions like the state 
and the family (and the ideology which is embedded within them) are seen as 
operating relatively independently of the economy and are perceived as key variables 
in the organisation of economic relations of domination and subordination. 
It has been claimed that because of their unique material position in society, 
studying social organisation from the standpoint of oppressed groups provides 
' Dialectical materialism holds that human labour is the basis of social activity, and that all 
social phenomena have a material character. Development In the social, historical, ideological 
and intellectual spheres occurs from the conflict of emerging contradictions and the creation 
of a new more advanced synthesis from this conflict (Marx 1964,1960, Engels 1960). 
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important insight into the material and ideological operations of the social order. 
Thus the standpoint of oppressed groups within society has been described as an 
epistemologically advantageous one (Smith 1987, Jaggar 1983). 
Feminist standpoint theory (for example as advocated by Hartsock 1987, 
Smith 1987, Jaggar 1983) argues that the experience and worldview of women 
provides one of the best sources of knowledge in our society. Against this it has been 
argued that since women are divided in crucial ways by a variety of other 
characteristics including their social class, race, ethnicity, and sexuality, the 
standpoint of 'women' cannot be conceptualised as providing the best vantage point 
from which to carry out research projects. It cannot account for the variety of lived 
experience of the oppressed of different genders, classes, sexualities and so on. This 
is a criticism which has been levelled at standpoint theory by postmodernist theorists 
in particular (for example Smart 1995). 
The acknowledgement and exploration of issues of difference, identity and 
power has been centrally important in the response of many feminists to the criticisms 
posed by postmodernist theorists, especially over the last twenty years (Charles 
1996). Black feminists within the women's movement have recognised that their own 
experience has been excluded in some analyses of women's oppression (Lorde 1992, 
hooks 1989,1984,1981, Collins 1986, Bhavnani and Coulson 1986, Davis 1982). 
Lesbian feminists have indicated too that the particular experiences of lesbians have 
been ignored in some feminist writing (Frye 1983, Wittig 1980). As a consequence 
many feminists working within the women's movement have striven to develop a 
more inclusive politics which explores the tensions and contradictions, as well as the 
similarities, in women's lived experience. 
In addressing strong postmodernist criticisms of standpoint theory, feminist 
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theorists have argued that all knowledge is inevitably socially situated and so there 
are a multiplicity of diverse standpoints (Haraway 199 1, Stanley and Wise 1990). 
Different standpoints can represent different positions among women in terms of the 
type of oppression they experience and the power they may possess. A multiplicity of 
standpoints among women actually reflects the relations of ruling in society -a 
society where women may not be completely powerless by virtue of the fact that they 
are women, but may be in a privileged social and material position as regards other 
women and men in terms of factors such as for example, class, race, and sexuality 
(Ramazanoglu 1986). Thus there are a range of possible vantage points which can be 
consciously chosen according to their political and social location, and which may be 
available to men as well as women (see for example Cain 1990). 
It has also been claimed that standpoint theory has strongly essentialist 
underpinningS2 (Andermahr, Lovell and Wolkowitz 1997). However feminist 
standpoint theory attempts to avoid essentialism by asserting that experience only 
produces knowledge when it is analysed according to theoretical concepts relating to 
the operation of social processes (Harding 1991, Smith 1988). In providing a 
theoretical basis upon which knowledge claims can be validated, it is argued that 
knowledge must be able to account for experience but it is not itself directly given by 
that expenence'. To say that-oppressed groups are epistemologically privileged 
therefore, does not mean that the more oppressed a person is the more complete their 
2 Essentialism is often contrasted with social constructionism. Tlie term 'essentialism' means 
certain essential, unchanging qualities from which differences spring (often cited as biological 
ones) (Andermahr et al 1997). 
' In this way standpoint theory attempts to avert a kind of identity politics in which knowledge 
is conceptualised as arising directly ftom experience so that one would need to share the same 
experience in order to properly understand it. 
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knowledge will be. A political understanding of the social relations which produce 
oppression and a personal experience of that oppression are two distinct entities. 
Experience of oppression does not in itself produce a critical awareness and 
understanding of the social relationships which have engendered this oppression 
(Maynard 1994, Jaggar 1983). For example, an individual member of an oppressed 
group within society may relate an experience which indicates that they been 
disadvantaged in a socially significant way and they may indicate that this caused 
them practical and emotional suffering. This does not mean however that they will 
necessarily perceive the political and social mechanisms which have produced this 
disadvantage. Significantly also they may not perceive themselves to be oppressed at 
all. As the ruling class tends to dominate access to knowledge production, the fact 
that the dominant class benefits directly from exploitative practices in society is ofien 
obscured. Within this ideology oppressed groups are often described as being 
disadvantaged because of a supposed flawed group characteristic. For example, there 
is some evidence to suggest that women are sometimes regarded in psychiatry as 
being inevitably more prone to mental illness than men, simply by virtue of the fact 
that they are women and so are by definition less psychologically healthy (see section 
1.7). Because of this ideology, in many circumstances the distress suffered by 
oppressed groups does not push them towards a criticism of the social order but 
instead instils in them a belief that there is something wrong with them for feeling this 
distress. Thus feminist standpoint theorists are not taking up an essentialist position in 
the sense that they do not interview members of an oppressed group and simply 
repeat uncritically the views which they have on particular issues. They locate these 
views within a theoretical and political framework wherein the social processes which 
give rise to these experiences can be explored. 
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Of course it must be noted that research which sheds important light on the 
systems of oppression within society is often carried out with the dominant group in 
the relationship rather than the oppressed (see for example Samson 1995 section 1.1, 
Britten 1991 section 3.5, Broverman et al 1970 section 1.7). Researchers who aim to 
challenge oppression do not necessarily have to work with oppressed groups 
therefore. Nevertheless, interviewing members of oppressed groups can yield 
important information concerning the operation of institutionalised power 
relationships, which would not necessarily be accessible by focusing on the 
perspectives of the dominant group within such relationships. In my research, I utilise 
the perspectives of women mental health service users in order to examine the 
operation of the mental health system in general and the specific social effects of the 
biological model of mental illness. I will discuss this in further detail in the next 
section. 
2.4 Women who use mental health services 
The statutory mental health services are characterised by an extreme power 
imbalance between service providers and service users (see section 1.2). There is 
some evidence to suggest that psychiatry itself plays a role in the oppression of 
women service users (see sections 1.7 and 1.8). In my research I interview women 
service users in order to investigate women's experiences within the mental health 
system. I use this information to analyse the social implications of the biological 
model of mental health problems in psychiatry. I do not rely on the women's service 
users' experiences alone however, as their subordinated position in the psychiatric 
system often means that they gain a fragmented knowledge of the power relations at 
work in the system as a whole. It is necessary therefore to bring in knowledge of 
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social relations and the wider social structure which do not necessarily come from 
the women themselves (see also Glucksman 1994, Smith 1988). 
I set out to interview women service users and ex-users from a variety of 
different social backgrounds including black women, lesbians, working class women, 
older women and women with disabilities in order to explore their experiences of 
mental health service use and consider the impact of wider societal oppression in the 
provision and use of mental health services. Despite my efforts to attract volunteers 
however, I did not interview any women who were over the age of sixty years old 
and I only interviewed one black woman and two lesbians. In view of these 
limitations it could be argued that it would be a mistaken enterprise for me to make 
any generalisations regarding the discrimination experienced by women belonging to 
these groups. The problem of extrapolating generalisations, however, is one that 
faces all qualitative research which focuses on the experience of a small number of 
participants. I can make no claims about the statistical representativeness of the 
women who participated in the research (see sections 2.11 and 2.12), nevertheless I 
do make generalised assertions throughout this thesis which I believe to be justified 
on the grounds of 'logical inference'. By this I mean that they are based on informed 
political and theoretical positions. Whether or not these generalisations are accepted 
as valid will hinge to some extent upon whether the theoretical and political positions 
I have adopted are accepted (see Gabe and Thorogood 1986 for a similar argument). 
This is also the approach recommended by Maynard ( 1994) when she says: 
"If feminism is to Uly confront racism and heterosexism, if it is to be able to analyze 
the interrelationships between class, race, gender and other forms of oppression, then it 
cannot let its focus remain with experience alone. One way of going beyond this is to use our 
theoretical knowledge to address some of the silences in our empirical work. " (Maynard 
1994: 24) 
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Methodology 
2.5 Situating the research self 
I have argued that in order to promote validity and improve figour within 
social science research, strong reflexivity should be included as an integral part of 
research methodology (see section 2.1). An investment of the researcher's identity 
within the research process is also an integral part of feminist research practice. It 
entails the researcher placing herself squarely within the focus of investigation, so 
that she owns the fact that she is as much a part of the data comprising the research 
as are the people who are being studied (Maynard 1994, Harding 1987). 
By introducing reflexivity into the research process, knowledge will be gained 
which is more valid than competing claims which attempt to ignore this social context 
(see section 2.1). The background, assumptions and beliefs of a researcher provide 
important data in any research project. In this section therefore I will briefly outline 
my own biographical details and political commitments and discuss the ways that 
these impact upon the research. 
I am thirty three years old, white and from a Welsh working class 
background. I have been committed to political activity from a young age, becoming 
chairperson and then secretary of my local Labour Party Young Socialist branch at 
the age of fourteen. At fifteen I was elected youth representative on the Wales 
Labour Party Regional Executive Committee. In the mid 1980's the Labour Party 
leadership decided to close down the youth vAng of the party nationally, because they 
perceived its membership to be predominantly Marxist in ideology. FolloNkring this 
move I did not renew my membership of the Labour Party. At about this time I 
became aware of feminism through reading a book on the oppression of women 
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called 'Hidden From History: 300 years of Women's Oppression and the Fight 
Against It' by Sheila Rowbotharn ( 1973). 1 became interested then in feminist politics 
as I perceived that an important dimension of my own experience as a woman in a 
male dominated society had not been addressed satisfactorily in the political activity 
which I had already been involved in. Subsequently I became engaged in feminist 
political activity - attending a consciousness raising group, joining 'reclaim the night' 
marches and becoming involved in women's groups for survivors of domestic 
violence and child sexual abuse. 
My interest in issues relating to mental health have been stimulated by both 
personal and professional experiences. In my mid twenties I became a mental health 
service user primarily because of the distress I was experiencing related to 
experiences of childhood abuse. I was given a course of psychotropic medication to 
deal with the emotional distress I was experiencing, and I found this to be quite 
useful. In addition, as I was not offered any counselling on the NHS I enlisted the 
services of a private counsellor on a fiiend's recommendation. I found the experience 
of counselling to be a very rewarding one in terms of increasing my self awareness. 
In terms of professional experience, I worked for eighteen months as a 
housing rights adviser at a homelessness charity. From this work I became aware of 
the lack of adequate services for many women experiencing severe emotional 
distress. When advising women who were experiencing domestic violence for 
example, it was usual to refer the woman to a Women's Aid refuge. However I found 
that the refuges could not accept women with very serious emotional disturbance, 
such as suicidal tendencies. These women then faced a choice of either returning to a 
violent partner or trying to become a voluntary patient in the local psychiatric 
hospital. Being in a position of advising women in such a situation was very difficult 
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as many did not want to take either of these two options, and there was very little 
else that I could refer them to. In one particular case a client told me that she wanted 
to go into a psychiatric hospital because she felt extremely distressed as a result of 
her partner's violence, and was afraid that she was going to kill herself When I took 
her to see the admitting doctor at the hospital however, she was turned away because 
he said her mental health problems were not serious enough to require inpatient 
treatment. He told her she was 'attention seeking', gave her a course of medication 
and told her to 'go home and sort things out with her husband'. Understandably she 
did not want to do this, so I tried to place her in a women's refuge. As she was 
openly threatening to kill herself however, they said they could not accept her. She 
had no choice then but to return to the violent and dangerous situation in her home. 
Experiences like this provided me with some insight into the provision of mental 
health services for women. 
The personal experiences that I have related in this section can be seen as key 
in motivating my interest in women's mental health issues. They can also be seen as 
influential in determining the methodology which I have chosen to investigate these 
particular issues. These experiences and the political conclusions that I have drawn 
from them are important in my sense of identity and as I am the researcher they 
inevitably exert some influence upon my work. This does not represent a bias which 
could be seen to discredit my research however. As I have already argued personal 
values, interests and political commitments are common to all researchers and will 
inevitably impact to some extent upon the research process (see section 2.1). To 
attempt to maintain a stance as a 'neutral disinterested observer' within the social 
scientific research process merely means that these factors are hidden from public 
view and exert covert influence upon the research. My contention is that personal and 
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political information relating to the researcher has relevance to the research 
investigation. It is an important part of the data as it clearly identifies the ideological 
and personal stance of the researcher, and so can be taken into account when 
considering the findings of the research. In this way it contributes to the rigour and 
validity of the research process. 
2.6 The role of emotions in-research 
The sociological study of the role of emotions in fieldwork is a significantly 
under-researched field. This can be seen as an inevitable outcome of the demand for 
the social sciences to adopt the positivist approach which has been so influential in 
the natural sciences (see section 2.1). This has enormous costs for research in general 
however, and for the fieldworker in particular. Emotions are often seen as 
unprofessional and unscientific, and if acknowledged may be perceived as a weakness 
in the research process (Kirkwood 1993, Kleinman and Copp 1993). This is 
especially true for women researchers, whose emotional responses may be used as 
evidence for a misogynistic ideology in which women are seen as hysterical, 
overemotional and unable to reason properly (Kleinman and Copp 1993, Kirkwood 
1993). This is not surprising as disregarding emotions as a source of knowledge is 
one way in which women can be devalued, in relation to white middle class men in 
particular (see section 2.1). As Kirkwood has observed: 
'The challenge of recognising the utility of emotions and emotional receptivity is not 
simply the challenge of adding tools for the understanding human behaviour that have not 
previously been seen as valuable skills. It is also the challenge of contesting the fabric of 
patriarchal culture, in which 'rational men' are valued more highly than 'emotional women'. " 
(Kirkwood 1993: 23). 
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Textbooks on interviewing all assert the need for interviewers to establish and 
maintain rapport with interviewees. Here rapport means being friendly but not 'too' 
friendly so that distance is always maintained. In order to be properly 'scientific' 
researchers are not supposed to address emotions in their work any more than this. 
Emotions which then do not fit this frame are often filtered out of the wfitten version 
of research, lest its inclusion bring a charge of unprofessionalism (Kleinman and 
Copp 1993). However, emotions can provide a valuable source of knowledge within 
the research process (see for example Williams and Bendelow 1996, Kleinman and 
Copp 1993. ) The emotions that are experienced in any given situation depend upon 
the individual's understanding and perception of that situation. In addition what is 
perceived as an appropriate emotional response is socially determined, and therefore 
influenced by factors of gender, class, political belief and so on (Jaggar 1983). 
Because of this, both the positive and the negative emotions which a researcher 
experiences can be analysed sociologically in order to provide a more in depth 
analysis of the subject in hand. 
Emotional responses can also be used reflexively as a means of providing 
extra insight and refinement in the analysis of research findings (see also Kirkwood 
1993, Kelly 1988). A simple example from my research indicates that the acceptance 
and analysis of an emotional response can provide additional insight for the 
researcher into the issues which are being researched. I found that on one occasion I 
was very anxious about visiting an interviewee in her home. On analysing the source 
of this anxiety however, I found that this was not a simple case of nervousness 
because I was travelling to another town to interview a woman I had never met 
before, regarding personal matters, in unfamiliar surroundings. Rather the source of 
my anxiety was that she had told me over the phone that she was a paranoid 
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schizophrenic. I was somewhat ashamed to find that my anxiety was a direct result of 
the stigmatising of mental health service users, especially those labelled as 
schizophrenic, as violent murderers who are out of control. In our society there is 
enormous stigma attached to anyone who is perceived to be suffering with a mental 
health problem. In a very immediate way my own emotional response made me 
realise the all - pervading impact of this stigmatisation, especially as I had always 
thought myself to be well aware of the demonisation of mental health service users 
which occurs in the media (for a discussion of this stigmatisation see section 3.4). 
The feeling of shame which I experienced here was triggered by a realisation that I 
had been 'taken in' by the prevailing ideology of inferiority of mental health service 
users. That I experienced this emotion provides an important clue as to my political 
beliefs, which include a commitment to studying and challenging the oppression 
which women mental health service users encounter. 
2.7 Emotions and research on sensitive issues 
The role of emotions in fieldwork is particularly important when sensitive 
issues are being researched. I became aware early on in the fieldwork of the strong 
emotional impact that the interviews would have upon me and that they often had 
upon the women I interviewed. The women interviewees usually talked openly and 
emotionally about their life experiences, revealing episodes of child abuse; domestic 
violence; rape; relationship breakdown; substance abuse; self harm; suicide attempts, 
and the traumatic experience of acute mental distress and emotional breakdown. In 
turn I experienced a whole range of strong emotional responses - often I felt nervous 
before an interview was to take place, anticipating the response I might get by the 
interviewee. I was often worried that the women might think my research too 
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intrusive into their private lives. As the fieldwork progressed I felt privileged that 
many of the women trusted me enough to be open about their feelings and 
experiences in the course of the interviews. I felt admiration for many because of the 
work they were doing in rebuilding their lives after experiencing a great deal of 
trauma. In many cases I felt angry and upset about what the women had experienced. 
In one interview I was moved to tears by a woman who told me about her 
experiences of child sexual abuse, the role that this played in causing her mental 
health problems and the lack of help she had received to help her deal with it. 
I used a field journal in order to wnte down my immediate perceptions of the 
interviews I carried out. It proved valuable as it gave me an immediate outlet for the 
strong emotions I experienced during the course of the fieldwork. This also became 
an important tool for purposes of reflexivity. However, I found that the emotional 
effects upon me of the interviews I carried out in my research was not something I 
had been prepared for. In my previous work as a housing rights adviser I had been 
used to interviewing clients who were experiencing considerable distress. The 
interviews I carried out for my research however, proved to be a very different 
experience for me both practically and emotionally. The process of doing this type of 
research is a very isolating experience. In my previous role as a housing rights adviser 
I worked in a team and although I had sole responsibility for intervieAring and 
advising a caseload of clients, there practical and/or emotional support available from 
colleagues immediately after the interviews, should this be necessary. Once it became 
apparent that my PhD fieldwork would become an emotionally distressing experience 
for me, my supervisors and myself made an arrangement that one of them would 
provide emotional support and a space to offload. stressful emotions in supervision 
sessions during the course of the fieldwork, and the other would take responsibility 
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for the more traditionally academic aspects of research supervision. As Holland and 
Ramazanoglu state "the impact of interviews on sensitive topics should not be 
underestimated, and a support structure is advisable" (1994: 137). Making a division 
of duties between supervisors in this way proved very useful to me, providing a clear 
definition of our roles as regards each other during this particular stressful stage of 
the research. Despite this support however, I did experience a substantial level of 
emotional distress. I believe that this is probably not unusual for anyone engaged in 
PhD research however given the subject that I was investigating I think that this did 
make it a particularly stressful experience. 
I found that during the course of the fieldwork I began to re experience vivid 
memories and dreams of traumas that I had experienced in my own past which were 
no doubt prompted by the stories that the women were telling me. This accords with 
the experience of other researchers who have been involved in researching 
emotionally charged issues (for example Kelly 1988). Emotional responses in this 
type of research cannot be ignored as they will inevitably affect both the research and 
the researcher, whether they are acknowledged, analysed and used as an integral part 
of the research findings or not (see also Kirkwood 1993, Dunn 199 1 ). 
After the first four interviews. 1 made the decision that in future I would not 
try to interview more than one woman in a day because of the emotionally demanding 
nature of the work. I developed a routine whereby immediately after the interview I 
would return home, write down all my responses to the interview in my field journal 
and then go to sleep for an hour or two because I was so emotionally exhausted. In 
addition as the fieldwork progressed I made the decision to see a private counsellor 
on a weekly basis in order to discuss the personal issues which were coming up for 
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me. This was extremely useful in view of the fact that the interviews were prompting 
the recollection of emotionally distressing experiences in my own past. 
2.8 Interviewing as a reciprocal arrangement 
As Ann Oakley has indicated in her influential paper "Interviewing Women- A 
Contradiction in Terms" (198 1) what many methods textbooks have to say about 
interviewing in the field is often unworkable in practice. This was my experience in 
interviewing as I found that it was neither possible nor politically desirable for me to 
side-step interviewees requests for information (see section 2.9), or to maintain a 
stance of neutrality and disinterest in response to their concerns (see section 2.7). As 
the interviewees were recounting some of the most traumatic experiences in their 
lives, it was important that I engaged with them in a responsive and reciprocal way 
and did not attempt to establish rapport with them only in order to exploit them more 
effectively as a source of data. I was also concerned not to add to the distress of the 
women I was interviewing. However a familiar emotion when I began my fieldwork 
was guilt that some of the women were becoming upset in the course of the 
interviews. These feelings of guilt persisted often some time after the initial 
interviews were over and relate to my concern that I did not exploit the women in the 
study. 
It has been argued that in order to avoid the dangers of exploitation, 
fieldwork should be reciprocal, that in return for participation in the research, the 
researcher should offer the participants something, such as a service or material 
reward (Skeggs 1994). One aspect of establishing reciprocity within the interview 
situation entailed my answering interviewees requests for information directly rather 
than side-stepping them (see also section 2.9). There were many requests for 
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information from the women I interviewed about the mental health services which 
were available to them; the side effects of their medication; the meaning of certain 
diagnostic labels, and so on. Where I could I provided this information, I also 
referred them to mental health agencies where appropriate, offering the telephone 
numbers of user groups, telephone advice lines, counselling services, and self help 
groups. It became quite obvious that many of the interviewees felt starved of 
information about such matters, and in fact more information being made available 
was probably the single most repeated suggestion for improving the mental health 
system made by participants in the course of the research. In addition, as the 
interviews progressed, I realised that I was offering interviewees a space to offload 
emotionally about their experiences. It became apparent to me that many of the 
women simply wanted to be heard and validated, although in the course of this some 
women would become upset. 
Several of the women commented during the interview that I was not what 
they had been expecting when they first heard about the research, because I was not 
like the mental health professionals that had been involved in their treatment and care 
(see also section 2.9 on power dynamics and the issue of the researcher's perceived 
identity). The difference they indicated here was that they often felt disregarded and 
patronised by service providers. They were clearly relieved that I adopted a different 
approach, as many women indicated that a lack of interest, warmth and empathy on 
the part of professionals working in the mental health system was a significant 
obstacle to them when they were attempting to explain their experiences of emotional 
distress (see sections 3.2,3.3,4.2). What seemed to be the common thread in this 
feedback was that the interviews were experienced as beneficial because the women 
had been given attention and the space to talk to someone who wanted to listen to 
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them without imposing any pat answers or condescending pieces of advice. Although 
this is a very simple requirement, it is something which most of the women had not 
had much experience of Other feminist researchers have found that the women they 
have interviewed have reported beneficial effects from their interview experience, for 
similar reasons (see Skeggs 1994, Phoenix 1994, Finch 1984, Oakley 198 1). Some 
women commented on the therapeutic value of the interview. One woman (Heather) 
told me that the interview was part of her "healing processý' and as I walked down 
her garden path on leaving her home afier the interview, she shouted after me "thanks 
for what you're doing for us! ". Another (Judy) said that the interview was a way of 
"clearing away more cobwebs". On one occasion however I became concerned that 
one interviewee, Isabel, actually thought that I was a therapist and the interview was 
meant to be a therapy session rather than research. I was concerned to clarify the 
position and when I did so I found that what she was saying was that she knew that it 
was a piece of research but she thought that what I was doing ought to be provided 
as therapy. She said she found my use of a tape recorder to record the interview 
therapeutic in itself, as she thought it was proof that her views mattered because they 
were being kept and would be noted down in detail. 
Negative feedback that the interview had been experienced as damaging or 
pointless was not given by any of the women I interviewed, but of course this is not 
to say that no one felt this way, just that they did not convey this message to me. AJI 
of the women that were interviewed at their homes were very warm and hospitable 
towards me and I was often moved by their acts of kindness, as I was after all, 
carrying out a one-off interview and was a complete stranger to them. I was always 
offered tea or coffee and sometimes I was invited to stay for meals. One woman who 
lived some distance away told me I was free to stay overnight in her spare room if I 
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did not want to take the long journey home after the interview was over. Another 
offered me the services of her husband in taking my car to the garage because I told 
her I was having some trouble with it. At Christmas time I received several Christmas 
cards from interviewees, a present of a book of poetry, and an invitation to a party at 
a mental health daycentre. Although I interviewed each woman only once I felt that in 
some cases an emotional bond had been established. This meant that occasionally I 
felt quite an emotional wrench when I left the interviewee, knowing that I would 
probably never see her again. 
2.9 Power relationships within the interviewing process 
Feminist researchers have drawn attention to the hierarchical power 
relationships which have characterised much social scientific research (Phoenix 1994, 
Skeggs 1994, Maynard 1994, Finch 1984, Oakley 1981). The social context in which 
research is carried out renders it almost inevitable that some kind of hierarchical 
relationship takes place. However much the feminist researcher may want to 
democratise the process of research, she will usually have more control over the 
research process than her interviewees, and where her interviewees do not share what 
can often be a privileged background, she will hold a place further up in the social 
hierarchy than them. It is important to note too, that the women interviewees in a 
study are usually not all equally powerless in terms of class and race, and can hold 
views which are oppressive in relation to other women and men. Interviewees may 
express views which the interviewer finds oppressive, for example if she is a black 
interviewer interviewing white women who express racist views to her (see for 
example Phoenix 1994). Phoenix (1994) mentions the case of the Jewish woman 
interviewer who carried out an interview with a woman whose flat was decorated 
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with swastikas. In this way many feminist researchers have asserted that it is 
necessary to become aware of, and explicitly address the complex power relations 
between the researcher and the researched (Skeggs 1994, Maynard 1994). An 
analysis of these power relations can prove difficult however as factors such as class, 
sexuality, age and race in both interviewer and interviewee, as well as the dynamics 
inherent in the issue which is being researched, all impact simultaneously upon the 
power dynamics of the interview (Phoenix 1994). 
Despite my efforts to minimise the imbalance in the power relationship 
between myself as researcher and the women I interviewed, I was aware of a 
hierarchical relationship between myself and many of the interviewees. I come from a 
working class background, but in indicating to the interviewees that I was carrying 
out research for a PhD, I was immediately established within the social hierarchy as 
someone with a privileged educational background. It has been observed that the 
inevitable power relations in the interview situation can be mediated to some degree 
by the interviewer by allowing interviewees to ask questions which are addressed 
honestly by the interviewer rather than being side-stepped (Phoenix 1994, Skeggs 
1994, Oakley 1981 - see also section 2.8). 
Many of the women asked me questions about my own personal background, 
in particular asking me whether I had shared certain distressing experiences that they 
had experienced and were discussing with me. It is important to note that these 
requests for information were of an entirely different category to those that were 
purely fact based (see also section 2.8). To answer openly in this situation often 
meant that I was disclosing sensitive information about experiences in my own past 
and of course, unlike my interviewees I did not have a promise of confidentiality with 
regard to this information. When this happened I made the decision to answer such 
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questions honestly however, as I thought that since I was asking women interviewees 
to reveal sensitive details about their own lives, I should be prepared to mediate the 
power dynamic by being similarly open and honest within the interview situation. 
Clearly this decision was influenced by my political commitments which entail a 
rejection of the role of the interviewer as a 'neutral disinterested observer'. This 
political commitment also entails an understanding that women's oppression is a 
significant factor in women's experience of mental health problems, so that many of 
the experiences which contribute to mental distress are commonly experienced by 
women in our society (see section 1.7). 1 was therefore prepared for the fact that I 
would have at least some degree of shared experience with the women in my study. 
As the interviews progressed I became aware of the tendency of many of the women 
to want to look after and support others emotionally. Therefore I was careful when I 
answered such questions that I did not displace the emphasis onto my own personal 
experience so that the interviewees would have put themselves in the role of 
emotional outlet or support for me. 
Answering questions in this way was an important aspect of my research and 
in most cases led to the adoption of a conversational style of interviewing. It has been 
suggested that such a conversational style is more likely with middle class 
interviewees who feel an equivalent status with the women who are interviewing 
them (Brannen 1993). This was not what I found in my research however, as working 
class women did not seem to differ from middle class women noticeably in this 
respect. This could stem from the fact that although I am involved in a middle class 
occupation I come from a working class background and this I think can be detected 
(as it often is in Britain) by accent. More importantly perhaps, the importance of my 
identity in relation to social class appeared to be superseded on many occasions by 
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the issue of my identity in relation to the mental health system, particularly as regards 
the service user/ service provider dichotomy. 
The five interviews that were held on statutory service premises were the least 
successful in enabling the interviewees and myself to feel at ease in the interview 
situation. I did not feel at ease whilst interviewing within statutory services because 
on several occasions I was drawn into the power relationships that were being played 
out in these environments. The staff at the centres treated me with much greater 
respect and accorded me the privileges of a fellow mental health professional which 
they denied to the women users at the centre whom I had come to interview. Ann 
Phoenix (1994) has observed that when the rapport between interviewer and 
interviewee is disrupted it can be analysed to provide an important insight into the 
power dynank of the issue which is being researched. Two interviews where rapport 
was extremely difficult to establish provides an illustration of the importance of the 
power dynamics which occur between mental health service user and service 
provider. 
The fact that the professional staff at the daycentres where I carried out 
interviews treated me like a fellow mental health professional, meant that often I was 
perceived as such by the centre's users. One woman, Justine, seemed very anxious at 
the beginning of the interview and although she appeared keen to talk at length about 
her experiences in the mental health system she proceeded to do so in a manner in 
which a lot of anger was directed at me personally. In the course of the interview 
with Justine, she revealed that she had a lot of anger towards mental health 
professionals because of their inability to address her needs. That she perceived me to 
be another 'one of them' could very possibly have been one reason for her anger 
towards me. Although I assured the interviewees that I was not a medical 
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professional, by using the premises belonging to a statutory mental health service I 
was blurring the boundaries between myself and the mental health professionals 
involved in treating them. This blurring of roles was revealed when another of the 
women I interviewed at a statutory service daycentre, despite my indications to the 
contrary, told me that initially she thought that I was a medical student who was 
carrying out the research in order to qualify as a psychiatrist. Another said that she 
was surprised to find that I wasn't "cold and patronising like most medical 
professionals", suggesting, of course, that despite my manner I was in fact a medical 
professional. This was damaging in terms of establishing rapport with interviewees as 
the providers of mental health services are in an extremely powerful relationship with 
regard to the people that use mental health services. A consideration of this dynamic 
was influential in my deciding that I would not interview any more women on 
statutory service premises. 
Issues relating to the researcher's perceived identity in the research situation 
have a significant impact upon the power dynamics of the interview. As my fieldwork 
progressed I became increasingly aware that clarifying my identity in relation to the 
mental health system both personally and professionally, was a key factor in 
mediating the power relationships between myself and the interviewees and in 
establishing trust within the interview situation. 
In describing a study with Clergymen's wives, Finch (1984) asserts that she 
agonised about whether to reveal her identity as a clergyman's wife in case this 
would be perceived as a bias in the research. However, she found that some 
interviewees deduced that she was a clergyman's wife, and when she confirmed this 
fact, they became much more relaxed and willing to talk to her. Therefore Finch 
rejected the role of interviewer as a 'neutral disinterested observer' and took the 
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decision to invest her own personal identity within the interview situation in order to 
allay the fears and suspicions of her inter-viewees. As I have already mentioned (see 
section 2.5) my interest in the research topic has been inspired partly by my own 
personal expenence as a service user. Initially however I was unsure as to whether to 
indicate this to the interviewees at the beginning of the interviews or merely whether 
to let it arise in response to any questions they asked. I was also wary of declaring 
any kind of shared identity merely in order to facilitate a more effective means of data 
collection by encouraging the women's disclosures. 
My sense of confusion in relation to these issues was clarified in the course of 
the interviewing process. Like Finch, I found that I was 'unmasked' by some 
interviewees as the interviews progressed. Comments were made such as "You know 
you're very understanding about this, has anything like it happened to you? " This 
indicated to me that, at least to some extent, I did have an insider identity, and this 
was something which was being picked up on by some of the interviewees. After the 
first few interviews therefore I decided that I would indicate to the interviewees at 
the outset that my own personal experience was one of the reasons for my interest in 
the topic. Inevitably the women asked me questions about this and so I was able to 
clarify the situation. I believe this was important in establishing trust within the 
interview situation, especially considering the stigmatised identity of women mental 
health service users. This stigma meant that many women were particularly wary of 
being interviewed and exposing the details of their experiences of mental distress to 
someone who did not have at least some personal experience of this themselves. 
Many interviewees appeared to relax visibly when I mentioned that my interest in the 
subject was partly inspired by my own experiences. One interviewee told me that she 
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would not have been prepared to offer an inter"ew at all if I had not revealed some 
shared personal experience in our initial discussion about the research. 
As Finch's study has indicated, matching interviewer and interviewee in terms 
of social identity can promote rapport and encourage disclosure. Which particular 
aspect of a researchers identity will encourage this rapport will depend to a large 
extent upon the particular dynamics of the issues that are the focus of inquiry. Of 
course this does not mean that a shared identity With participants is necessary in order 
to effectively carry out research Political and theoretical understanding mediates 
experience in crucial ways so that it is perfectly possible for someone who does not 
identify with their participants to analyse and gain an understanding of their 
experiences and the social factors that give rise to them (see section 2.3). It is also 
possible that aspects of similarity could limit disclosure within the interview, because 
an interviewee might not want to discuss certain issues with another 'insider'. 
Although investing my personal expenence in the research was for the most part 
conducive in encouraging disclosure, on a couple of occasions it did appear to limit 
it. Because shared expenence can sometimes appear to imply a shared understanding 
of the situation, I was aware that occasionally women were not clarifying what they 
thought because they assumed I would already know. I was alerted to this by being 
told things like "well I don't have to tell you, you know what I mean. " I became 
careful therefore to ask interviewees to spell out things for me as it was important 
that I clarify what their thoughts on the matter were, rather than making assumptions 
from my own opinions 
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Methods 
2.10 The Pilot Study 
Before I carried out the pilot study I submitted a research proposal to the 
directors of social services and the relevant health authority ethics conunittees in the 
South Wales area requesting permission to seek volunteers for the research in their 
areas. Of the three health authority ethics committees that I approached the first gave 
me ethical permission to proceed by letter after consideration of my proposal. 
Another requested me to attend the meeting of the ethics committee where they 
would discuss my research proposal. This meeting itself comprises relevant data in 
research as it illustrates some of the power dynamics which are important when 
considering mental health serNice pro-vision. I Will outline the proceedings by quoting 
from my field journal. 
'lley were all medical doctors sitting. in the board room of the hospital. I was 
shocked that in a meeting open to the public they were sitting around the table laughing, 
showing off, trying to compete with each other in 'humorous' tales about the severity of the 
eating disorders of their patients. "Well one of mine ate chips meant for 20 people! " "Well 
one of mine ate the plaster cast off her arml"... Sitting there waiting for the meeting to start 
one of the two woman doctors on the committee said very loudly "this first proposal, I've 
never seen such a lot of confused nonsense ... talking to them 
indeed, it's no different to what 
we all do anyway. If she wants to know something she should ask us. " The others nodded and 
smiled in agreement. Of course mine was the first one and that was the one she was talking 
about ... Needless to say they made it clear they did not understand the point of the research, 
and they did not like it. The research came under considerable attack... I felt small, short, 
Young and very female. " 
At this meeting most of the medical professionals (women included) seemed 
to be of the opinion that my research was pointless because I was intending to 
interview women service users about their experiences. Their opinion seemed to be 
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that they were the real experts, rather than the service users, and so the study would 
probably not proVide anv worthwhile knowledge. The hostile manner in which they 
received my research proposal contrasted with the enthusiasm with which they 
received the other proposals, all of which concerned the double blind testing of newly 
developed pharmacological medication upon patients. This attitude actually reflects 
one of the major criticisms made of the medical profession by many of the women 
who took part in my studv This was that the women felt disempowered by their 
doctors who they felt did not listen to them and did not respect what they had to say. 
Despite this ethics committee's opposition to my research, I received a letter from 
them telling me that they could not object to the study on ethical grounds and I was 
given permission to proceed. The third health authority ethics committee turned 
down my application for ethics permission, because, in the opinion of their scientific 
officer, the research did not fulfil adequate scientific criteria. They requested by letter 
that I amend the study in order to fulfil the scientific standards which they required, 
asserting that they would not even allow the study to be considered by the ethics 
committee unless I adopted a positivist approach in the research. I declined to do 
this. 
Of the social services directorates, only one replied. This was done through a 
mental health officer who called me in for a meeting. By contrast, at this meeting I 
found him to be very interested in and enthusiastic about the research. He asked for a 
copy of the findings when they were available and told me that I could quote his 
name when approaching social services staff in a bid to find volunteers to take part. 
In addition he gave me a list of all the mental health daycentres in his area, and 
Offered to write to them individually to ask them to participate in my research. He 
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told me that he thought that it was an important piece of work and so would like to 
offer help in whatever ways he could. 
Following this, the pilot study was carried out with four women who were 
users of a mental health daycentre and were ex-psychiatric inpatients. I contacted 
these women via a feminist facilitator of a women service user's group at a mental 
health daycentre. I told about her the research and she asked the women in the group 
whether any of them would be willing to take part. Four women volunteered. The 
group facilitator, with their permission, gave me their phone numbers and I rang them 
to describe the research in more detail and arrange a time for the interview to take 
place. 
I selected semi-structured interviews as the method of investigation for the 
research. Semi-structured interviews provide direction while still allowing a 
significant degree of open-endedness (Barham and Hayward 199 1, Kirk and Miller 
1990, Hakim 1987). 1 thought that this was appropriate, because my aim was to 
encourage the women to reflect upon their experience of mental health service use, 
and also to consider specific questions regarding the provision of mental health 
services. In this thesis I have used the information the women provided in the 
interviews as the basis for examining the social effects of the biological model of 
mental health problems upon service users. However, most of the women were not 
aware of the particular model of mental health that their practitioners were using. In 
the majority of instances, the content of the consultations the women described 
(including the explanations some of the women had been given for their mental health 
problems) indicated that their medical practitioners were using a biological approach 
to mental health issues. Indeed, as I described in section 1.1, the biological model is 
the dominant approach used in British psychiatry and it is a fundamental organising 
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principle for mental health services throughout the statutory sector. I did not attempt 
to check the conceptual approach used by the women's medical practitioners by 
contacting the practitioners themselves, for two main reasons. Some of the women 
could not remember the names of the practitioners they had seen, and second, I did 
not wish to do anything which would, or might appear to, compromise the 
confidentiality of the women who took part in the study. I thought that this was 
particularly important in view of the extreme power relations that exist within 
statutory mental health service provision. Consequently, I relied on the women's 
descriptions of the content of their consultations with medical practitioners as the 
main indicator of the approach their practitioners took to conceptualising mental 
health issues. 
Because of the power relations in psychiatric service provision, I attempted to 
make it clear to interviewees at the outset that I had no connection with any health or 
social services body in order to distance myself from the mental health professionals 
that they were used to dealing with (but see also section 2.7 on the effect on power 
relations of the researcher's perceived identity). I dressed informally and explained 
that I was carrying out the research as part of my PhD project. I explained exactly 
how much information from the interviews would be kept completely confidential and 
how much might be used in publication. I reassured them that their names and 
addresses, and the names and addresses of any family, fiiends, services and staff they 
mentioned would be kept completely confidential. I also pointed out that short 
passages from the interviews might be quoted verbatim in the research but only if 
they did not hold information which could be used to identify the participant. Each 
participant was given a written letter which provided this information again and 
included my name, work address and telephone number for her to contact if she 
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wanted to discuss the research at a later date (see appendix d). Each interviewee was 
asked to sign a written consent form (see appendix e) and asked for pennission to 
tape record the interview. All participants were asked if they would like a copy of the 
summary of the research findings when they are available. I made it clear to each 
participant that if she did not feel comfortable with any question she could 'pass' and 
move on to something else, and that she could end the interview at any time if she 
didn't feel like carrying on with it. 
At the end of the pilots I discussed with the women what they had thought of 
the questions I had asked and the interview process generally. I interviewed each 
woman once, as I thought that I had collected adequate information from a single 
interview. I was also somewhat wary of making too many demands on the women's 
time and energy. Although establishing trust is certainly an issue (see section 2.7 for 
example) it could be the case that there are certain benefits associated with a one off 
interview in terms of the fact that intervie-wees, do not have to commit themselves to 
continued participation. 
In the course of the research I found it quite difficult to find women who were 
willing to volunteer to participate. The search for volunteers became quite a time 
consun-ýing process, no doubt being seriously affected by the issue of the 
stigmatisation of mental health service users. Even when no longer using mental 
health services the fact that a person has been a psychiatric service user means that 
their credibility can be called into question at any moment. Many service users 
declined to be interviewed expressing concern over the stigma attached to mental 
health problems. Those who did volunteer to participate in the research often told me 
that they "didn't care what anyone thought about them anymore". 
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I included the pilot interviews in the research findings as they Yielded 
extremely valuable information for the research, and also because the women I 
interviewed wished to contribute to the main body of the research as well as involve 
themselves in the pilot study. Following this pilot I amended the interview schedule 
only slightly. Of the four pilot interviews, three women spontaneously told me that 
they had experienced sexual abuse as children. This obviously has important 
implications in the provision of services and so I decided to add a question relating to 
abuse in the schedule. I was initially somewhat unsure about this as I felt concerned 
about asking the women to talk to me about such a distressing subject. On reflection 
however, I decided that the issue was of the utmost relevance and therefore I would 
ask directly about it. I took steps to make this as safe as possible -I made sure that 
although I had told the women at the beginning of the interview that they should feel 
free to pass on any question, I reminded them again at the beginning of questions 16 
and 19 that they were free to pass. I located the questions relating to abuse carefully 
in the interview schedule, siting them in the middle of the interview so that I would 
have time to establish rapport with the women, ensuring also that I was not ending 
the interview on a potentially distressing topic. 
The final draft of the interview schedule can be seen in appendix f Thirty five 
women mental health service users were interviewed. Five interviews were carried 
out in mental health daycentres, two in the offices of user groups and the rest were 
carried out in the homes of participants. The shortest interview lasted only twenty 
minutes, the longest four hours. These were exceptions however and on average the 
interviews lasted around two hours. All thirty five women participants agreed to the 
interview being taped. I assured them that the tapes would remain securely locked in 
a filing cabinet and no one but myself would have access to them. 
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2.11 Finding volunteers to participate in the research 
The criterion of selection used by Rogers, Pilgrim and Lacey in the 'People 
First' Study (1993) (see section 1.5.2) was that each participant should have had 
experience of being a psychiatric hospital inpatient. However, as a programme of 
psychiatric hospital closure has been implemented the number of psychiatric hospital 
inpatient beds has been drastically reduced. This criterion would therefore impose 
severe limitations on the number of women eligible for participation in this research. 
In addition there is evidence to suggest that women are more likely than men to be 
diagnosed by their GP and are less likely to be referred for specialist psychiatric 
treatment (see section 3.2). My criteria in selecting volunteers was that they should 
be women and should have had experience of using a mental health service from the 
range available in the statutory and voluntary sectors. Resource limitations dictated 
that volunteers were sought only in the South Wales area. I sent out a poster and 
leaflets to GPs surgeries, mental health daycentres, outpatient clinics, self help 
groups, user groups, supported housing schemes, women's refuges and so on in 
South Wales. In addition I attended various meetings of service users and mental 
health professionals in the voluntary sector. In these meetings I introduced the 
research, made a request for volunteers and distributed more leaflets. I explained to 
potential volunteers the purpose of the research and what would happen in the 
interview. If they wanted to go ahead we then arranged a place and time for the 
interview to take place. A full breakdown of the participants characteristics in terms 
of service use, race, social class, age, and diagnostic label, can be seen in section 2.12 
below. I did not seek volunteers who were actually hospital inpatients at the time the 
interview was to take place. This decision was based on problems associated with 
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researching hospital inpatients which has been revealed in previous research, in 
particular that carried out by Batcup with inpatients of the Royal Maudsley 
psychiatric hospital (1995). She found that although her participants were assured of 
the confidentiality of the interview, some still did not feel able to speak freely, 
perceiving that a criticism of the hospital establishment could have repercussions for 
them in terms of their treatment. As many inpatients are held in hospital involuntarily 
and can have physical treatments like medication and ECT imposed upon them, this 
factor is important in limiting the effectiveness of interviewing inpatients. 
I have adopted a qualitative approach in my study in order to explore in depth 
the experiences and perceptions of a small number of women mental health service 
users in regard to service provision. The representativeness of the women 
participants in this research in relation to the whole population of women mental 
health service users is an issue however. As there is no central bank of statistics 
which presents a comprehensive profile of women who use the mental health system, 
the participants cannot be compared with appropriate data relating to the female 
mental health service user population of either Wales or Britain. Because of this, it is 
not possible to ensure that the women are representative of the whole population of 
women mental health service users. However I attempted to ensure that the women 
came from a variety of social backgrounds and have used a diverse range of mental 
health services (see section 2.12). In addition, although all of the women lived in the 
South Wales area, they were drawn from five different Health Authority areas in 
South Wales. 
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2.12 Breakdown of services used by interviewees 
In this section I include a breakdown of the mental health services which 
women in the study have used in both the voluntary and statutory sectors, in order to 
indicate the particular range of service use which has informed their experiences, and 
consequently informs this research (see table 1). In addition I include a breakdown of 
the point of first contact with women in order to indicate the range of social locations 
in which service users were enlisted to participate in the study (see table 2). In the 
literature review (sections 1.2,1.7 and 1.8) 1 discussed how the practice and theory 
of psychiatry can perpetuate the oppression which some service users experience in 
the rest of society. This is a theme which I explore throughout this research and I 
therefore include a breakdown of the participants characteristics in terms of race 
(table 3); social class (table 4); age (table 5); sexuality (table 6); and disability (table 
7). The experience of mental health service use is affected significantly according to 
the medical diagnosis which women have been given as users of services within the 
statutory sector. Therefore I include a breakdown of the diagnosis which participants 
have received within the statutory mental health system (table 8). 
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Table 1: Services Used by Interviewees 
Service: No. of women who have used this service 
(out of a total 35): 
GP 33 
Psychiatrist 25 
Psychologist 21 
Psychiatric hospital (inpatient) 19 
Mental Health Daycentre (statutory) 16 
Community Psychiatric Nurse II 
NHS counsellor 3 
Social Worker II 
Women's Refuge 2 
User Group 12 
Supported Housing 3 
Self Help group 17 
Private Counsellor/psychotherapist 6 
Residential Rehabilitation Unit (drugs and alcohol) I 
Complementary therapies: 
Aromatherapy 10 
Homeopathy 6 
Hypnotherapy 7 
It can be seen that thirty three women have consulted their GP regarding a 
mental health problem. For most of the women their family GP was the first point of 
contact when they sought medical help with a psychological or emotional problem. 
Three women were referred to counsellors working within the NHS. Six women have 
paid for counselling/ psychotherapy in the private sector. Three women said that they 
had received counselling from community psychiatric nurses and three said they had 
been counselled by psychologists. A third of women have used some form of 
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complementary therapy, usually aromatherapy, homeopathy, or hypnotherapy which 
was offered in the private sector and which they paid for themselves. 
Table 2: Where Interviewees Were Initially Contacted 
Via - Mental Health daycentres (statutory sector) 6 
Mental Health network (voluntary sector) 5 
Sexual Abuse Survivors groups ("") 5 
Manic Depression Fellowship groups 5 
MIND groups 4 
National Schizophrenia Fellowship groups 2 
Psychiatrist Outpatient Clinic I 
Women's Resource Centre 2 
Other (being told by a friend etc. ) 5 
Total 35 
I attempted to attract participants in the research from a wide range of 
services. It can be seen that five women were recruited by 'word of mouth'. This 
refers to women who were not recruited directly via a mental health service, but who 
came forward to be interviewed after hearing about the research from ffiends and 
family who were themselves mental health service users. 
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Table 3: Race of Interviewees 
Black - GB I 
White - GB 32 
White - Other 2 
Total 35 
Previous research has indicated that people of Afro Caribbean descent are 
over represented in the psychiatric inpatient population (MfND 1992b, Torkington 
199 1) but seriously under represented in service user groups such as MIND. In order 
to address this I printed and distributed leaflets to statutory and voluntary services 
which specifically appealed for black women to come forward to participate in the 
research (see appendix c). In addition I contacted the only two groups in the 
voluntary sector in South Wales who provide services for people of colour 
specifically. Unfortunately no volunteers were forthcoming from these groups and I 
was only able to interview one black woman. As I asserted in section 2.2 questions of 
race, class, gender, sexuality and other oppressions have relevance in the discussion 
of the provision of mental health services. In order to address these factors fully it is 
necessary to focus on theory as well as experience. As there is only one interviewee 
who is black in this research, this represents an important limitation in the research. 
Nevertheless I will address issues which relate to racism in the provision of services 
using theory; and secondary sources where these are available; in order to 
compensate for the gaps in experience which are present in the research (see section 
2.4). 
Table 4: Social class by present or last occupation held 
Registrar general's classification by occupation: No. of women participants: 
Social class 1 /11 (professional/managerial) 13 
Social class IIIN (non manual) 15 
Social class HIM (skilled manual) I 
Social class IVN (semi-skilled/unskilled manual) 3 
Never held a full time paid occupation I 
Still in Full time education 2 
Total 35 
As an indicator of social class position in my study I use the Registrar 
General's classification of class according to occupation, which is used in population 
studies in Britain. The women are classified according to their last full time paid 
occupation however, as some of the women are full time carers, others are 
unemployed, or have withdrawn from full time paid employment due to physical 
and/or mental ill health. It must be borne in mind however that occupation is only one 
indicator of social class position. A wide range of factors have a bearing on social 
class position - such as occupation, educational qualifications, income, housing and 
family background (Charles 1990, Pollert 198 1), 
Nineteen women who participated in my research belong to categories III -V 
and therefore could be described as working class (category II IN indicates shop 
work and low grade clerical work - Charles 1990). Thirteen women belong to 
categories 1/11. This category predominantly represents a number of teachers and 
qualified nurses who took part in the study. A link between poverty and mental 
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distress has been suggested in previous research (see for example Bruce et al 199 1, 
Hollingshead and Redlich 1958). Therefore it would seem that women from a 
professional and/or managerial background are proportionately over represented in 
the research. In the course of my fieldwork it did become apparent that women who 
had been educated beyond secondary school level were proportionally more likely to 
volunteer to take part in the research, as compared with women who hadn't had the 
same level of educational opportunity. I interviewed five trained nurses and four 
teachers. A further six women have been university educated, although not all of 
them were able to complete their studies at university because of their experience of 
mental health problems. It would certainly be true to say that their education meant 
that these women were more familiar with the purpose of PhD research. For example 
many of the nurses that I interviewed had already encountered this kind of research in 
the course of their professional training. 
Table 5: Age of Interviewees 
Vears Old: No. of women participants of this age range: 
16-19 1 
20-29 9 
30-39 7 
40-49 1 
50-60 5 
Did not choose to disclose age 2 
Total 35 
Significantly there are no participants in my research who are over sixty years 
of age. The available literature indicates that older women are prescribed more 
113 
psychiatric medication than any other age group and they are least likely to be offered 
counselling despite the fact that they are more at risk from the side effects of 
medication (Williams et al 1993). In an attempt to attract older women I printed and 
distributed leaflets appealing directly to women over sixty. In addition I contacted 
voluntary organisations and social workers who work with older people in order to 
appeal to older women service users to participate in the research. However no one 
over sixty came forward to take part in the study. Mental health statistics compiled 
by the Welsh Office (1999) indicate that the largest single age group of psychiatric 
hospital inpatients is people over the age of sixty five years old. There were 7,865 
people in this age group who were inpatients in 1998 (compared to 3,335 in the thirty 
five to sixty four age group - these figures were not broken down according to 
gender - Welsh Office 1999). It is therefore a significant limitation in the research that 
there are no women over sixty. 
Table 6: Sexuality of Interviewees 
Lesbian 2 
Bisexual 2 
Heterosexual 30 
Not Sure I 
Total 35 
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I printed and distributed leaflets appealing specifically for lesbians to come 
forward to take part in the research (see appendix c). I also contacted groups for 
lesbian and bisexual women in a bid to find volunteers. However, only two women 
came forward who defined themselves as lesbians and two who defined themselves as 
bisexual. 
Table 7: Disability of Interviewees 
Disability (physical) 7 
Disability (mental) 2 
No disability 26 
Total 35 
Problems of definition came to the fore as regards disability. Several of the 
women inquired as to whether they should describe themselves as disabled because of 
their mental health problems. In these circumstances I left it up to them to define their 
identity themselves. Two women defined themselves as suffering with a disability 
because of their mental health problems. Seven women said that they were disabled 
because of a physical condition. 
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Table 8: Most Recent Diagnosis of Interviewees 
Acute Psychosis I 
Manic Depression 7 
Schizophrenia 2 
Depression 10 
Anxiety 2 
Personality Disorder I 
Not informed of their diagnosis 10 
Respondent did not wish to disclose diagnosis 1 
Not consulted a medical doctor 1 
Total 35 
Within the statutory services, the first stage in the treatment of any 
psychological or emotional problem is the diagnosis of the problem by a medical 
professional (Foster 1995). GPs usually diagnose what are regarded as the 'minor' 
mental health problems (anxiety, non severe depression) while a psychiatrist usually 
diagnoses the 'major' illnesses (e. g. schizophrenia, manic depression). There is 
considerable disagreement in the medical profession as to the specific diagnostic 
categories used in psychiatry (Foster 1995). In my study many women had 
accumulated several diagnoses from different doctors and psychiatrists throughout 
the history of their service use. Therefore this table represents only the diagnosis they 
had received most recently. Ten women have not been informed of a diagnosis 
although they use statutory mental health services on a regular basis. Of those women 
who had been told a diagnosis and who wished to disclose it to me, depression and 
manic depression were the most common categories applied. 
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2.13 Data analysis 
In 'Analysing Qualitative Data' Bryman and Burgess state: 
"[First] there is no standard approach to the analysis of qualitative data; secondly 
data analysis relates not only to technical procedures but also to the social relations aspects of 
fieldwork; finally 
... much of the work in which investigators engage in this stage of the 
research process is as much implicit as explicit. " (Bryman and Burgess 1994: 12) 
I discuss the 'social relations' aspects of fieldwork in sections 2.5 - 2.9. In 
this section I describe the technical procedures used to analyse the data collected. 
Stage one of the analysis process was to familiarise myself with the data I had 
collected (Ritchie and Spencer 1994). Interviews were replayed, transcribed and re- 
read soon after completion to ensure a successive development of ideas during the 
interview process (Porter 1993). 1 immersed myself in the data - reading through my 
fieldnotes several times, listening to the tape recordings of the interviews twice 
through and then transcribing them verbatim. In the course of doing this I examined 
the issues that were highlighted by the original research question and explored the 
answers to the questions that were posed to the interviewees (Miles and Huberman 
1994). In the initial stage of the research process I had formulated general hypotheses 
and these hypotheses were empirically tested in the interview and analysis process 
(Porter 1993). This lead to a degree of hypothetical reformulation. For example it 
had been my intention to analyse the need for residential service provision for 
women, but as the interviews progressed it became apparent that in exploring this 
question, the use of the biological model of mental illness has considerable salience 
(as it does for the provision of mental health services across the board - see also 
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introduction to the thesis). I thus readjusted my focus to explore the impact of the 
biological model of mental illness upon mental health service provision. 
In analysing the interview data I made a list of the recurrent themes and issues 
which were important to the interviewees. I looked for recurring phrases and 
common threads of ideas and examined themes arising from the recurrence or 
patterning of particular views or experiences. For each of the main themes I drew up 
a flowchart in which I explored the causal connections, contradictions and similarities 
in the conceptual data. From these charts I developed a thematic framework. I 
systematically applied the thematic framework to the textual data, making notes of 
the headings on the margins of each transcript (Ritchie and Spencer 1994). 1 adopted 
a 'cut and paste' approach whereby sections of verbatim text were regrouped and 
compared/contrasted according to their thematic references. I then went back to the 
flowcharts and fed back into them new information gleaned from the analysis of the 
verbatim texts. As the final stage I interpreted the data set as a whole. 
In the thesis I numerically count personal characteristics and viewpoints in 
order to provide further information about the salience of particular issues and I 
indicate percentages accordingly. However, the use of percentages is not meant to 
indicate that the study makes any claims to being of a statistical nature (Mason 1994). 
Rather this is used to provide information relating to the proportions of the sample 
group who had particular views, characteristics or experiences. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have provided an in depth review of the methodology I have 
used in my research and considered the epistemological issues which inform the 
theoretical basis of my methodology. I have argued that in order to improve the 
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validity of research, the background and political views of the researcher must be 
placed squarely within the research frame, as issues of values, politics and emotions 
can have an important effect upon the research process. 
In this chapter I have detailed the methods I used to contact and interview the 
participants in my research. I have also provided a breakdown of the characteristics 
of the women interviewees in tenns of service use; point of contact; medical 
diagnosis; race; class; sexuality; disability; and age. In order to investigate issues 
relating to women's oppression within the mental health services I attempted to 
attract women participants from a diverse variety of social backgrounds. However I 
was not altogether successful in this aim as only one black woman volunteered to 
take part in the research, only two lesbians and no women over the age of sixty years 
old. This does represent a significant limitation in my research. In order to make up 
for the gaps in my empirical material, I use theoretical and secondary sources 
wherever possible. However, this does not always compensate for the lack of 
participation of women who come from the aforementioned groups, as there is a 
dearth of research available concerning women service users perspectives on the 
operation of the mental health system. Consequently, my research findings are limited 
in these key areas of women's experience. 
In the following four chapters I present the findings of my research in relation 
to the women's experience of diagnosis, stigma and medical treatment (chapter 
three); issues of discrimination within mental health service provision (chapter four); 
the particular experiences of abuse survivors in the mental health system (chapter 
five); and the women's views of community care and psychiatric hospitalisation 
(chapter six). At the beginning of the next chapter I introduce the findings of my 
11() 
research by providing a brief overview of the main issues which came up in the 
interviews. 
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Chapter Three - 
The Impact of the Biolor-ical Model on Sti2ma, Diarnosis 
and Treatment 
Introduction 
I begin this chapter by providing a brief overview of the main findings of my 
research and I indicate the sections in my thesis where these findings are analysed in 
depth (section 3.1). 1 then go on to discuss the women's experiences of consulting 
GPs and psychiatrists (sections 3.2 and 3.3). 1 consider the women's experiences of 
stigma, examining in particular the ways in which the biological model of mental 
health problems contributes to the stigmatising of service users (section 3.4). 1 also 
consider in detail the women's experience of diagnosis (3.5) and medical treatment 
(3.6). In considefing these findings however, it must be bome in mind that these 
issues do not operate in isolation. For example, issues of discrimination (the subject 
of chapter four) are connected with the medical approach used by GPs and 
psychiatrists. Therefore throughout this thesis I make references to other relevant 
sections in the research, where appropriate. Instead of describing the detailed social 
characteristics of each of the participants every time I refer to them, I have provided 
biographical data relating to each of the women at the end of the research (appendix 
a). Of course the names of the women have been changed in order to preserve their 
confidentiality. 
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3.1 An overview of the main research findings 
I asked all of the women who took part in the study whether the mental health 
services they had used had been helpful to them. I then went on to identify what, for 
them, characterised a helpful experience in relation to the specific attitudes of service 
providers and the treatments that were made available. 
The majority of women in the study (sixteen, or 46%') reported that overall 
they had had mixed experiences within statutory mental health services. They cited 
numerous problems but had on occasion received assistance from mental health 
professionals which they had found to be helpful to them. Thirteen of the thirty five 
women (37%) whom I interviewed for this research reported that their experiences 
within statutory mental health services had been totally unhelpful, and had even been 
damaging to them. The women in this group said that overall their experiences with 
mental health professionals had exacerbated their mental health problems, rather than 
helping them. Six of the thirty five women (17%) who took part in this study said 
that overall, the statutory mental health services they had used had been helpful to 
them 
The problems which the women described covered a broad range of issues 
including an over reliance on drug treatment and ECT ( see section 3.6), widespread 
discrimination against women service users (chapter four) and an inability amongst 
many statutory service providers to deal with mental health problems which are social 
rather than biological in origin (chapter three, four, five). Many women in the study 
' As I mentioned earlier, the use of percentages is intended to give the reader an indication of 
the prevalence of certain viewpoints, characteristics, or experiences amongst the interviewees, 
It is not meant to imply that the research is statistically representative. 
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reported being treated like 'objects on a conveyor belt' rather than people by medical 
practitioners (see section 3.3). 
Some women said they would like to see women psychiatrists and community 
psychiatric nurses and were unhappy that they were prevented from doing this despite 
repeated requests (see section 4.3). Several women said that they would like to see 
psychiatrists with key social characteristics in common with them other than gender, 
such as race (see section 4.9), class (see section 4.8), and sexuality (see section 4.5). 
Opportunities to see psychiatrists who shared these characteristics with them were 
not made available however. 
The majority of women criticised the policy of care in the community for 
failing to address their needs; they opposed the programme of psychiatric hospital 
closure despite expressing reservations about hospital treatment (see chapter six). 
One reason why many women opposed hospital closure was because they identified a 
need for a residential mental health service when they could no longer cope within 
their home environment (see section 6.5). 
Several women said that they had originally approached mental health 
services for help with distress caused by the oppression they had experienced in wider 
society. Significantly many of these women indicated that the services did not help 
them and, in some cases, this oppression was actually repeated within the services 
themselves. This issue is explored in depth in chapter four on women's experiences of 
discrimination,, Aithin the mental health system, and in chapter five concerning the 
particular experiences of women abuse survivors. 
One of the most disturbing issues which came up within the interviews 
referred to the sexual abuse of women patients by male professionals and male 
service users. Several women in the study referred to incidents of sexual harassment 
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and physical and sexual abuse within statutory mental health services. This ranged 
from reports of male professional's apparently salacious interest in the sex lives of 
female patients to repeated rape by male professionals and male patients in 
psychiatric hospitals. All of the women who reported that they had been abused when 
they were using the services were survivors of child sexual abuse and had also 
experienced abuse from male partners. I describe the experiences of the women abuse 
survivors who participated in my research in detail in chapter five. 
3.2 The women's experiences of consulting GPs 
The first point of contact for people seeking help with a mental health 
problem in Britain is usually their GP. In most cases it is via an initial GP referral that 
access to specialist psychiatric services is gained; whether this is a consultation with a 
psychiatrist, a visit from a community psychiatric nurse, psychiatric social worker or 
sessions with an NHS counsellor (where these are available). Mental health problems 
which are regarded as mild by GPs are treated by them without specialist 
intervention, while conditions which are regarded as indicative of a serious mental 
illness are referred on to psychiatrists. 
Of the thirty five women who participated in this study, thirty three (94%) 
had approached their GP with a mental health problem. Of these, fourteen (42%) said 
that their GPs had been consistently unhelpful to them. Thirteen women (39%) said 
that they had had mixed experiences overall, and six women (18%) said that their 
GPs had always been helpful in assisting them with a mental health problem. 
Amongst the women who had unhelpful or mixed experiences there were five main 
sources of dissatisfaction. These included their GPs displaying a dismissive attitude 
towards them and refusing to take their concerns seriously-, sexist attitudes amongst 
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GPs; the very brief time their GPs spent in consultation with them, a reliance on 
prescribing medication, and an inability to discuss psychosocial issues relating to their 
mental health problems. 
Many women complained that they found it difficult to access specialist 
services because their GP would not take their mental health problems seriously. For 
example, Pauline described how her GP had been dismissive towards her when she 
approached him for help because of the distress she felt at having been sexually 
abused in childhood: 
I told my doctor 15 years ago about it and he just told me to forget it ... he said 'well 
these things bother us when we get older'. So I actually got into the services via the doctor in 
the family planning clinic ... I said look, I can't cope anymore and I couldn't go back to my 
own GP. So she wrote a letter for me and she sent it to my own GP as well and that's how I 
got into the [specialist] services. " 
Previous research has indicated that women are more likely to be treated for a 
mental health problem by their GP but less likely to be referred for specialist help 
than men. For every hundred women diagnosed by GPs as having a mental illness, 
only three were known to specialist psychiatric services (Community Care 1994). 
This compared to ten in a hundred for men. 
In this study, several women complained that their GPs had expressed sexist 
attitudes towards them, and in particular had disregarded their concerns by making 
patronising references to 'women's troubles' (sexist attitudes amongst GPs are 
discussed in detail in section 4.2). The ideology that women are inevitably more 
prone to minor mental illnesses by virtue of their gender - in particular their 
reproductive processes (see section 1.7) - can be seen as influential in the attitude of 
many GPs who refuse to take their women patients concerns seriously and refuse to 
refer them on to specialist service providers. In order to overcome the obstructive 
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attitudes of some GPs, many women argued that there should be a process of self 
referral to specialist services, so that they could directly access community psychiatric 
nurses, counsellors, psychologists and psychiatrists. 
Another central criticism was that GPs spent only a very brief amount of time 
in consultation and usually prescribed medication to ameliorate the women's feelings 
of distress, without discussing with them the possible reasons why they felt this 
distress. Many of the women felt dissatisfied because their GPs did not provide them 
with any sort of explanation for their mental health problems. For example Jade said: 
"Over the years doctors have just dished them out [tranquillisers and antidepressants] 
willy nilly. You go to see some doctors and you go in and they've got the pen ready on the 
prescription pad 'right what do you wantT 'Well I would like to know what's wrong with me 
first'. 'OV ." 
Foster (1995) has asserted that many GPs may prefer to prescribe their 
patients medication to ease their feelings of distress without making a formal 
diagnosis of mental health problems, particularly as many are aware that the reasons 
for their patients distress reside in social problems such as poverty, bad housing, and 
unemployment. Foster asserts that as they feel powerless to do anything to resolve 
these issues, GPs prescribe medication in order to assist their patients to cope with 
their life situation. She notes that: 
"Doctors may be fully aware that what their patients really need is better housing or 
a job or a divorce but they cannot provide these stress relieving solutions for their patients, 
nor in many cases can their patients avoid the social conditions which may be creating their 
anxiety ... Whilst 
GPs may be able to do little or nothing to prevent or alter very poor housing 
conditions or bad marriages, the prescribing of tranquillisers to women facing such problems 
must at the very least be regarded as palliative fbr social inequalities, rather than a cure fbr 
medical illnesses. " (Foster 1995: 91) 
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However, many of the women who participated in my research indicated that 
their GPs had neither the time nor the inclination to find out about the social issues 
which may have contributed to their mental health problems. Two women (Mandy 
and Sheila) were referred to counsellors attached to their GPs' surgeries, because 
their GPs believed that the women's distress was linked to stressful life events. 
However this was exceptional overall, as the majority of women indicated that they 
were prescribed medication without being offered the opportunity to discuss the 
social and personal issues which may have been significant in causing or contributing 
to their mental health difficulties. Pressures of time in a busy GP's surgery obviously 
encourages the tendency of many doctors to prescribe medication without inquiring 
into the possible causes of a patient's distress. Funding shortages in the NHS mean 
that many GPs may find that they have only a few minutes to spend in consultation 
with each patient. Some GPs do, as Foster has asserted, believe that their patients 
distress has been caused by psychosocial issues. Nevertheless, medication is often the 
only treatment which is available to service users. Furthermore, the medical training 
of GPs is dominated by a biological model of illness causation in which they are 
primarily trained to diagnose and treat physical illnesses on the basis of their patients 
presenting symptoms. GPs receive only a relatively small amount of training relating 
to mental health (within the biological model of mental health problems), and thus 
they may often feel ill equipped to discuss issues relating to mental health problems 
with their patients; especially where they perceive these problems to be caused by 
psychosocial issues (Foster 1995 - see also section 1.3). 
Of the women who had had good experiences with GPs, a recurrent source of 
praise was that their GP respected them, took the time to talk to them about their 
personal concerns and was willing to refer them on to specialist service providers 
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when they were requested to do so. In addition a helpful GP was one who listened to 
them and took into account what they wanted to achieve rather than simply imposing 
a treatment plan upon them regardless of their wishes in the matter. Such attitudes 
made the women feel that their GPs were attempting to work with them rather than 
against them. For example Diane said: 
I felt like she trusted my own judgement of what the situation was. She didn't want 
to rush me off to the nut house, but on the other hand she didn't want to play it down and oh 
say this is nothing serious. She accepted my judgement that this is probably a temporary 
problem that might be helped by a drug of some sort just to give me a foothold out of it and 
yeah she wasn't judgmental about it or putting me down or anything. " 
Similarly Heather observed that her GP had been very helpful. She said: 
"He doesn't seem to be in such a rush as some people are - you know writing the 
prescription before you get through the door sort of thing. He treats me on a level of 
intelligence with himself, which I probably am. I really think he tries to help me on the way to 
where I want to go rather than pushing me to somewhere where he wants me to go. " 
GP's often act as gatekeepers for other services, and as GPs are the first point 
of contact for many women service users, they should, at the very least, provide 
women with up to date information concerning outside agencies which provide 
support, free advice and assistance. A lack of information being provided was one of 
the central concerns expressed by the women who participated in my study, and many 
said they would like to be informed about the existence of other mental health 
services, such as self help groups; women's refuges; free counselling services, and 
housing and welfare benefits advice centres. 
Many of the women clearly had a low expectation of the amount of assistance 
they could expect from GPs in relation to mental health problems. GPs were 
perceived by some women to represent a gateway to further service provision rather 
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than as experts themselves in the treatment of mental health problems. By contrast 
psychiatrists were regarded as the ultimate experts and so there was a far higher 
expectation of their potential to assist service users (even though in practice many 
said that they did not provide adequate assistance - see section 3.3). 1 explore issues 
relating to the women's experience of consulting psychiatrists in the following 
section. 
3.3 The women's experience of consulting Psychiatrists 
Twenty five (7 1 %) of the thirty five women I interviewed had been treated by 
psychiatrists. Of these, seventeen (68%) had found their psychiatrists to be totally 
unhelpful to them, four ( 16%) had found them to be helpful, and four ( 16%) had had 
mixed experiences with their psychiatrists. 
Amongst the women who had had unhelpful experiences with 
psychiatrists there were six main sources of dissatisfaction, some of which were 
closely linked together - that of being objectified; of not being listened to, a 
predominance of physical treatments; an unwillingness to discuss psychosocial issues, 
a lack of information being provided; and discriminatory attitudes (see also chapter 
four) 
Several women reported feeling objectified because little attention was paid to 
their own unique life histories. Their feelings, concerns, knowledge and experiences 
were largely disregarded in favour of isolating the medical symptoms that were 
perceived to be indicative of an illness and prescribing physical treatments (see also 
Coyle 1999). Their views were not sought and they were often not listened to when 
they attempted to talk about concerns relating to their mental health. All of the 
women who found their psychiatrist to be unhelpful mentioned this as a central 
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criticism, as did most of the women who had had mixed experiences with them. For 
example Charlotte said- 
"He has never seemed interested in me ... He's just delivered you with these drugs and 
he just wants to see if they're working rather than looking at all the other problems which are 
connected with it. " 
Veronica said: 
"He saw my problem as a chemical imbalance. So he felt that if he gave me Prozac 
then it would alleviate my problems. He wasn't really interested in how I felt, he was more 
interested in treating me from a physiological point of view, rather than a psychological point 
of view... 1 terminated the sessions I had with him because I didn't feel that I was benefiting in 
any way from it. He spent more time talking about his holiday home in Barbados and his 
family than he did in talking to me". 
In Nfiles's (1988) study with women mental health service users, all of her 
sixty five women participants had seen a GP initially, and had then been referred to a 
psychiatrist. Twenty five women (38%) in her study found the psychiatrist to be 
helpful to them, twenty five (38%) found them to be unhelpful and fifteen (23%) had 
had mixed experiences with psychiatrists. This compared favourably to their 
experiences with GPs - only five women (8%) described their GP as helpful, fifty 
(77%) described them as unhelpful and ten (15%) described them as being mixed in 
their efficacy at helping them with mental health issues. Many of the women in 
Miles's study observed that their psychiatrist spent a longer time than their GP 
talking to them and appeared to be genuinely interested in talking over their 
problems. In fact the women in Miles's study perceived that talking was the main 
treatment which psychiatrists provided, to which the prescription of medication was 
secondary. Miles said: 
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"Most of those who found the psychiatnsts helpful, and even most of those whose 
feelings about them were mixed, commented favourably on the length of time that these 
specialists spent with them, compared with the few minutes accorded them by their family 
doctor, and on the much greater interest shown in their personal problems. Secondly, although 
the psychiatrist prescribed drugs, patients gained the impression that these were ancillary to 
the main treatment which centred upon talks. " (Miles 1988: 124) 
By contrast, the majority of women I interviewed who had been treated by 
psychiatrists did not believe that the psychiatrists were interested in talking over their 
problems as a means of treating them. A central criticism made of psychiatrists was 
that they did not appear to be interested in talking over the women's concems about 
the problems they had in their lives and the impact these had upon their mental health. 
Gail's comments were typical of this complaint, which was made by twenty one 
(84%) of the twenty five women who had been treated by psychiatrists: 
I really believe that he [die psychiatrist] didn't care how I was feeling. I was just 
number such and such on that little card. Because I'd come away from there when I'd go for 
my appointment, and I'd feel what was the point of going because I didn't achieve anything. I 
was just walking out with yet another prescription -" 
As in the case of GPs, this criticism was made of psychiatrists regardless of 
whether they were male or female. For example, Jade, who was diagnosed with an 
anxiety disorder said: 
"I never got any help from her [the psychiatrist]. We'd sit throughout the whole 
session saying nothing ... she'd say 'what medication are you on at the momentT, and 
I'd tell 
her and that would be about it. I've seen a couple of others over the years, and they were just 
the same. " 
A study carried out by Barham and Hayward (199 1) with a group of twenty 
five men and women diagnosed with schizophrenia found similarly that psychiatrists 
were only concerned with prescribing medication and did not discuss with them 
131 
social and/or personal issues (see section 1.3). This was also found in the 'People 
First' study carried out by Rogers, Pilgrim and Lacey (1993) with 516 men and 
women service users with a variety of diagnoses (see also section 1.6.2). 
At first sight it could be argued that the explanation for the discrepancy in 
findings between my study and that carried out by Miles, is that by contrast with my 
research (see section 2.14 table 8), and the studies mentioned in the preceding 
paragraph, all of the women in Miles's study had been diagnosed as suffering with a 
neurotic condition. If psychosocial factors are considered at all by psychiatrists, they 
are often only considered in connection with diagnoses of neurotic disorders (see 
section 1.2). On closer examination however, this argument is inadequate as in this 
study the women who knew they had been diagnosed with a neurotic disorder all 
made similar criticisms of psychiatrists to the women who knew they'd been 
diagnosed with psychoses; namely that their psychiatrists appeared to have neither 
the time nor the inclination to talk to them about their lives, and were interested in 
prescribing them medication only. 
Similarly with the Barham and Hayward study and the 'People First' study 
there was no apparent connection between the willingness of psychiatrists to talk 
over service users personal problems and the diagnosis they had been given. 
Another reason worth considering for the difference in findings between my 
study and that carried out by Miles, is that in her research she contacted all of her 
women interviewees through one or more psychiatrists who wished to co-operate 
with the aims of her research (although how many psychiatrists were involved in 
helping her seek volunteers for her research is not clear). The content of the 
consultations which Miles described suggests that the psychiatrist(s) who treated her 
participants did not employ a strictly biological model to understanding mental health 
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issues. Indeed, although the biological model is the dominant approach used in British 
psychiatry, it is not employed by each and every practitioner working within the 
discipline (see section 1.1). Furthermore, it could be the case that psychiatrists who 
are willing to co-operate with qualitative social science research with their patients 
(as in Miles' study), are less likely to employ a strictly biological approach in treating 
mental health problems. Whether or not this is the case is a matter of conjecture 
however, as the issue is not dealt with in Miles's research report. Research which is 
suggestive of this conclusion was carried out by Britten ( 199 1 ). Britten asserted that 
doctors who employed a biological approach were largely opposed to information 
sharing with patients as they wished to retain complete control over the doctor - 
patient relationship, believing in the infallibility of modem medicine and the need to 
preserve their role as the experts in treating health problems through medical 
treatments. 
Britten interviewed twenty four consultants drawn from a variety of 
specialisms which included psychiatry, gynaecology, oncology/radiotherapy, 
paediatrics, medicine, surgery, dermatology, ophthalmology, and Senito-urinary 
medicine. She found that hospital consultants who used the biological approach were 
opposed to patients having access to their medical records (sometimes because they 
were opposed to letting patients know what their diagnosis was). Whilst those who 
adopted a more psychosocial approach were in favour of giving patients access to 
their files, discussing with them their diagnosis, the details of their medical history 
and their personal concerns about their health problems. The main reasons she 
discusses for this difference in attitude, include the fact that doctors working from a 
biological model wish to retain complete control of the process of diagnosing and 
treating patients. By withholding information from patients this high level of control 
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is maintained. She says that practitioners in this model may be afraid of upsetting 
patients by being open with them about their diagnosis and prognosis. They also 
subscribe to the belief that modem scientific medicine is largely infallible and that 
patients, by virtue of being ill, are not capable of participating adequately in decision 
making processes regarding their health problems. Thus in the biological model, the 
patient is perceived to be suffering with an illness over which they have no control, 
and the very fact they have been diagnosed with the illness tends to count against 
their being able to participate adequately in consultation processes relating to their 
treatment (see also section 3.5 on diagnosis). 
Consequently, it may be the case that psychiatrists who subscribe strictly to a 
biological model of mental health problems would have less of a tendency to see the 
relevance of a qualitative study which aimed at consulting service users about their 
experience within the mental health system. Britten's ( 199 1) study does suggest that 
such practitioners are inclined to objectify their patients more than those who use a 
psychosocial model, simply because of the way they have of conceptualising mental 
health issues. 
A sense of objectification was exacerbated for many of the women in my 
study by a lack of listening skills amongst their psychiatrists. They perceived many 
psychiatrists as lacking in warmth, interest and empathy. Previous research with 
medical practitioners has indicated that the training provided in medical school, which 
is predominantly within a biological approach to treating issues of physical and 
mental illness, means that practitioners are poorly equipped to discuss personal and 
emotional issues with their patients (Baker, Yoels and Clair 1996, Silverman 1987, - 
see section 1.3). The stance of some medical practitioners as scientists (in a crude 
positivistic model) and therefore 'neutral disinterested observers', may be one reason 
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why the interviewees experienced them to be cold and dispassionate 2. Foucault 
described how the power relations within doctor-patient interactions may be 
intensified by the 'medical gaze': the adoption of an 'objective', distant, critical 
stance towards patients (Foucault 1973). The structure of discourse within the 
medical encounter itself may also tend to contribute towards feelings of 
objectification. The doctor dominates the interaction by employing a question and 
answer technique and the patient's narrative is often interrupted so that the doctor, 
acting as a scientist, can isolate the symptoms which may suggest a particular disease 
process (Coyle 1999, Mishler 1984). In so doing the information tends to be 
decontextualised from its personal biographical context and dismantled to fit into the 
diagnostic frameworks of psychiatry. 
Several women also complained that they felt objectified by being provided 
with standardised medical treatment for which they were not properly consulted. 
Thus they were often not asked which treatments they would prefer and were not 
given information about any possible side effects (see section 3.6 for a further 
discussion of this). 
In addition to feeling objectified many women indicated that they felt 
disempowered because they were not provided with adequate information relating to 
their diagnosis, prognosis, and treatment (see sections 3.5-3.6). Indeed a lack of 
information being provided was the most common criticism made by the women who 
participated in the study (see section 3.5-3.6). It has been argued that maintaining a 
strict control upon the amount of information that is provided tends to sustain a 
tn chapter two I described how many of the women said they had fbund the process of betng 
mterviewed to be a rewarding one, specifically because I did not attempt to adopt a stance of 
neutrality in response to their concerns. 
135 
hierarchical power relationship between doctor and patient, as mystification increases 
the authority of the doctor as the expert within the consultation (Waitzkin 1979). 
A further source of complaint relates to widespread discrimination within the 
statutory mental health services. I discuss this in detail in chapter four. 
The women who had had some positive experiences %krith psychiatrists 
indicated that the psychiatrists they had found to be helpful were those that respected 
their individuality and were willing to take the time to listen to and discuss their 
personal concerns in relation to mental health issues. In addition, as in the case of 
GPs, a helpful psychiatfist was one who did not want to dominate them completely in 
a consultation, shared information with them, and was willing to allow the woman 
some level of input and control in matters relating to her treatment. For example 
Evelyn said: 
"Some of the doctors have been marvellous, they've got time for you and they're 
great... There've been doctors though that I didn't want to know-one doctor treated me like I 
didn't know anything about the illness, which I didn't like. I had to show him that I was 
serious and I did know about it. If it was possible I wish that they could listen to the patient 
because in this illness [manic depression] the patient knows more than the doctor, unless they 
happen to be a manic depressive doctor or psychiatrist. " 
Similarly Mary (who had been diagnosed with manic depression), found that 
psychiatrists who were unwilling to allow her control over her treatment were 
completely unhelpful to her. 
"Various treatments were tried, depot injections, ECT, and it was only when I 
decided I wanted nothing more to do with any form of psychiatnc help at all, that I made 
contact with a second psychiatnst who handed the illness back to me. Now I manage the 
illness myself through self medication and a recognition of what my stress factors are. " 
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In talking to interviewees it became apparent that doctor-patient interactions 
can have a significant effect upon a woman's self esteem. Not being consulted on 
questions of diagnosis and treatment; not being properly listened to (see also section 
4.3); being patronised, and not being respected as an individual could all conspire to 
make a woman feel disregarded and devalued. However the women conceptualised 
their mental health status (see section 3.5), they wanted to be perceived as whole 
people with feelings and a life outside the consulting room. Thus they wanted to be 
respected as people rather than simply the 'carriers' of an illness. 
3.4 The women's perspectives on the stigmatisation of mental health problems 
Several studies have indicated that there is a stigma associated with mental 
health problems (see section 1.5). There is some evidence to suggest that mental 
health problems have been particularly stigmatised in recent years, as a link has 
increasingly been made between a diagnosis of mental illness and a propensity to 
violence. This has been described as a 'moral panic' (Pearson 1999) fuelled by the 
fact that within the media, any violence carried out by a service user or ex user has 
been highlighted and sensationalised. The present government has responded to 
widespread public concern by reviewing mental health policy and proposing stricter 
legal controls upon service users within the community in order to protect the public 
(see section 1.6) 
In this study, thirty four (97%) of the thirty five women I interviewed 
identified the stigmatisation of mental health problems as a significant problem for 
them. Some of the women expressed surprise that I was asking them about this issue 
as they thought that the stigmatisation of them as psychiatric service users is clearly 
obvious in their everyday lives. In describing the impact of this stigma, several 
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women reported a significant change in their friends' and colleagues' attitudes to 
them when they found out about their use of psychiatric services. For example, 
Evelyn described how she had lost her job when it was discovered that she had been 
diagnosed with manic depression. Many of the women in the study thought it was 
important to hide the fact that they had used mental health services and/or had been 
diagnosed with a mental health problem from ffiends, employers, and sometimes from 
members of their own families. This subterfuge was thought to be undesirable, but 
fear of the repercussions which would ensue if their experiences became common 
knowledge, was the motivating factor in leading them to attempt concealment. This 
has also been found in other studies with mental health service users (for example 
Barham and Hayward 1991, Miles 1988). 
Some women who took part in my study described how they had encountered 
stigmatising attitudes amongst medical staff as well as members of the general public. 
For example Gillian observed that general hospital staff treat patients less favourably 
when they discover they have been diagnosed with mental health problems. When I 
interviewed Gillian, she was a nurse in a general hospital. She said: 
"If someone comes with an appendicitis, they'll write on the notes 'has a history of 
psychiatric admissions' and then they're marked. If someone else comes in with appendicitis 
that hasn't had that, then it's totally different. But what has that got to do with it? We've had 
some right up and downers there about it. It's subtle mind, they don't do it openly, the 
patients perhaps wouldn't notice - but I can see they don't build up such good rapport with 
them or get close to them. They don't get that closeness. Fear is at the root of it. There's a 
stereotype that all mental patients are violent ... sometimes 
I think mental illness has got a 
bigger stigma than AIDS. Once you've been unbalanced then you're always unbalanced - 
they're waiting for you to turn or erupt or something. " 
Elaine said that she had encountered stigma in the attitudes of the staff at her 
health centre. She said: 
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"When I first went to register up there and I was talking to the receptionist and I said 
'schizophrenic and manic depressive' - they said 'oh she's schizophrenic - oh I'll get the 
doctor to see you now'! It was as if I'd got two heads! " 
Jane said that she had encountered stigma even in the attitudes of her 
Community Psychiatric Nurse (CPN). She explained that her CPN stopped visiting 
her, when Jane, who is a survivor of child sexual abuse, disclosed the degree of anger 
she sometimes felt about her experiences. Jane clearly felt angry, hurt and let down 
by the behaviour of her CPN. I asked her why she thought that her CPN had this 
attitude towards her, and she answered: 
"One of the first thmgs we were taWing, about, she said well 'how does it make you 
feelT And I said... 'well sometimes I get so mad I want to smash the house up'. From this 
now she suddenly got this idea that I was a violent person and 1 went out and committed 
violent acts, whereas I already explained to her although I feel violent a lot of the time, what 
makes it worse is that I don't go out and commit violent acts ... 
But this girl really did think 
that I was violent, and I really was paranoid that she was frightened to come round in case I 
hit her 
... One thing she said, she said something about 'oh I 
hope you don't hit me'. I said 
'don't say that! '... She's my fucking psychiatric nurse for fuck's sake, she's bound to Say 
sensitive things to me and hit things on the head, but I'm not going to hit her! But she really 
did think that one day I would lose it in here talking about something upsetting and give her a 
good kicking. I had to curb my feelings on certain things then, because I knew she'd be 
frightened. I'm not a loony ... And she kept saying things that made me think she really 
does 
think I'm a loony. " 
Eventually Jane's CPN stopped visiting her altogether and no explanation was 
offered. Jane said that she had blamed herself for this, and consequently, her CPN's 
behaviour had actually worsened her feelings of distress. 
In accounting for the stigma they had experienced, many of the women in my 
study referred to a general lack of understanding about mental health problems in 
society, which is a source of a great deal of fear for many people. Most interviewees 
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blamed the media for fuelling this fear by highlighting acts of violence which are 
committed by ex-psychiatric inpatients living in the community, thereby implying that 
all service users pose a danger to the general public. The women were broadly of the 
opinion that the majority of violent acts are committed by people who have never 
used mental health services, but anyone who has had a history of psychiatric service 
use is singled out by the press for special attention. Whilst the majority of 
interviewees opposed the policy of closing psychiatric hospitals as part of the policy 
of care in the community (see chapter six), they all (with one notable exception) 
vehemently opposed the argument that hospitals need to be kept open to 
accommodate patients who would otherwise murder innocent members of the public. 
Thirty four women (97%) thought that media stories served to substantially reinforce 
the stigma they experienced. For example Gail said: 
I personally think myself that they [the general public] hear the words 'mentally ill' 
and they actually think you're off your head, you're not capable of making a rational decision 
or having a proper conversation ... What should 
be done really, there shouldn't be all these 
wild stones that you read in the newspapers about a person whose just come out of hospital 
and whose been mentally ill and it just goes out of all proportion. And that's what I think - 
they [die media] play a big part in causing it. ". 
One participant in the research, Debbie, was notable because she did not 
criticise the media for this point of view and in fact emphasised the violence 
committed by ex-psychiatric patients in the community. She sai& 
"It does frighten you that one person a week is killed by a mental patient. Which 
means there's a lot of sorting out to be done in mental hospitals into who is dangerous and 
who is bloody not. I mean we're talking about perhaps women or men who have stress or 
nervous conditions, but then you take these other people and you're talking about a different 
kettle of fish, you know. I mean because they're a threat to themselves and they're a threat to 
society - they are. Because I mean, an eleven year old girl was stabbed, wasn't there, by a 
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schizophrenic - well they always stab people - they have shown in reports, one a week has 
been killed by one of them. If it was my daughter then I'd want them all locked up too. " 
Debbie's viewpoint was an exceptional one in the context of the other women 
I interviewed, as all of the other women criticised this viewpoint in the media for 
contributing significantly to the stigma which they experience. Debbie clearly 
differentiated herself from other psychiatric service users, such as those diagnosed 
with schizophrenia, as she thought that her mental health problems (which she 
described as anxiety) were of a different, less severe category in which she was not 
prone to violence. Although the other women in the study did not share Debbie's 
views on the danger posed by ex-psychiatric patients in the community, several also 
wished to distinguish between the sort of mental health problem they had 
experienced, which they often described as caused by 'nerves' or stress and which 
they thought was relatively minor, compared to the conditions experienced by people 
diagnosed with serious psychotic illnesses such as manic depression and 
schizophrenia. Some of these women wanted to distance themselves from people 
diagnosed with psychoses because they appeared to them to be so disturbed as to be 
truly 'mad'. Seven women (20%) said that they did not want to share service 
provision (such as being on the same inpatient ward) with women (and men) who had 
more severe mental health problems like schizophrenia, as they felt ffightened being 
around them (see also chapter six). 
In this sense, the women who took part in this research were not a 
homogenous group, and there were important divisions between them in ten-ns of 
their self identity as a psychiatric service user or ex-user. The women who had been 
diagnosed with neuroses were more likely to express a fear of 'madness', either the 
madness of fellow service users, or a fear that they might become 'mad' too. This 
finding accords with that of Miles in her study (1988) of women diagnosed as 
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neurotic. It would certainly be true to say that the stigma which is encountered by 
people diagnosed with psychotic illnesses such as schizophrenia and manic depression 
is far greater than that which is entailed in diagnoses of neurotic illness like anxiety 
and non-psychotic depression. A diagnosis of psychosis represents true 'madness' as 
people who have received this diagnosis are perceived to be completely out of touch 
with reality (see section 1.2). People diagnosed with psychotic mental health 
problems are also widely believed to be more prone to acts of violence. However 
there is no clear dividing line in public perception between different categories of 
diagnosed mental health problems so that those diagnosed with neurotic conditions 
may also experience considerable stigma (see also Miles 1988). 
In discussing with the women their ideas for removing or reducing the stigma 
associated with psychiatric service use, the most popular suggestion for improving 
the situation was that there should be more education and information available 
relating to mental health issues. In particular it was argued that media coverage 
should be improved. 
"It's just educating the public, it is literally just educating and infonnmg the public 
so that people are no longer frightened. " (Mary ) 
Stephanie said: 
"People need to know that for a start people that have used mental health services are 
not criminals - you've probably got less likelihood to be attacked by someone whose got 
mental health problems than from anyone else ... you 
know I picked up all these stereotypes 
myself that somebody whose been in a psychiatric hospital is a danger to society, that they're 
violent, that they're not intelligent, that there's something wrong and they should be avoided. 
And they're an object of derision ... Mental health problems need to 
be seen as just part of the 
normal human experience. We're not talking mental health problems we're talking people 
who experience emotional distress and trauma, people who are logically expressing reactions, 
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normal human reactions to trauma and distress. And that's how all our symptoms need to be 
treated. They're not to be scared of and they're not to be derided. " 
Some interviewees suggested that people should be more open about their 
experiences of mental ill health and this would in turn serve to lessen the stigma 
attached to mental health problems. However it was recognised, that this would 
involve a 'Catch 22' situation, as people are reluctant to identify themselves as having 
a mental health problem precisely because of the degree of this stigmatisation. In 
view of this problem several women said that there was probably no way of removing 
this stigma altogether. Jane said: 
"You'll never be able to do it. It's like the prejudice against blacks ... You can't 
explain to a whole nation that mental health is a part of life, you can't. If you haven't been 
through it, then the attitude is - 'for god's sake sort it out'. " 
Kate thought that psychiatric services themselves played a key role in 
stigmatising their users. She asserted that psychiatric hospitals themselves stigmatise 
inpatients through the process of sectioning some patients, diagnosing them with 
mental illnesses and then relying exclusively on drug treatment. Her suggestion for 
reducing the stigma attached to mental health problems was to reorganise psychiatric 
service provision (see also section 6.4 on the stigma associated with psychiatric 
hospitals and community based services respectively). 
"You could remove the stigma if mental hospitals were run in a different kind of way, 
made into you know clinics or something. I mean if they were just going to be like for women 
they could just be called women's centres or something, you know where people could go 
when they needed a rest, not somewhere people go when they're supposed to be nuts or 
something. But I think it's going to be really difficult to take that stigma away anyway. 
don't know if you could actually do it. But I'm sure there are things you could do to try. " 
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Kim, an ex-psychiatric nurse herself, argued that the stigma attached to 
mental health problems could not be removed without a complete change in the way 
that society is structured. She asserted that society is based on an inequality in the 
distribution of power in which men have the power to discriminate against women, 
and in which heterosexuals have the power to discriminate against homosexuals. She 
argued that the stigma against mental health service users in society was another way 
of discriminating against a section of society in order that the dominant group (which 
she described as male heterosexuals) remain in control. 
"It's because society always needs something to stigmatise. We're back to control 
again. Tlie government is a forin of control and all the services within that government are 
designed to control people. It's as simple as that. " 
As I outlined in section 1.5, it is my contention that psychiatry itself plays a 
role in stigmatising psychiatric service users. The notion of stigma encapsulates both 
disgrace and the evidence of disorder. A psychiatric diagnosis can be seen to 
demarcate its recipient as a person whose identity is itself fundamentally flawed, as it 
indicates that they are suffering with an illness which renders their communication, 
behaviour and thought processes illogical and unintelligible. A diagnosis of a mental 
health problem thus permanently focuses doubt on the conduct and thought processes 
of the person diagnosed. Within the biological model of mental health problems, the 
social factors which may have caused an individual's mental health difficulties are 
ignored (see section 1.1 and 1.2). This has some impact on the stigmatising of service 
users, as drawing a link between social factors and the experience of mental health 
problems, could serve to indicate that many emotional and behavioural problems 
which are perceived to be indicative of a mental health problem, are actually 
explicable responses to psychosocial pressures. For example, in research with people 
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diagnosed with schizophrenia and their families, Laing has consistently indicated that 
when placed in a familial context, the content of the speech of diagnosed 
schizophrenics is rendered intelligible, and even logical, in relation to their particular 
family dynamics (Laing 1960, Laing and Esterson 1969). However, in the traditional 
psychiatric consultation, diagnoses of mental health problems are made by studying 
the behaviour and speech of service users, without reference to the social context in 
which service users' live. Ignoring this social context means that the behaviour and/or 
speech of service users may be regarded by medical practitioners as meaningless in 
itself, and explicable only in so far as it represents a symptom of mental illness. 
In their study of stigma, Barham and Hayward (199 1) assert that "people with 
mental illness" should be referred to in the "vocabulary of membership, as 'one of 
us ... ( 199 1: 1). They add however, that there should not be "an opposing form of 
normalising discourse in which difference comes to be glossed over or denied, as 
though a benign regard or the force of good intentions could prise away the stubborn 
reality of chronic mental illness" (1991: 5). Thus they argue that the notion of mental 
illness itself ought not to be abolished. One of the inevitable problems with the 
dominant biological model of mental illness however, is that the individual is 
sometimes regarded as merely an extension or carrier of their illness (Pilgrim and 
Rogers 1993). Since this illness is regarded as a disease of the mind, the implications 
are enormously damaging for the lives of those so labelled. The biological model of 
mental health problems itself establishes difference, attaches stigma and labels 
csufferers' as an essentially disempowered pathological 'other'. It serves to obscure 
the common psychosocial issues which can be key in an individual's experience of 
psychological disturbance. 
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Although a psychiatric diagnosis inevitably entails stigma, in my research I 
found that there are further issues relating to stigmatisation which are specific to 
women service users. For example, some women who participated in my study 
indicated that receiving a psychiatric diagnosis, even where this denoted a psychotic 
illness, actually made them feel less stigmatised. than if they had not received the 
diagnosis. These women said that receiving a medical diagnosis meant that they were 
suffering with a disease over which they had no control, and thus it meant that their 
distressing feelings were 'not their fault'. They had been given a label which, 
although it entailed stigma, was preferable to the stigma they would have experienced 
if their feelings had been perceived as indicative of them being women who were 
troublesome or badly behaved through their own choice. I will consider issues 
relating to women and psychiatric diagnosis in detail in the next section. 
3.5 The effect of the biological model on the diagnosis of mental health 
problems 
In this study twenty four women (68%) had been presented with at least one 
psychiatric diagnosis by the GPs and/or psychiatrists involved in treating them (see 
table 8,2.14). One woman had not been treated by medical practitioners in the 
statutory services and so no diagnosis would have been made. Ten women (28%) had 
not been given a diagnosis, although they may have had one applied to them as they 
were regular users of statutory psychiatric services. Some of these women were 
curious as to whether they had been diagnosed, and if so what that diagnosis was. 
Whether or not they had actually been diagnosed is unclear. It has been claimed that 
many GPs avoid formally diagnosing their women patients if they feel their conditions 
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are not serious and instead provide them with minor tranquillisers and/or 
antidepressants (Foster 1995, Miles 1988 - see also sections 3.2,4.2). 
A study carried out by Miederna and Stoppard in Canada (1994) (see also 
section 6.3) with women who had been psychiatric hospital inpatients found that very 
few women were actually informed of the diagnosis which had been made of them, a 
situation which they were dissatisfied with. However they found that the women in 
their study who had been informed of their diagnosis did not find the diagnosis itself 
to be helpful to them (although the researchers did not describe why). As I discussed 
in the preceding in section 3.3, there may be tendency for some practitioners 
(especially those working within a biological model) to withhold information from 
patients. Several studies have indicated that a lack of information being provided by 
doctors is one of the most frequently cited sources of dissatisfaction amongst patients 
(see Rogers, Pilgrim and Lacey 1993, Miles 1988, Cartwright and Anderson 198 1, 
Miles 1979). 1 also found this in my research as many women complained that they 
had been 'kept in the dark' by doctors who would not discuss with them matters 
relating to their diagnosis and/or treatment. 
One of the reasons that Britten (1991) cites for this tendency is that 
practitioners working within the biological model have a commitment to the 
infallibility of modem medicine and believe that patients do not need to know details 
about their own case and should trust their doctors to know what is best for them 
(see section 3.3). This belief in the efficacy of mainstream psychiatric practice is not 
shared by a substantial number of commentators on mental health service provision 
(see section 1.1). Indeed the process of diagnosing mental health problems by 
psychiatrists and GPs has been described as an cuncertain science' as there is 
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controversy regarding the diagnostic categories which are used within the discipline 
(Foster 1995, Pilgrim and Rogers 1994, Miles 1988). It has been asserted that 
"... a careful study of psychiatric textbooks and psychiatric joumals soon reveals, 
even to the relatively untramed eye, that many psychiatric diagnoses are based more on 
educated guesswork or current fashion than on proven uncontested medical science. " (Foster 
1995: 88), 
Clinicians making diagnoses on the same patients have achieved a substantial 
degree of discrepancy in the diagnoses applied (Wing 1988). Indeed, many of the 
women who participated in this study had accumulated a range of different diagnoses 
from different doctors over the course of their service use. 
Of the twenty four women who had been given one or more psychiatric 
diagnoses, eleven (46%) had found it be completely unhelpful; seven (29%) had 
found that receiving a diagnosis had been helpful to them and two (8%) had found 
that receiving a diagnosis had entailed both helpful and unhelpful aspects. Four 
women (17%) said they had no particular views on the helpfulness or otherwise of 
receiving a psychiatric diagnosis. 
There was no overall correlation between the nature of a diagnosis and 
whether it was perceived as helpful or not in the sample group. Thus of the eleven 
women who found a diagnosis to be unhelpful, six (55%) had been diagnosed with a 
psychosis and five (45%) had been diagnosed with a neurosis. Of the seven women 
who found a diagnosis helpful, four (57%) had been diagnosed with a psychosis and 
three (43%) had been diagnosed with a neurosis. In view of the increased stigma 
attached to psychotic mental illnesses, it might have been expected that more women 
would have found a diagnosis of psychosis to be unhelpful precisely because of this 
stigma. However, this did not come across in the interviews and what emerged were 
other issues relating to stigma which were not related to the nature of a particular 
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psychiatric diagnosis (I discuss this later on in the section regarding women who 
found a diagnosis to be helpful). 
In terms of how they conceptualised their mental health status themselves, 
twenty six women (74%) overall identified social and personal problems in their lives 
as causing their mental health problems, regardless of the type of diagnosis which 
they may have received (and any alternative explanations which may have been 
provided them by medical practitioners). Five women (14%) identified their mental 
health problems as being caused by a biological illness. Four women (11%) were 
unsure about what had caused their mental health problems and were dissatisfied that 
they did not have, and had not been offered within the statutory services, an adequate 
explanation of why they had experienced these problems. In talking with the 
interviewees about their thoughts concerning the issue of diagnosis, a number of 
issues became apparent. First and most obvious was that all of the women had 
originally felt that they had needed assistance with feelings and/or behaviour which 
they felt was distressing and was impinging negatively upon their lives. The emotional 
and behavioural problems which the women described covered a very broad area - 
there were several reports of self harm; attempted suicide; hearing voices when there 
was no one there speaking; an inability to communicate with other people; feeling 
compelled to indulge in frenetic activity, not being able to do anything or to face 
anybody; fear of going out of the house; a complete inability to function in their day 
- lack of energy; to day lives; seemingly inexplicable feelings of fear and anxietyl 
feeling depressed and hopeless; nightmares; flashbacks to previously traumatic 
events, and acute panic attacks. Though not all of them believed that they were 
mentally ill or suffering with a biological disease, all of them thought that they were 
seriously distressed and in need of some kind of assistance. 
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Issues relating to the predominance of biological explanations; medical 
jargon, and lack of participation, were significant for the eleven women(46%) who 
found a diagnosis to be completely unhelpful to them. A central criticism was that the 
diagnosis did not appear to take into account, or signify in any meaningful way, the 
fact that social and personal issues had caused their mental health problems. Many of 
these women experienced the process of diagnosis as a disempowering one where 
they were being labelled with an illness, so that their distress was seen as pathological 
rather than a logical outcome to a distressing social situation. For example Joy was 
variously diagnosed as manic depressive and as schizophrenic. She said that problems 
in her relationship with her husband were responsible for her distress, but she was 
diagnosed by a psychiatrist as suffering with a biologically induced psychosis. Her 
need for practical and emotional support in dealing with the problems she had in her 
marriage have been ignored by the psychiatrists responsible for treating her. She said: 
"I am not psychiatrically ill but my heart was sore and aching and I did not need 
treatment, I needed comforting and tenderness. I find it impossible to convince my 
psychiatrists that any of these needs are relevant. He believed that I was a manic depressive 
and still am and therefore I need the drugs to cure it .... 
I think there is no such condition as 
manic depressive psychosis, schizophrenia, etcetera, etcetera. I think they are convenient 
labels to describe a set of symptoms which people produce when they are misunderstood. And 
become so misunderstood that they have to resort to a place of safety, an asylum, which 
technically translated means a quiet place in the wood, but is rarely so. " 
Some psychiatrists and GPs utilise, a diagnostic category called exogenous, or 
reactive, depression, which is meant to signify depression which has been caused by 
personal experiences (Corob 1987). Endogenous depression on the other hand is 
meant to signify depression which is purely biologically induced. However previous 
research (Corob 1987) has indicated that many doctors diagnose endogenous 
depression because they do not ask their patients about the events in their lives which 
150 
may have caused the depression. This was a major criticism made by many of the 
women who took part in the study, and was made in relation to a broad range of 
diagnostic categories, not just depression. Many women thought that doctors were 
content only to diagnose and prescribe medication for their symptoms of distress and 
were not willing to talk over with them possible social causes. For example, Gillian 
was diagnosed with endogenous depression when she was admitted to hospital after a 
suicide attempt, because her doctors did not identify any external causes of her 
feelings. Her distress was therefore accorded to a chemical imbalance in her brain and 
she was given psychotropic medication and several courses of electro-convulsive 
therapy. Gillian points out, however, that the reason why she felt so depressed was 
that she was trapped in a violent marriage with three small children, no money and 
nowhere else to go. No one ever asked her about her personal circumstances 
however. Thereafter her husband used the fact that she had been diagnosed as 
mentally ill as a way of further humiliating and abusing her. Gillian's feelings of 
depression were perfectly understandable without recourse to expert medical 
knowledge given the position that she was in at home. Her feelings of distress, which 
included feeling trapped and suicidal in order to escape from her life, were 
nonetheless transformed in the medical process of diagnosis into medical symptoms 
which signified faulty brain functioning. In this way the. cause of Gillian's distress was 
explained back to her by the medical experts as residing in her own brain malfunction. 
This was also explained to her husband, who was exonerated from any role in causing 
Gillian's distress. When Gillian was discharged from hospital the power relations 
between her and her husband were further weighted in his favour, the stigma 
associated with mental health problems being used by him as a means of further 
disempowering her. Gillian attempted to commit suicide soon after her discharge and 
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was admitted to hospital once again. On her return her medical notes were produced 
and her continuing suicidal impulses were seen as further evidence of her endogenous 
depression, which required stronger medication and further courses of ECT. Her 
increased feelings of distress were perceived to be medical symptoms which further 
justified the diagnosis she had been given. This diagnosis also served to divert 
attention from the abusive situation which she was experiencing at home (see also 
chapter five on the experiences of abuse survivors within the system). 
Several women commented that their diagnosis was an inaccessible piece of 
medical jargon and their doctor did not explain in layman's terms what it meant. I 
asked Jade whether she had experienced the psychiatric diagnosis she had been given 
as helpful. She said: 
"Not at all. Because they never went on to explain what exactly they mean. You just 
come away thinking- 'oh my god, I'm mad! ' Not helpful at all, in fact the opposite. They 
come out with some fancy jargon, some name, you know and I'd think bloody hell, you know! 
And I didn't have the courage, the confidence to say 'can you explain what you meanT They 
just say blah blah blah and you think 'oh right' and leave sheepishly. " 
I asked her whether receiving these diagnoses had affected the way she felt 
about herself subsequently. She answered: 
"Yes, yes. I thought I must realiv be mental, you know? " 
Foster (1995) describes how receiving a diagnosis of a mental health problem 
is often unhelpful and can be completely devastating for the women diagnosed. One 
negative outcome is that women may think that they are labelled as mentally ill for 
life. Another is that they may simply not understand the diagnosis which is applied to 
them because their doctor does not explain it. This was certainly the case with Jade, 
as she described above. Like the withholding of information generally, it has been 
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argued that the use of medical jargon helps to maintain a power relationship where 
the doctor is perceived as the possessor of expert knowledge which cannot be 
accessed by the layperson. Thus the layperson becomes wholly dependent upon the 
doctor to interpret symptoms and make diagnoses (Britten 199 1, Banton, Clifford, 
Frosh, Lousada and Rosenthall 1985, Waitz 1979). 
A significant source of dissatisfaction amongst the women was that they were 
not allowed any degree of participation in the diagnostic process. They found it 
disempowering that they were not asked for their views on what had caused their 
mental health problems and their diagnosis was imposed upon them without any 
consultation (beyond asking them about their symptoms). For example, Charlotte 
said that an abusive relationship with a partner was significant in triggering her 
mental ill-health, culminating in her hospitalisation and diagnosis as a manic 
depressive. This diagnosis was imposed upon her however; her psychiatrist did not 
ask her for her views about what had callsed her condition. She has wanted to discuss 
with her psychiatrist the possibility that the domestic violence played a role in causing 
her mental health problems (and the possibility of other causative factors which are 
social in origin), but because she has been diagnosed with manic depression her 
psychiatrist will not entertain the possibility of any psychosocial factors being 
significant in the aetiology of her mental health problems. She said that she cannot 
make too much of a fuss about this and argue the point, because, crucially, being 
argumentative vith the psychiatrist can be used as evidence that she does suffer with 
a biological illness over which she has no control. Thus in this situation she is offered 
only one way to make sense of her problems - the official version - and she is 
constrained to accept it. 
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Issues of validation; the easing of guilt; a lessening of stigma; and self- 
education, were significant factors for the seven women (29%) who reported their 
diagnosis to be helpful to them. Six women (86% of those who had found a diagnosis 
helpful) said that being given a diagnosis represented a validation that they had a 
mental health problem. It provided a welcome acknowledgement that there was 
something significantly wrong. They commented that without the acknowledgement 
represented by a diagnosis they had felt guilty because of their inability to cope 
adequately in their everyday lives. Gail described the relief she felt when, after many 
years of service use, she was finally told of her diagnosis: 
"I really did feel better for it you know-When you're down you blame yourself for 
absolutely everything that happens, you know, bad mother, bad wife, you know you really do. 
You know and you can think this is why I'm feeling like this. You know - it's some sort of 
answer. 
When I asked her about her feelings on being diagnosed as depressed, Wendy 
said 
I think it does help. Because if you're quite depressed and you're not 
communicating, you're not socialising, you feel guilty, you don't know what is going on. But 
if someone says to you, 'you're depressed, you're ill' you can accept that I think, it's easier to 
accept. You don't feel guilty because it's an illness. And sometimes you've got to convince 
yourself of that mind you because you do still feel a bit guilty. But, um, I think it's quite 
useful mind, you say 'yes you've got depression, or you've got anxiety' or whatever you 
know. " 
A diagnosis may be particularly welcomed by some women because it can in 
some circumstances help to relieve them of stressful responsibilities (for example paid 
employment). It also provides an explanation which does not blame the women for 
being unable to properly shoulder these responsibilities. Conceptualising mental 
health problems as a malfunction of the physical body (the brain) means that they are 
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not located as a problem within the 'mind' and so cannot be removed by an effort of 
will 
Three women (Charlotte, Mary and Wendy) all specifically said that having a 
medical diagnosis did not make them more stigmatised, but actually reduced the 
stigma they experienced because their mental health problems were being accorded to 
an illness rather than their own actions. From this it would seem that for some 
women to be perceived as suffering with a severe mental illness is preferable to being 
perceived as being troublesome and badly behaved, because to have an illness means 
that your problem is not your fault. For these women it did seem that the only way to 
explain and understand their mental health problems was either to accord it an illness 
(being mad) or to accord it to a voluntarily chosen attitude (being bad). Both labels 
involve stigma, but the latter for women especially, can be very negative indeed, 
incurring as it does strong feelings of guilt exacerbated by the challenge to gender 
stereotypes which bad behaviour by women entails. 
Foster ( 1995) explains this situation in the following terms: 
"Naturally some women who are suffering extreme distress, for which they can find 
no logical explanation, may actually welcome a medical diagnosis which both explains the 
pain and relieves them of any responsibility for it. Our society may still attach a stigma to 
mental illness but an even greater stigma may be attached to bad behaviour, especially bad 
mothering, for which there is no medical explanation. " (1995: 89) 
Although it may serve to validate a woman's experience of mental distress 
and play a role in easing guilt, there are some drawbacks associated with a diagnosis 
of mental illness which I have not yet addressed. A diagnosis can tend to foster 
dependence as it places the woman squarely within the sick role. Because she is 
perceived as ill a woman service user may not be thought capable of looking after her 
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own children (see section 4.4 for a discussion of the particular problems facing 
women with childcare responsibilities). It can also foster dependence in the sense that 
it makes the service user reliant on medical intervention to treat her condition. 
Medical consultations are essentially asymmetric in character and involve a 
microsocial play of power (Atkinson 1995). The medical doctor is by definition the 
cexpert' in any consultation; service users are not accorded the power of the medical 
professional to define and treat health problems. There is a social distance between 
doctor and patient and an unequal distribution of medical knowledge and resources. 
Psychiatric knowledge lays claim to the status of objectivity and so tends to disqualify 
other discourses which cannot make the same claim (such as service users' own 
views on the causation of their mental health problems). The power relationships 
within the medical encounter can thus subjugate service users' own discourse to that 
of the doctor (Coyle 1999). 
Another significant factor in whether a diagnosis was welcomed by the 
women relates to the issue of education and information. Seven women (29% of the 
women who had received a diagnosis) commented that a medical diagnosis was 
useful because it enabled them to educate themselves about the nature of their 
condition. Receiving the diagnosis presented a welcome opportunity for them to go 
out and gather information on issues relating to the distressing psychological 
disturbances which they had experienced. They thought that a medical diagnosis 
provided the first stepping stone in developing a means of understanding why they 
felt and behaved in ways which they thought were abnormal and distressing, but for 
which previously they had no explanation (thus contradicting the finding made by 
Miederna and Stoppard 1994). With two exceptions, these women had all been 
diagnosed with manic depression and were members of the Manic Depression 
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Fellowship (N4]DF). They had contacted branches of this user group once they had 
been diagnosed and the group had provided them with information relating to the 
condition. These women agreed with the diagnosis they had been given and attributed 
their mental health problems to a biologically based illness, thus concurring with 
analysis provided by the MDF 3. The MDF appeared to be influential in the women's 
understanding of their mental health problems and in their acceptance of psychiatric 
discourse. These women found that the knowledge they had been provided with by 
the MDF had enabled them to actively and assertively engage with the medical 
discourse when discussing their mental health problems with doctors. 
From this data it can be seen that women are not passive participants in the 
medical discourse relating to mental illness. They may engage, resist, struggle, and 
develop alternative discourses (see also chapter five). Feminist researchers have 
indicated that women actively construct as well as interpret the social processes 
constituting their everyday realities (Stanley and Wise 1990, Smith 1988). In terms of 
diagnosis it can be seen that women adopt one discourse over another according to 
its potential to make sense of their experience and also because of the advantages that 
accrue in choosing one discourse over another. However, this is a complex process 
as what is advantageous in one context (for example, because it eases guilt), may 
bring with it distinct disadvantages in others (for example increased dependence on 
medical intervention). 
' The discourse of the MDF resembles very closely that of the dominant medical discourse. 
'Mus manic depression is perceived to be a biologically based mental illness which is 
tnggered' by stress factors in the environment. 
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3.6 Drug Treatment and ECT 
Samson (1995) has demonstrated that there is a clear linkage between the 
hypothesis of the biological aetiology of mental illness and the perceived efficacy of 
physical treatments. The existence of physical treatments which alter biochemistry is 
used by many psychiatrists to validate the hypothesis of the biological causation of 
mental illness (this is a somewhat misleading argument however - see section 1.1). 
In this study thirty three (94%) of the thirty five women I interviewed had 
been prescribed psychiatric medication. One interviewee had not been prescribed 
medication by her GP (the only doctor she had seen) and one had not sought any 
assistance from doctors in dealing with her mental health issues. The medication 
which doctors and psychiatrists have prescribed for the women in the study range 
from antidepressants such as Prozac to major tranquillisers such as chlorpromazine. 
Of the women prescribed medication, eighteen (55%) reported serious side effects 
with the drugs they had been prescribed, but most of these women had not been 
warned of the potential side effects when they were first prescribed the medication. 
The side effects the women reported, ranged from the addictive effects of minor 
tranquillisers like Valium (diazepam), intense drowsiness associated with high doses 
of some antidepressants, to severe interference with the functioning of the nervous 
system, which is associated with major tranquillisers (see also section 1.4). The most 
serious side effect which is induced by psychiatric medication is the disease called 
tardive dyskinesia which is caused by even short courses of treatment with major 
tranquillisers (see also section 1.4). The disease is a chemically induced form of brain 
damage which is similar to Parkinson's disease, and is irreversible and sometimes 
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fatal. Joy said that her fhend, who was also a service user, died of the condition. She 
said 
"If they give a person too much largactil [chlorpromazine] then it kills them, they call 
it tardive dyskinesia. I have witnessed it and I found it one of the most painful things in my 
life. I'm talking about a person whom I loved very much and I begged her not to take the 
tablets but she wanted to because she was ready to die. She was on largactil for about 25 
years. I suspect they put something innocuous on the death certificate such as heart failure or 
something. " 
Joy described the effects of the medication which she was forced to take 
whilst detained in hospital for several years under a section of the Mental Health Act. 
She said- 
"I've taken everything. And I had every side effect possible - sickness, diarrhoea, 
headaches, depression. I only agreed to go on it because my husband made me. I was told by 
a doctor when I was first admitted [to hospitall that if I took haloperidol for six weeks I 
would be right as rain. I tried and tried not to take it and then I was persuaded against my 
best judgement to take it and six weeks turned into six months and they kept on trying to 
shove it down my throat or inject my backside with it and I got more and more sick. " 
There was a significant degree of polypharmacy among the women in the 
research (prescribing more than one drug at a time) despite the fact that multiple 
prescribing and the consequent interaction of drugs is commonly understood to be 
dangerous by psychiatrists. A high rate of polypharmacy was also found in the 
'People First' study carried out by Rogers et al 1993. Multiple prescribing and 
overprescribing was a source of concern for some women in the study, especially 
amongst ex-psychiatric inpatients who described the prevalence of overprescribing on 
hospital wards (see section 6.3). 
"I've seen people on half a dozen drugs at the same time, which is a completely 
illogical way of doing anything because you have no idea which is doing what. And very 
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dangerous. I saw them, other patients, falling down - staggering along because they were 
under such a weight of medication ... The health service creates addicts. If you're not very 
canny and very careful it can induce new diseases. " (Kim) 
The women in the study were broadly divided in how helpful they found the 
medication they had been prescribed. Some thought that it had actually worsened 
their feelings because of the side effects they had experienced. For example several 
women said that minor tranquillisers, had initially been useful, but because of their 
addictiveness they had actually added to their problems over the long term. Several 
women thought that psychotropic medication (particularly antidepressants) had been 
useful in improving the way they felt, despite any side effects which might have been 
incurred by taking them. Other women who had been prescribed antidepressants said 
that the medication had not made any difference at all in the way they felt. Most of 
the women who had been prescribed neuroleptic medication (major tranquillisers) had 
been prescribed them whilst hospital inpatients. I discuss the particular issues relating 
to the over prescribing of medication within the hospital environment in section 6.3. 
Six women (17%) in my study (Gail, Gillian, Heather, Mary, Joy and 
Margaret) had been given ECT. All of those who had had ECT reported serious side 
effects with the treatment, the most worrying of these being long term permanent 
memory loss (see also section 1.3.2). None of them had been informed of the side 
effects of the treatment prior to receiving-it. The women reported that even though 
they had all received the treatment many years ago, they had never recovered their 
memories fully, and have permanently incomplete memories of parts of their past. 
Gillian said that she had found a course of ECT to be useful in lifting her feelings of 
depression, despite the fact that she had encountered severe side effects in terms of 
memory loss. The other women who had received ECT said that it was ineffective in 
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reducing the severity of their symptoms of mental distress, and because of the side 
effects incurred had actually increased feelings of depression. Heather said: 
"They didn't explain about the side effects of the ECT or anythmg... for about a year 
after that I had a terrible pain in the back of my neck and I think of course that was because 
of the spasm that you go into when they give you the shock. And the other thing of course is 
that my memory was very patchy for a long time. The thing I particularly remember about 
that was that a postcard came to the house addressed to me written in a very ftiendly way and 
I just could not remember who this person was and that really upset me. To think that 
someone could be writing to me who knew me and I didn't know them, that I had completely 
lost my memory ... I will never have it [ECTI again. The thing is if something's not 
brought to 
your attention then you won't realise that you've forgotten it. My memory isn't very good 
now. 
Many women in the study complained that drugs and ECT were the only 
treatments they had been offered. They thought that counselling would be effective in 
helping them to deal with their experience of mental ill health. For most of the 
women it was not thought to be straight choice between drug treatment and 
counselling, however. The majority of women in the study thought that drug 
treatment can be useful in controlling their symptoms but they also want assistance to 
address the social issues in their lives which they perceive as either causing or having 
impact upon their mental health problems. They were clearly dissatisfied with the 
'doctor knows best' attitude and would like more information sharing, control over 
the treatment options available to them including the type and strength of the 
medication they are prescribed and access to complementary therapies. This finding is 
echoed by that in the 'People First' study (Rogers et al 1993, Pilgrim 1993) which 
clearly indicates that service users are dissatisfied with the predon-ýnance of physical 
treatments in the mental health system, due to the unwanted side effects of such 
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treatment and the fact that it does not address the social difficulties which many 
service users perceive as significant in their experience of mental ill health. 
Too often service users are reduced to the level of symptom carriers rather 
than being perceived as people who exist and find meaning for their lives within a 
complex network of social relationships. In protesting against this tendency Charlotte 
argued that professionals should: 
"Treat people with a lot more respect as people, take a holistic view of the person 
rather than just symptoms, treating symptoms. Actually take the time to examine what's 
going on in this person's life and what other solutions might be possible. " 
Many of the women who took part in this research reported that they were 
prescribed drugs (and even given ECT) to cope with distress which they identified as 
being caused by social and personal problems, rather than by medical illnesses. This 
tendency to prescribe physical treatments to suppress feelings of distress caused by 
social problems has been indicated in other studies (for example Darton, Gorman and 
Sayce 1994, Barnes and Maple 1992, Curran and Golombok 1985, Ettore 1992, 
Brown and Harris 1978, Brooke and Davis 1985, Chamberlain 1988). The pressures 
of motherhood; domestic violence, sexual abuse; racism; homophobia; and poverty-, 
were some of the social problems which the women in this study described as being 
key in causing their experiences of mental distress (see also sections 4.2 - 4-9). 
Physical treatments such as medication and ECT are therefore being prescribed to 
many women to suppress painful feelings caused by the social situations they have 
encountered. Clearly there is a biological aspect to many conditions of emotional 
distress (Busfield 1996, Breggin and Breggin 1994, - see section 1.1) - this is why 
medication such as antidepressants and tranquillisers can actually work to ease 
painful feelings. However, to concentrate on altering these biological responses to the 
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neglect of the social, personal and political factors which have an impact upon 
women's mental health, leads to some women becoming psychologically and/or 
physically addicted to medication, possibly endangering their health with side effects 
(and even their lives as in the case of major tranquillisers which induce tardive 
dyskinesia). 
Certainly psychotropic medication can be very useful for many women 
because it can provide a temporary respite from what can be the crippling symptoms 
of emotional distress. However in order that it does not become an additional 
problem, at the very least prescription of psychotropic medication should be an 
adjunct to other forms of non-chemical assistance. This assistance may come in the 
form of counselling and psychotherapy for those who request it. Just as important 
however is practical assistance in terms of childcare provision; and information about 
outside agencies which provide free information and advice relating to issues such as 
domestic violence (see chapter five); claiming welfare benefits, and obtaining housing 
allocations. I discuss this in further detail in chapter four concerning issues of 
discrimination within the mental health services, and chapter five concerning the 
specific experiences of women abuse survivors in the system. 
Conclusion 
A diagnosis is made by talking to and observing the behaviour of the patient. 
The patient may complain about thoughts, feelings and/or behaviour which they find 
distressing, or other people may indicate that their behaviour seems odd. In many 
other branches of medicine a hypothesis is developed on the basis of presenting 
symptoms and this is verified by physiological testing. In diagnosing mental illness, 
however, there are no laboratory tests which can be carried out which can verify the 
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presence or absence of a particular mental illness. The diagnosis is made purely on 
the basis of verbal reports and observations of behaviour. Thus communicational 
processes lay at the very heart of the diagnostic procedure. 
Issues relating to objectification, disempowerment and discrin-ýnation (see 
chapter four on issues relating to discrimination) were key in the women's criticisms 
of medical practitioners, particularly psychiatrists. Several women reported that they 
found psychiatrists cold, lacking in empathy and patronising. A particular source of 
concern for the majority of women who had been treated by psychiatrists, was that 
they adopted a 'doctor knows best' attitude and would not allow them involvement 
in decisions relating to their treatment. Psychiatrists were particularly criticised for 
their unwillingness to discuss social and personal issues with their patients. 
The process of diagnosis usually take place within the medical consulting 
room. Thus it is often divorced from the social surroundings which may provide 
alternative meanings for the phenomenon being studied. This lack of social context 
may be one reason why the focus often tends to remains with personal pathology. 
Furthermore, the diagnostic framework used is based on symptom patterns which 
assume an underlying pathology. The process of diagnosis itself is generally perceived 
as a non-social event which aims at uncovering this pathology. Thus mental illness is 
presented as a neutral scientific 'fact' which is investigated by scientific methods of 
observation. However the process of diagnosis is crucially affect by the social 
interaction between the doctor, the patient, and the physical environment in which 
any consultation takes place. 
The exclusive focus upon identifying symptoms in order to make a diagnosis 
and prescribe medication, can tend to have the effect of objectifying service users. 
One outcome of focusing exclusively on personal pathology is that service users' 
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views can tend to be invalidated as meaningful in themselves, and regarded only as 
the symptoms of a mental illness. If a service user disputes their diagnosis, this too 
can be seen as symptomatic of the mental illness with which they have been 
diagnosed. Ignoring the social context of women's everyday lives means that 
women's feelings of distress are often seen as symptomatic of a biologically induced 
illness, rather than as intelligible responses to stressful experiences. Furthermore, 
because practitioners working within the biological model often tend to attribute the 
distress caused by social problems (such as domestic violence and child sexual 
abuse), to the symptoms of a biologically induced illness, it inevitably diverts 
attention from social and political issues within society. I discuss this tendency in 
further detail in chapter five. 
Although the biological model is the dominant approach utilised within 
psychiatry; not all medical practitioners working within the discipline subscribe to a 
strictly biological model of understanding mental health problems (although many do 
- see section 1.1- 1.3). However, many psychiatrists believe that a patient is suffering 
with a biological illness simply because their training has led them to conceptualise 
mental distress in this manner. Medical practitioners and other mental health 
professionals are not trained to consider the effects of social problems and 
interpersonal issues on service users' feelings of emotional distress (Johnstone 1993, 
1989, -see section 1.1- 1.3). A frequent failure by medical practitioners to carry out 
adequate 'detective work', so that appropriate questions are not put to patients to 
ascertain the distressing social experiences which may have caused their mental health 
problems, is one outcome of the dominance of the biological model of mental health 
problems within the statutory mental health services. Thus many doctors may 
diagnose a biological illness in ignorance of the common social experiences which 
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have caused a woman's mental health problems (see also section 5.2 on this issue as 
it relates to women abuse survivors). 
Overall, the women who took part in this study were broadly divided over 
whether they chose to accept or reject the diagnosis they had been given (if indeed 
they had been told one). There is considerable stigma attached to diagnoses of mental 
health problems, especially where these denote psychotic disorders (see section 3.4). 
However, there is also considerable stigma associated with women who break 
dominant gender norms concerning women's behaviour. Thus for many women a 
psychiatric diagnosis provides an explanation for their distress which does not entail 
that they are bad wives, bad mothers or simply troublesome women. What did seem 
to be key in some women's decision to reject the diagnosis which was applied to 
them, was whether they believed that they had an adequate alternative means of 
explaining to themselves and other people why they were suffenng with mental health 
problems which again did not mean that they were 'doing it on purpose' or 'attention 
seeking'. Significantly, the women in the study who had experienced sexual abuse as 
children were more likely as a group to reject the medical diagnoses which had been 
applied to them because broadly they thought that they had an explanation which 
made more sense to them than the one they were being provided with in the 
psychiatric establishment. A growing awareness in society of the prevalence of child 
sexual abuse coupled with a proliferation of self help books, self help groups and 
helplines for survivors of child sexual abuse have provided them with an alternative 
way of conceptualising their mental health status. Amongst the women who did not 
acknowledge child sexual abuse as an issue for them, there were several (including 
some survivors of domestic Violence) who speculated as to what degree social factors 
would have influenced their mental health problems. They were clearly ambivalent 
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about their own mental health status, a situation which many were not happy with as 
they thought that they would like an adequate explanation of why they felt the 
distress they did (see chapter five on further issues relating to women survivors of 
abuse) 
Whether or not the women perceived themselves to be suffering with a 
biological illness; reacting to oppressive social and/or personal circumstances; or 
were confused about the causation of their mental health problems; all of them 
indicated that mental health service delivery should focus on more than the 
prescription of medication. They thought that service providers should take account 
of other factors in their lives, beyond the symptoms of their mental health problems. 
In particular they felt that medical practitioners should pay attention to the whole 
person rather than focusing exclusively on the symptoms of illness. 
In addition, what all of the women said they wanted from service providers 
was assistance in dealing with their mental health problems, as well as some answers 
as to why they were suffering with them in the first place. A lack of information being 
provided by mental health professionals was one of the most frequently mentioned 
criticisms made by the women, however. They thought that they were being 'kept in 
the dark' by many practitioners, either as a result of a conscious decision on the part 
of the professional, or because professionals did not have the time or the inclination 
to provide accessible information concerning their mental health problems. Thus, for 
example, some women complained that they were not told what their diagnosis was 
while others complained that they were told, but that their doctors did not discuss 
with them what the diagnosis actually meant, what had caused it, what were the 
treatment alternatives and what the likely outcome of their condition would be. In 
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addition the majority of women had not been advised of the potential side effects of 
the physical treatments they were prescribed. 
In this study I found that in some cases, experiences of oppression that 
women identified as being key in causing their mental health problems were actually 
repeated within the mental health services themselves. I will discuss this in the 
following chapter in relation to issues of discrimination in the statutory mental health 
services. In chapter five I go on to explore this tendency specifically in relation to the 
experience of women abuse survivors. 
